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summary 
The central problematic of this thesis is the formation of a philosophy of creative 
matter, a philosophical materialism, deriving from the work of Gilles Deleuze and Fdlix Guattari, and based substantially upon an examination of the consequences 
of their engagement with the philosophical tradition. I have supplemented the 
writers used by Deleuze and Guattari with the resources of Giordano Bruno's 
philosophy, as well as numerous examples and arguments from the natural 
sciences. Bruno is particularly important here, in that in his work and life, 
materialism is most tightly bound up with monism. Philosophical materialist 
monism can be crystallised as a sustained meditation upon one problem: that of 
the overcoming of dualism; and in this sense to speak of materialism is to speak of 
the problem of hylomorphism. The hylomorphic model, formalised by Aristotle, and 
operative in both philosophy and science, implies both a transcendent form that 
organises matter, and a dead matter, passively moulded by the imposition of that form. These ontological and epistemological assumptions have clear political and 
theological ramifications, contributing to an abstract diagram of State power. The 
critique of this model calls for a philosophy of active, self-organising matter- a 
necessarily heretical, materialist thought, constitutionally opposed to all 
transcendent powers. 
I In this chapter I produce a performative diagram of DeleuzeGuattari's 
understanding of the heterogenetic nature of the concept by examining those of drive, assemblage, multiplicity. The case used here is the linked complex of 
problems associated with death and entropy. These issues are posed throughout as 
means of indicating Deleuze and Guattari's challenge to dominant modes of 
philosophising. 
II Here I offer an elaboration of Deleuze and Guattari's relationship with 
cybernetics, through an outline of the work of Gilbert Simondon. The principal 
concepts developed here, are individuation and becoming. This is followed by 
extensive critiques of hylomorphism and autopoiesis. The categories of minor or 
nomad, and major or State, sciences, are introduced along with the related concepts 
of following and reproducing. 
III This chapter explores the oppositions between consistency and 
organisation; immanence and transcendence. Here I read two of Deleuze and 
Guattari's key concepts- intensity and incorporeal transformation- in terms of 
Spinoza and Schelling respectively. Symbiosis and morphogenesis are examined as 
examples of the minor sciences introduced in the previous chapter. The minor then 
poses the questions of invention and pragmatics in philosophy. 
IV This chapter is devoted to a critique of Manuel De Landa's reading of 
Deleuze and Guattari that aims to demonstrate, against his claims, the centrality 
of Marx to their philosophy. The chapter also elaborates upon the concepts of 
Geophilosophy, the machinic phylum, and machinic surplus value. 
V This chapter offers a set of elaborations upon the nature of the materialism 
produced by bringing the thought of Giordano Bruno into contact with that of 
Deleuze, thereby transforming both. Inverted vitalism is posed as a key marker of 
Deleuze's genealogy. I show the identity of metaphysics and politics, and its role in 
an account of materialist heresy. 
VI The final chapter consists of a critique of Kant's claim to being `Copernican', 
and Copernicus' claim to being revolutionary. It demonstrates the extent of Bruno's 
cosmological revolution. I use Nietzsche's `perfect nihilist' to further the ideas of 
invention and heresy advanced earlier, to end with a demonstration of philosophy's 
ever present becomings hybrid, as opposed to dominant ideas of its being in a 
permanent state of mourning. 
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introduction 
Philosophy's Mathematical Strain ticket 
it is of course clear why our academic thinkers are not 
dangerous; for their thoughts grow as peacefully out of 
tradition as any tree ever bore its apples: they cause no alarm, 
they remove nothing from its hinges; and of all their art and 
aims there could be said what Diogenes said when someone 
praised a philosopher in his presence: `How can he be 
considered great, since he has been a philosopher for so long 
and has never yet DISTURBED anybody? ' That, indeed, ought 
to be the epitaph of university philosophy: `it disturbed 
nobody'. 
(Nietzsche 1983 194)' 
Most materialists, even though they may have wanted to do 
away with all spiritual entities, ended up positing an order of 
things whose hierarchical relations mark it out as specifically 
idealist. They situated dead matter at the summit of a 
conventional hierarchy of diverse facts, without perceiving that 
in this way they gave into an obsession with the ideal form of 
matter, with a form that was closer than any other to what 
matter should be. Dead matter, the pure idea, and God. 
(Bataille 1 179) 
I 
If out of the multiplicitous, polyvocal and heterogeneous corpus of 
Deleuze and Guattari's thought one can isolate a defining characteristic 
it would be the relentless attempt to construct a series of dynamic 
maps, of immanent forces and constitutive relations, of trackings of 
lines of power and affect. The combination of these terms in Deleuze 
and Guattari's thought indicates a revolt against philosophy as the 
system of judgement and principles, an advocacy of "a logic of sense 
and the event, and not [ ... ]a logic of predication and truth" (Deleuze 
1969/90 151/111), so that in every area of concrete enquiry, one is 
confronted with an infinitely growing set of immanent explorations set 
in motion, and constituted by drives. Slavoj Zizek notes that the 
introduction of a concept of drive (by Freud for Zizek), guarantees 
"radical immanence" (Zizek 1997 84). This connection between 
immanence and drive appears at numerous points, in several guises in 
Deleuze's work related variously to Spinoza's conatus, Nietzsche's will 
to power, Bruno's creative power of matter. Etienne Balibar, in a 
remarkable article articulating two thinkers, central to Deleuze's 
thinking but not usually related-- Spinoza and Simondon- has also 
expressed this commitment, argued here to be common to all of the 
figures in Deleuze's genealogy, not just the two to which Balibar applies 
it. Commenting on the underlying perspective of immanence in both 
Leibniz and Spinoza, by which, Balibar writes "any individual can be 
singularised only under the effect of its own inner activity, which can be 
conceived as some `force' (conatus), some `energy' (vis), some `tendency' 
(appetitus), or some `desire' (cupiditas) to realise all its possibilities" 
(Balibar 1993 32). The different forms of this concept of drive will be 
continually returned to throughout this work, and in one sense hold it 
Philosophy's Mathematical Straitjacket 
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together, it is dealt with at greatest length in the first chapter dealing 
with Deleuze's complex, multifaceted deployment of the concept of the 
death drive; and in the fifth, which stages an engagement between 
themes in Deleuze and in Giordano Bruno. The concept will have to 
pass here without lapidary definition, indeed as with all of Deleuze and 
Guattari's concepts, it is characterised by its resistance to such 
definitions, it being constituted only through use, through its immanent 
emplacement in specific concrete assemblages. Hence the concept has 
no definition, only sense or productive tffect. It is for this reason that it 
is insisted that philosophy is neither a closed system, a totality, nor is it 
a jigsaw puzzle, its pieces having neat edges that can be exactly fitted 
together in one way and one way only, rather it is an assemblage of ill 
fitting, sometime overlapping machine parts each of which has no 
single purpose, but is combined with other such parts only in response 
to a particular question. In a sense Bataille's attack on the dictionary 
applies particularly well to philosophy as practised by DeleuzeGuattari. 
Bataille writes that "a dictionary begins when it no longer gives the 
meanings of words but their tasks C... ] Philosophy has no other aim 
than fitting all that exists into a straitjacket, a mathematical 
straitjacket" (Bataille I 217). This straitjacket, composed variously of 
Platonic forms, Kantian categories, "the judgements of god", is what 
Deleuze and Guattari's thought attempts to relinquish. It is to this end 
that Deleuze introduces the idea of plasticity, initially with regards to 
the place of will to power within the formation of a superior empiricism, 
the reconciliation of principles with empiricism. A "plastic principle [is 
one that] is no wider than what it conditions, that changes itself with 
the conditioned and determines itself along with what it determines", as 
Philosophy's Mathematical Straitjacket 
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such the plasticity of concepts is an index of their immanence, or 
flatness, with that which they determine; a plastic concept "is never 
superior to the ways that it determines a relation between forces, it is 
always plastic and changing" (Deleuze 1983 50). 
Faultling 
In the Logic of Sense Deleuze makes it clear that he considers 
philosophy to be organised around a fundamental faultline "established 
between those who linked sense to a new transcendence, a new avatar 
of God and a transformed heaven, and those who found sense in man 
and his abyss, a newly excavated depth and underground" (Deleuze 
1969/90 98/71). The presentation of this critique is important, for it is 
cast as a distant precursor of a central concept of Deleuze and 
Guattari's final joint work, What is Philosophy?, that of the conceptual 
persona. Here we are presented with the idea of an `effect', as a bearer 
of sense, we are offered the examples of effects in science and medicine, 
in which an "effect is [... ] designated by a proper name", or a disease 
named for the doctor who elaborates its symptoms. In What is 
Philosophy?, this idea is returned to, to give form to the creative 
imperative of philosophy, the demand that the philosopher "completely 
changes the image of thought" (Deleuze and Guattari 1990/94 63/65). 
To return now to the critique, Deleuze goes on to give two, perhaps 
three, thinly veiled, examples of philosophers on the former side of his 
faultline, the first obviously is Kant, since whom Nietzsche writes: 
"transcendentalists [... ] have been emancipated from the theologians: 
what joy! -- Kant showed them a secret path by which they may, on 
Philosophy's Mathematical Straitjacket 
4 
their own initiative and with all scientific respectability, from now on 
follow their `heart's desire' (Nietzsche 1969 III § 25). This Kant is, for 
Deleuze, the perpetrator of a new theology and a new humanism, 
pacing beneath the "misty sky [... ] of Königsberg" (Deleuze 1969/90 
98/71), and in whom "both God and the I underwent a practical 
resurrection" (Deleuze 1968/94 117/87). The second philosophical 
persona, author of the second philosophical effect, is perhaps 
Heidegger. The latter will, in What is Philosophy? be called the "strict 
professor [ ... ] perhaps madder than he seemed", for whom "sense is 
presented as Principle, Reservoir, Reserve, Origin [... ] said to be 
fundamentally forgotten or veiled [... ] deeply erased, diverted and 
alienated" (Deleuze 1969/90 99/72). We might also hear in this the 
sound of a Derrida, especially when written in 1969, for he had recently 
published the trilogy of works, Of Grammatology, Writing and 
Difference, and Speech and Phenomena, all in 1967, in which he would 
seek to place transcendental principles sous rature (or under erasure). 
The trenchant critique of Derrida and his rhetoric of presence continues 
along two lines - and this passage alone should serve as rebuke to the 
many commentators who seek to impose common purpose on the 
respective positions of Derrida and Deleuze- first, to suggest that 
beneath the "erasure and the veil, we are summoned to rediscover and 
to restore meaning, in either a God which was not well understood, or in 
a man not fully fathomed" (Deleuze 1969/90 99/72). And second, by 
offering sketches of how Deleuze will read two figures who are of great 
importance to Derrida, that is Nietzsche and Freud, in ways that are 
totally antithetical to him. The form of the distancing from the current 
reading is clear and emphatic, for with regards to both Nietzsche and 
Philosophy's Mathematical Straitjacket 
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Freud, Deleuze writes that "We do not seek in" Nietzsche, Freud, a 
prophet of reversal and transcendence, schemas for interpretation 
respectively (Deleuze 1969/90 99/72). 
Whilst most contemporary philosophies have adopted variants of 
Derrida's textualism, embodied in his declaration il n'y a pas de ýotvjt-*K, 
texte, Deleuze and Guattari have simultaneously retrieved, and 
invented, a distinctive tradition of materialist thought, one that stakes 
itself upon the following of "matter in movement, in flux, in variation, 
matter as a conveyor of singularities and traits of expression" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 509/409). The specific details of this materialism 
of immanence are further worked out throughout the thesis and in 
particular in the treatment of the critique of hylomorphism in chapter 
two. Whilst the Kantian critical revolution is conventionally taken to be 
the foundation of modernity, an assumption that is severely criticised 
here in the chapter dedicated. to Giordano Bruno, it is a modernity 
harbouring the covert mission of a "renovated theology" (Deleuze 1983 
93). This mission, clearly marked from its inception by a legislated 
repugnance for Spinozism, did of course have dissenters, and in the 
immediately post-Kantian period, one of the most notable of them was 
Friedrich von Schelling. One of the themes running through this thesis, 
then, is the location of Deleuze and DeleuzeGuattari's work in what I 
describe as a tradition of heretical materialism, a tradition that is not 
just heretical vis a vis mainstream, or State philosophy, but also 
heretical with regards to the image of materialism constructed for it by 
that State philosophy. The characteristics of this heretical tradition 
will be explicated continually, and I will not attempt to summarise it 
Philosophy's mathematical Straitjacket 
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here. Needless to say it includes those names familiar from Deleuze's 
own work, but is supplemented by two significant others: Giordano 
Bruno and F. W. J. Schelling, two writers who have traditionally neither 
been accorded a place within materialism, nor have they been 
discussed in relation to Deleuze2. The images assigned to these writers, 
that of Hermetic magician (Yates 1964), and "the last great 
representative of anthropomorphic, prescientific theosophy" (Zizek 
1996 7) respectively will have to be dispelled, and their ground 
dismantled. 
Schelling's work represents a massive attempt to engage with both 
Spinoza, and importantly for this thesis, with Giordano Bruno (going so 
far as to name one of his dialogues in the latter's honour, the 1802 
Bruno, oder über das göttliche und naturliche Prinzip der Dinge), the 
grounds for this engagement is the need to move beyond Kantianism, 
and principally with a need to overcome the vast distance that the 
Kantian system had opened up between man and the rest of the 
cosmos. Hence Schelling's critique of what he sees as the lack of "the 
requisite humility", in what is clearly meant to be Kantianism, which 
insists upon "beginning everything straight away with the highest 
concepts and bypassing the mute beginnings of all life [... ] this 
overhasty nature that would rather bedazzle from the very start with 
spiritual concepts and cliches than descend to the natural beginnings of 
every life" (Schelling 1997 148). Spinozism in its various 
manifestations is taken, in this thesis, principally as a sign for a 
thought of active matter, or hylozoism, hence a thought of immanence, 
and as the principal means of making man into an active part of 
Philosophy's Mathematical Straitjacket 
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nature. It is in the name of a Spinozism that Deleuze and Guattari 
create a philosophy that is a positive discipline, in contradistinction to 
its two dominant characterisations, it is neither the Lockean under 
labourer nor the Kantian prescriber of limitations; as such it has a 
positive, creative task, governed by the recognition that "there is no 
other truth than the creation of the New: creativity, emergence" 
(Deleuze 1985/89 191/147), and by the Nietzschean demand to make 
philosophy experimental (Nietzsche 1974 § 110). This positive task of 
philosophy is defined on occasion by Deleuze and Guattari as the 
invention of concepts, or of multiplicities (this sense of invention will be 
continually explicated throughout this thesis). These concepts are 
possessed of two dominant characteristics: immanence and 
transversality. 
Deleuze and Guattari's approach resonates with Schelling's critique of 
the top-down tendencies in philosophy that he rejected in favour of his 
wonder that: "Even the smallest grain of sand must contain 
determinations within itself that we cannot exhaust until we have laid 
out the entire course of nature leading up to it" (Schelling 1997 122). It 
is these multiple, heterogeneous becomings that constitute 
DeleuzeGuattari's field of study: "multiplicities, lines, strata and 
segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machinic assemblages 
and their various types, bodies without organs and their construction 
and selection" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/8711/4). 
What these objects hold in common is their character of being always 
already multiple, already differential, they cannot be plotted as points 
Philosophy's Mathematical Straitjacket 
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but rather must be diagrammed, with attention paid not to points but 
to the lines between the points; and as Deleuze has said of these lines, 
"lines aren't things running between two points; points are where 
several lines intersect" (Deleuze 1990/95 222/161). In so far as both 
Nietzsche and Spinoza are philosophers who affirm the one, and who 
affirm the multiple within this one, this project is distinctly marked by 
them. For both, to parallel the preference alluded to above, the most 
amazing question is not that of the soul or spirit which "seems to me to 
be actually a life-endangering, life-caluminating, life-denying principle" 
(Nietzsche 1968 § 644) but that of the body. As Deleuze writes, of a 
body "we will not define [it] by its form, nor by its organs and its 
functions, nor as a substance or a subject [... ] we will define it by 
longitude and latitude" (Deleuze 1988b 127; Spinoza 1985 E IIP13L1). 
The former, longitude, indicates a mode of defining a body by "the set of 
relations of speed and slowness, of motion and rest, between particles 
that compose it from this point of view"; whilst, latitude is "the set of 
affects that occupy a body at each moment". The two taken together 
constitute a map. The centrality of cartographic strategies to the 
DeleuzoGuattarian project is fundamental, allied as it is, to the 
intensive working out of the concept of the machinic. The radicality of 
this aspect of their work is too often understressed (whilst that of 
Spinoza's is ignored or subject to massive distortion). The reading that I 
am proposing here exposes the failure to properly mark the subaltern 
path, the heretical materialist path, out of the currently canonised 
philosophical tradition indicated by the way in which Deleuze and 
Guattari mobilise Spinoza. The reading of Spinoza initiated by Deleuze, 
and furthered in the joint works with Guattari, indicates a massive 
Philosophy's Mathematical Straitjacket 
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critique of ontology. The Spinoza offered here, though materialist, is far 
from the determinism attributed to him by orthodox readings, his 
matter is not the dead, brute force of the hylomorphic scheme, but the 
site of intensive individuation. Spinoza's construal of the body, of 
materiality, is not of a homogeneous mass but a concatenation of 
differential forces, "distinguished from one another by reason of motion 
and rest, speed and slowness, and not by means of substance" (Spinoza 
1985 E IIP13L1). 
This thesis, a contribution to a Schizogenealogy of heretical 
materialism, attempts to survey the history of philosophy, scanning it 
for those moments where philosophy invents new concepts that 
contest the story that philosophy tells of itself. We shall see how these 
events occur where matter erupts into a State philosophy beholden to 
transcendence and theology. In this way, political-philosophical heresy 
is shown to be ineluctably and constitutively tied to materialism, and 
not just to any materialism, but to a materialism on the side of matter, 
and its self-organisation, a materialism that refuses the image foisted 
upon it by transcendence. As Bataille shows in the epigram above, 
most materialism has been idealist insofar as it "situated dead matter 
at the summit of a conventional hierarchy" and so "gave into an 
obsession with the ideal form of matter" (Bataille 1179). Bataille has 
sketched this scheme in the lecture included as an appendix here, 
indicating how, following its theological framework, philosophy has 
evaluated matter as evil or inert. By reclaiming those moments where 
this scheme is challenged we gain new conceptual weapons to be 
utilised in the Kampfplatz that is contemporary philosophy. 
Philosophy's Mathematical Straitjacket 
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ntronic Tendencies: Nomoloeical Processes, Death. 
DeleuzoGuattariau P ar ctice 
It is absurd to speak of a desire for death that would oppose 
itself qualitatively to the desires for life. Death is not desired, 
there is only death that desires, by virtue of the body without 
organs or the immobile motor, and there is also life that 
desires, by virtue of the working organs. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 393/329) 
every time a line of flight turns into a line of death, we don't 
invoke an internal drive like the death instinct [instinct de 
mort], but again an assemblage of desire that puts into play an 
objectively or extrinsically definable machine. 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1977 171)3 
Artaud expresses the multiplicity of fusion, fusionability as 
infinite zero, the plane of consistency, Matter where there are 
no gods; principles as forces, essences, substances, elements, 
remissions, productions; manners of being or modalities as 
produced intensities, vibrations, breaths, Numbers. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 196/158) 
We are not invoking any kind of death drive [pulsion de mort]. 
There are no internal drives in desire, only assemblages. 
Desire is always assembled; it is what the assemblage 
determines it to be. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 280/229) 
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The principal concern of this chapter is to make a deviation through 
DeleuzeGuattari's work, not to engage in a direct exposition of their 
various dicta, statements etc. upon the field of problems indexically 
located under the heading, `death': an entity treated either as a 
transcendental problem in the field of philosophy, or as an object of 
ethical speculation around which a series of bons mots or ethical 
statements circulate. 
Rather, the concern is with the relationship between one construction 
of death- principally that found in Freud's 1920 account of the death 
drive, or rather one swathe of problems in which death figures, as a 
predicate of materiality- and the explosion of this figure into the 
expansion of DeleuzoGuattarian procedures, understood as an entirely 
novel development within a certain philosophical materialism. The 
figure of death then is demonstrated to be an extraordinarily productive 
resource for the invention of the specific problems that mark out 
DeleuzeGuattari's philosophical territory. 
Ever since its Kantian fixing- or more precisely its Husserlian fixing 
as an appearance to consciousness as fact- as the form of the 
transcendental question, death has played out its role within humanist 
philosophy as the figure of the noumenal. This noumenalisation is the 
deep conceptual reason why death has been relegated to the realm of 
ethics. However, in emphasising the double aspect of death, after 
Blanchot, Deleuze has made those aspects of death that have 
traditionally been considered `noumenal' to be the source of a profound 
meditation on the `event' of death; and has shown, as Foucault pointed 
Entropic Tendencies: Nomological Processes 
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out, death to be the very form of the event (see Foucault 1977 173). To 
remain within the framework of the Neo-Kantian liberalism that 
dominates both wings of contemporary philosophy, that is to say the 
phenomenological or deconstructive, and the analytic, is to continue 
mistaking death for a personal limit. This is to continue treating death 
as an empirical fact discussed within a discourse distinguished, if by 
nothing else, than by its pieties and by the obfuscation of what can only 
be described as a reconfigured religiosity. To evade this tradition means 
to investigate the resources of materialism: roughly a line stretched 
out- as has been said- between Bruno, Spinoza, a non-Oedipal Freud, 
and the work of DeleuzeGuattari. 
Finally, this chapter is, in part intended as a performative illustration 
of the heterogenetic and immanent character of the concept in 
DeleuzeGuattari's work. Deleuze speaks of the assemblage as the 
bringing into relationship of disparate singularities, of elements from 
heterogeneous series Here the principal concepts are intensity, drive, 
multiplicity, and far from being imposed, an attempt is made to extract 
them from the material examined. In this case the line followed is that 
of death and its figuring in a range of disciplines from Freud's non- 
Oedipal, or pulsional work, to the development of thermodynamics from 
a linear entropic narrative promising an apocalypse given in the Heat 
Death of the universe, to its development into an account of infinite 
productive complexity. 
Entropic Tendencies: Nomological Processes 
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Pulsion&d Freud, Oedipal Freud 
Deleuze, and DeleuzeGuattari's various treatments of the concept of 
the death drive constitute a complex, multi-dimensional diagram of a 
heterogeneous terrain. Notionally the concept is constructed and 
deployed within the field of psychoanalysis. Here, its position in a series 
of different disciplines is examined, and its place amongst the governing 
figures of Deleuze and Guattari's construction of libidinal or energetic 
materialism is explicated. As a point of scholarly rectitude it might also 
be worth noting that the specific figure of the drive in Deleuze has an 
ur-source in his treatment of the Spinozist conatus, a doctrine which if 
it mobilises nothing else in DeleuzoGuattarian thinking, mobilises the 
thinking of the Body without Organs. The BwO in the twin volumes of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia is always associated with Spinoza, it is 
not for nothing that the Ethics is named as the "great book of the BwO" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 190/153); it is further invoked as a 
weapon against any humanist, therapeutic or interpretative use of the 
death drive. This is meant in the fashion of Logic of Sense -- and this is 
the principal critique of Freud in the Anti-Oedipus- that what is 
sought in Freud is not that he be "an explorer of human depth and 
originary sense" but rather "the prodigious discover of the machinery of 
the unconscious" (Deleuze 1969/90 100/72). Hence for DeleuzeGuattari 
it is always a question of sense and not meaning, of production and not 
representation, the factory of the unconscious rather than the theatre 
of representation (Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 31/24). This latter 
disastrous shift, marking the replacement of the pulsional, materialist 
Freud, with "a new brand of idealism" is dated to the introduction of 
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Oedipus, and as the title of Deleuze and Guattari's first book makes 
abundantly clear: it is a polemic Anti, against, Oedipus. 
The death drive predates Oedipus. However, the Manichean struggle 
between Eros and Thanatos, will not be seen as a means of deriving a 
master schema for psychodramas, but will be placed within the 
complexity of a thinking of force, tendency, intensity and matter. 
Freud's `Beyond the Pleasure Principle' of 1920, where "he engaged 
most directly- and how penetratingly- in specifically philosophical 
reflection" (Deleuze 1989 111), as well as being the locus classicus of the 
death drive occupies a privileged position in the thermodynamic 
discourse of the subject, in the materialist energetic Freud. 
Consequently, it has a critical role to play in DeleuzeGuattari's 
production. 
It is free action, however, which by its essence unleashes 
the power of repetition as a machinic force that multiplies 
its effect and pursues an infinite movement [... ] Traits of 
expression describing a smooth space and connecting it with 
a matter-flow thus should not be confused with striae that 
convert space and make it a form of expression that grids 
and organises matter (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 
622/498) 
To examine the multiple status of the death drive and the series of 
questions that it opens up in Deleuze's work, in particular as it appears 
in Freud's `Beyond the Pleasure Principle', will take us back to some of 
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Deleuze's earliest texts, principally Coldness and Cruelty, The Logic of 
Sense, and Difference and Repetition, all of which contain lengthy and 
detailed treatments of this area. We will also attempt to follow this 
thread in the multiple tracks it carves through the collaborative twin 
volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
The death drive constitutes a paradigmatic diagram- understood as 
"the presentation of pure relations between forces or the transmission 
of' singularities (Deleuze 1988a 82)4- of what DeleuzeGuattari 
describe as Noology, "the study of images of thought, and their 
historicity" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 466/376). How, it is asked, 
does the death drive connect with "the forces of the outside" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 467/377)? What kind of war machine is mobilised 
by putting the death drive in to the centre of the DeleuzoGuattarian 
project? 
Death. Twice 
First a warning: in spite of metaphorical temptations and disciplinary 
pressures, all too common in the `critical' literature, we must beware of 
settling for Freud's understanding in `Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in 
which the death drive is flattened to a "return to inanimate matter" 
(Deleuze 1968/94 137/104). Deleuze thinks this so important that he 
repeats the warning elsewhere: we must not accept a picture of 
death 
and of the drives in which it is read as a "tendency towards increasing 
entropy or a return to inanimate matter" (Deleuze 1968/94 333/259). 
Freud, coming only superficially close to Spinoza's conatus writes of the 
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"universal endeavour of all living substance- namely to return to the 
quiescence of the inorganic world" (Freud 1920 267). As Deleuze makes 
clear, the problem with the Freudian model is that it remains 
"inseparable from the positing of an ultimate term, the model of a 
material and bare repetition and the conflictual dualism between life 
and death" (Deleuze 1968/94 137/104). Not least of the problems with 
this model is its completely inadequate dualist understanding of both 
life and death. Against the Freudian model we must insist that the 
difference between "death as an empirical event and death as an 
`instinct' or transcendental instance" (Deleuze 1968/94 149ff/112fi) be 
maintained, hence, contra Freud who restricts his model of death to a 
purely physical entropic model, Deleuze seeks to add a noncorporeal 
account, an account of death as an event. Whereas Freud restricts 
death to "the return of the living to inanimate matter" giving death 
"only an extrinsic, scientific and objective definition" (Deleuze 1968/94 
147/111), and thus refuses death any other dimension. Deleuze seeks to 
restore this other dimension to death by making a distinction, following 
Blanchot, between a `personal' and an `impersonal' death. This first is 
the one to which Freud is restricted; Deleuze, on the other hand, seeks 
to pursue the second, impersonal death, "the other face, or aspect of 
death" which "refers to the state of free differences when they are no 
longer subject to the form imposed upon them by an I or ego, when they 
assume a shape which excludes my own coherence no less than that of 
any identity whatsoever" (Deleuze 1968/94 149/113). Curiously, 
Freud's essay contains the germ of such an account, but leaves it 
separate and unintegrated. Herein lies the problem, for Freud does not 
integrate the account of the death drive, the account of cosmic entropic 
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linear time (chronos), with the central section of the essay: the 
introduction, in the account of the fort-da game, of repetition, the 
account of local cyclic time (aion), the time of complexity and of the 
eternal return. Repetition "as conceived by Freud's genius is in and of 
itself a synthesis of time- a `transcendental' synthesis. It is at once 
repetition of before, during and after, that is to say it is a constitution in 
time of the past, the present and even the future" (Deleuze 1989115). 
Deleuze's account of death as event is perhaps best summed up in his 
last published piece, the moving `L'immanence: une vie... ', a Lucretian 
dismissal of the fear of death (Lucretius 1947 3 830). Deleuze writes 
that "Between life and death, there is a moment which is no longer just 
that of a life playing with death. An individual life gives way to a life 
which, impersonal yet nevertheless singular, extricates a pure event 
from the vicissitudes of the interior and exterior life, that is to say from 
the subjectivity and objectivity from which it comes [... ] It is a 
haecceity, which is no longer individuation, but singularisation: a life of 
pure immanence" (Deleuze 1995 5). The achievement of Deleuze's 
reworking of Freud's account of the death drive such that it is able to 
incorporate a death on the side of repetition, apart from making it 
consistent with the new non-linear thermodynamics, is to demonstrate 
the truly great philosophical depth of Freud's essay- the recognition of 
the synthesis of time given in repetition. It also enables us to 
reconsider, on a renewed materialist basis a philosophical question that 
up to now has been considered only in terms of a Derridean and 
Lacanian `petrification' (Guattari 1995 74) of Freud as a reader of 
texts. That is the question of iterative afterwork, Nachträglichkeit. In 
Entropie Tendencies: Nomological Processes 
18 
Deleuze this question is explicitly posed in opposition to the readings of 
Freud defended by Derrida and Lacan. Deleuze's major discussion of the 
question opens thus: "the question of whether psychic experience is 
structured like a language", as in Lacan's famous formulation, "or even 
whether the physical world may be regarded as a book" (Deleuze 
1968/94 160/122), as in Derrida's all consuming textualismb. For 
Deleuze, both of these questions are subject to the tyranny of the 
signifier and the pursuit of an originary presence, and both can be 
critiqued from a position suspended between Freud and Nietzsche. As 
we have seen and as we shall see throughout this thesis, Deleuze's 
incorporeal materialism is predicated upon a difference-in-itself, 
according to Gilbert Simondon's principle that "ontogenesis [the process 
of individuation, EA] becomes the point of departure of philosophical 
thought; it really will be first philosophy", and so contrary to Levinas' 
claim that ethics is first philosophy; in this perspective "ontogenesis 
precedes ontology" (Simondon 1989 163). This is the ground for a 
rejection of there being any original ground of plenitude to which we can 
return or a telos to which we are heading, or equally of a truth that we 
can discovers. Rather, Deleuze's world governed by the eternal return, 
the groundless `law' of a world which is a "monster of energy" "excludes 
the assignation of an originary and a derived as though there were a 
first and second occurrence, because the sole origin is difference [... ] the 
absence of any assignable origin- in other words, the assignation of 
difference as the origin" (Deleuze 1968/94164/125). 
Nonetheless, an association of the Death Drive- a force dragging 
bodies (in the wide Spinozist sense) towards death, dissolution and 
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dissipation in an undifferentiated energetic soup-- with the irreversible 
tendency of the Second Law of Thermodynamics is a necessity, for 
DeleuzeGuattari insist that the unconscious belongs to the realm of 
physics "the body without organs and its intensities are not metaphors, 
but matter itself" (Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 336/283). However, 
the complex, and now complexified, structure of nonlinear 
thermodynamics allows for a stratification of the dimension of time, we 
can integrate local repetitive cycles (the cycle of the fort-da game) with 
an exponential movement towards maximal entropy (Thanatos). The 
critical distinction running just beneath the surface of this enquiry is 
that between telos (and its contemporary definition as teleonomy) and 
tendency. The stating of this distinction here has the specific purpose of 
disengaging acceptance of a thermodynamic framework from the 
millenialist craving for a revelation (apocalypsis) of the truth of the 
world, Wiener's universal Ragnarök (Wiener 1950 32) that were, as we 
shall see, attendant upon it in the nineteenth century. This needs to be 
stated more strongly and in two distinct ways. First, by seeking, albeit 
indirectly, to answer, and also to investigate the role played by, 
Deleuze's linked questions as to why Nietzsche was "interested in the 
energetics of his time" to "discover what it was that he sought to find in 
the science of intensive quantities" (Deleuze 1968/94 313/243)? And 
further to discover "what Nietzsche means by noble" in the context of 
his borrowing "the language of energy physics and call[ing] noble that 
energy which is capable of transforming itself" (Deleuze 1968/94 60/41, 
also 1983 42 and 55)? Investigating and answering these questions can 
only be done by providing a philosophical account, culled 
from a 
Nietzschean and Deleuzian perspective, in which elements of 
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thermodynamics are deployed in a resolutely anti-teleological fashion, 
analyses of such sort being rejected as indissolubly theological. Second, 
scientifically, with an examination of more recent interpretations of 
thermodynamics, principally Prigogine's nonlinear refinements which 
places it beyond mechanistic interpretations, such that entropy 
becomes an index of complexity. 
Final States, Eternal Processes 
Philosophical critiques of mechanism however, long predate the 
scientific, principally being found in a tradition threaded from Bruno to 
Schelling, thence to Nietzsche and Deleuze. As Nietzsche, echoing 
Schelling almost verbatim who is in turn echoing Bruno, repeatedly 
stresses, "if the motion of the world aimed at a final state, that state 
would have been reached [... 1 the world as a circular movement that 
has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game in 
infinitum" (Nietzsche 1968 § 708,1066). Theses positing a beginning or 
end, whether it be the account of Genesis, or a Big Bang, the Day of 
Judgement, or the Heat Death of the universe are born from the same 
theological source'. As noted, Nietzsche's critique of any thesis that 
posits an end, at the same time of mechanism (ie. reversibility), is an 
echo of Schelling's, couched in the question "Has creation a final goal? 
And if so, why was it not reached at once? " Elsewhere Schelling has a 
stunning rejection of mechanism: "If, as a few supposed sages have 
claimed, the world were a chain of causes and effects that ran 
backward and forward to infinity, then there would in truth be neither 
past nor future. But this nonsensical thought should rightly have 
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vanished along with the mechanistic system to which alone it belongs" 
(Schelling 1997 120). Indeed Spinoza is quite clear in the astonishing 
Appendix to the first part of the Ethics --- an Appendix that deserves to 
be recognised as the true precursor to the critique of ideology and 
theological unreason, the "asylum of ignorance", and of the power- 
knowledge complex- that "not many words will be required to show 
that Nature has no end set before it, and that all final causes are 
nothing but human fictions" (Spinoza 1985 EI appendix). This part of 
Spinozism is important in the way in which it connects to a key thread 
in the materialism adhered to, and developed by, DeleuzeGuattari. That 
is the critique of mechanist or determinist materialism, a telling 
symptom of this for example is the complete absence in 
DeleuzeGuattari's work of any reference to Eighteenth century French 
materialism (La Mettrie, Holbach) which is perhaps, along with 
Stalinism, the zenith of such a determinism, a materialism of 
clockwork, and critically of a dead matter. This is the materialism 
that, as we have seen, Bataille castigates in the following precise terms: 
Most materialists, even though they may have wanted to 
do away with all spiritual entities, ended up positing an 
order of things whose hierarchical relations mark it out as 
specifically idealist. They situated dead matter at the 
summit of a conventional hierarchy of diverse facts, 
without perceiving that in this way they gave into an 
obsession with the ideal form of matter, with a form that 
was closer than any other to what matter should be. Dead 
matter, the pure idea, and God (Bataille I 179) 
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Developing a position out of their varied resources, Deleuze and 
Guattari's diagramming approach attempts to produce a rigorous 
method with regard to the selection of problems: tendential 
developments understood as intensity shifts (becoming, process). The 
axis here is that produced, in Michel Serres' words, by "the theoretical 
reconciliation between information theory and thermodynamics [that] 
favours and advocates the practical reconciliation between those funds 
of knowledge which exploited signs and those which exploited energy 
displacements" (Serres 1977/82 270/81). The importance of this 
synthesis is to allow for the introduction of what I have described above 
as a massive plasticity, or fluidity into the way in which we are able to 
manipulate concepts. The importance of Serres' work for 
DeleuzeGuattari is inestimable, implicated as it is on the base level of 
the series of distinctions clustered around the `royal', the `nomad' or the 
`minor' (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 446/361), and more specifically 
for their consistent engagement with a series of questions derived from 
the manifold deployment of thermodynamics. This deployment allows 
for the introduction of a series of inquiries related to irreversibility, 
probability, population, complexity. 
Prigoirine's Citiaue 
"The cosmologists had predicted an eventual heat-death for 
the universe (something like Limbo: form and motion 
abolished, heat-energy identical at every point in it); the 
meteorologists, day-to-day, staved it off by contradicting 
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19875) 
The possibility of a thermodynamics no longer limited to the end-game 
scenario of its nineteenth century incarnation was opened up by the 
work of the physicist Ilya Prigogine in the 1960 s. Prigogine's 
breakthrough came from his development of a non-linear 
thermodynamics, and his research on `dissipative structures' which 
resulted in an account of the production of order out of chaos in open 
systems far from equilibrium: self-organisation. His innovation, well 
summed up by Capra, was to move beyond the framework of classical 
thermodynamics in which "the dissipation of energy in heat transfer, 
friction, and the like was always associated with waste. Prigogine's 
concept of a dissipative structure introduced a radical change in this 
view by showing that in open systems dissipation becomes a source of 
order" (Capra 1996 88-9). In this way, Prigogine's work appears as the 
physical confirmation of the concept of excess that Bataille had 
audaciously elaborated in his work on the general solar economy in the 
Accursed Share. Prigogine, in a reversal of the classical evaluation, 
shows how prodigious excess is productive, rather than wasteful 
(similarly, an important finding of symbiogenetic biology is that `germs', 
should not just be understood as bringers of death and disease but as 
bearers of vivifying complexity. It is the metaphysically governed, and 
politically expedient, model of the self-contained organism adequating to 
Platonic perfection that has prevented this from becoming clear for 
quite so long). The epistemic leap required to begin to understand the 
long observed but numinous natural patterns now associated with 
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complexity, was an acceptance of Bataille's intuition, elaborated into a 
revolutionary attempt to explain the "general problems that are linked 
to the movement of energy on the globe" (Bataille I 27/20). Prigogine 
had discovered that the flows of matter and energy that pass through 
certain physicochemical systems and "keep them far from equilibrium 
can nourish phenomena of spontaneous self-organisation, ruptures of 
symmetry, evolutions toward a growing complexity and diversity" 
(Stengers 1997c 38). Here is how Prigogine, in words written with his 
collaborator Isabelle Stengers, summed up the contribution made by 
his elaboration of dissipative structures to the philosophy and science 
of matter: 
In far-from-equilibrium conditions we may have 
transformations from disorder, from thermal chaos, into 
order. New dynamic states of matter may originate, states 
that reflect the interaction of a given system with its 
surroundings. We have called these new structures 
dissipative structures to emphasise the constructive role of 
dissipative processes in their formation. (Prigogine and 
Stengers 1984 12) 
Prigogine's achievement, then, is the reintroduction into physics, of 
time, and more specifically, the defence of the essentially Bergsonian 
thesis of a multiplicity of lived durations, "a radical multiplicity of time" 
(Deleuze 1991 78)8. It is the introduction of a synthesis capable of 
coherently holding together different rhythms of time, both reversible 
and irreversible. The recognition of the "irreversible time of evolutions 
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nourished by the world they are part of, the bifurcating time of 
evolutions generated by instability [... ] and even microscopic time" 
(Stengers 1997c 41). This is not far enough, to stop here would be a 
simpleminded pluralism; we have to go further with Deleuze and 
Guattari to make "PLURALISM = MONISM" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 31/20); this formula is the key used by DeleuzeGuattari to 
dissolve the "entirely necessary enemy" that dominates theology, as 
well as metaphysical and transcendental philosophies alike: 
Man. ichaean dualism (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 23/14). It is the 
guide in the attempt to surmount the irrevocable split in the world 
posited by dualism that motivates all of their philosophy, and it is 
variants of this formula that are found throughout the bastard line of 
philosophy with which they identify themselves: from Bruno's 
complicatio, the holding together of the one and the multiple; to Bruno 
and Spinoza's modal differentiation of one matter, given in Spinoza's 
definition of a body and Bruno's "mutation is not striving for another 
being, but for another mode of being" (Bruno 1998 89); to intensive 
difference. Finally, this formula is opened out such that "repetition in 
the eternal return [... ] consists in conceiving the same on the basis of 
the different" (Deleuze 1968/94 60/41). Here, this unity of multiplicity 
and unity is aimed at time, such that the plurality of times, posited 
above, is only possible, "livable or lived in the perspective of a single 
time" (Deleuze 199181), they are folds in a single time, local spirals in a 
river, demonstrations of the truth of the relative, not of a relativity of 
truth, but a truth of the relative (See Deleuze 1993 20,1985/89 
191/147 and Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 55/54,123/130; and the 
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expansion of this issue in chapter six below). Perhaps the best 
exposition of this phenomenally complex attempt to hold together the 
times of difference and of repetition, of increasing complexity, and of 
irreversibility is Massumi's: "there are many time lines, as many as 
there are universes that will have been, even more, as many as the 
phenomena that will have been born and died in those worlds [... ] this 
amounts to a scientifically derived version of Nietzsche's theory of the 
eternal return of difference" (Massumi 1992 168). 
Entropic Muitinlicit 
The death drive, in a sense is already plasticised, already 
deterritorialised, transversal. It can be classified according to 
Guattari's schema proposed in his `Machinic Propositions' as belonging 
to the first of the `Flux Propositions', that is as a `Positive 
Deterritorialisation', one of those "basic component[s] of propositions of 
intensive flux (line of escape and line of abolition)" (Guattari 1977 357), 
it introduces a thought of entropy which moves, Deleuze suggests, 
beyond the philosophical economy of truth and judgement and towards 
one of sense and the event; it is "not merely one instinct among others, 
but the crack itself around which all of the instincts congregate" 
(Deleuze 1969/90 431/326). The history of the entropy law in its 
various disciplinary deployments displays characteristics embodied in 
Guattari's critical distinction, it is "not a surplus value of encoding but a 
trans-encoding" (Guattari 1977 333), that is to say, it is transversal. It 
is "a component that has taken upon itself the specialised vector of 
deterritorialisation. In effect, what holds an assemblage together is not 
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the play of framing forms or linear causalities but, actually or 
potentially, its most deterritorialised component, a cutting edge of 
deterritorialisation" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 415/336). When 
engaging with the death drive, with the multiple disciplinary structures 
and thought-events in which it is implicated, and with the multiple 
series in which it is engaged in Deleuze and Guattari's thought, we will 
have to be attentive to the writing procedures by which they operate. 
By this, an evolutionary drawing of the passage of the death drive 
through a series of texts made from an external position of judgement 
will be rendered impossible, rather we will have to diagram the lines 
along which this particular rhizomic structure operates "in the 
heterogeneous [by] jumping from one already differentiated line to 
another" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 17/10). The method must 
always be immanent, that is to say that the operation of 
DeleuzoGuattarian critique militates against transcendence by a 
process of self-organisation (intensive production at base level). 
Against Manichaean Dualisms 
Subordinate, and adjacent, to this recasting of the death drive is the 
recognition, all too often overlooked in the secondary literature, that 
apart from the "analytic imperialism of Oedipus" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1974/83 30/23), the major attractor of DeleuzeGuattari's animus in the 
Freudian corpus is the maintenance of dualism. Indeed, `The First 
Positive Task of Schizoanalysis' (Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 385- 
406/322-39) is almost entirely taken up by a critique of Freudian 
dualism, and the proposal of a materialist psychiatry based on a 
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philosophy of machinic intensity, the discovery of a "new energetic 
conversion [... ] the third kind of synthesis, the synthesis of conjunction" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 395/330). In accord with Karl Krauss' 
notion that "psychoanalysis is that illness of which it believes itself to 
be the cure", the argument of Anti-Oedipus is that Oedipalisation is 
indeed an incurable disease and one only propagated by its supposed 
cure. That is to say from a certain, dominant, way of understanding 
Freudian thought, a path that is unavowedly semiological, welded as it 
is onto the foundations of the primordiality of the linguistic signifier, and 
the machinations of the phenomenologically inspired discourse of 
presence. Guattari economically summarises the evolution of 
Freudianism as being from "the seething richness and disquieting 
atheism of its origins" to a structuralism "recentred on the analysis of 
the self, its adaptation to society, and its conformity with a signifying 
order" (Guattari 1995 10), its reterritorialisation into an overcoding 
system operated by a priesthood. This recentring is one that in 
DeleuzeGuattari's words demonstrates the symptoms of "signifiance 
and interpretosis" the "two diseases of the earth or the skin, in other 
words, humankind's fundamental neurosis" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 144/114). Even if Oedipus is a dead end there is still much to 
be gained in removing dualism from the Viennese body, it is this task 
that DeleuzeGuattari set about in a way that is assiduous, radical and 
singular. How is this operation to be effected? Deleuze argues that 
Freud can be taken beyond crippling dualism: by suggesting that 
underlying qualitative difference is a "difference in rhythm and 
amplitude a difference on a time-scale" (Deleuze 1989 115). The 
question of dualism then is always attacked from the perspective of the 
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problematic of intensity, and the proposal of a concept of "ontological 
intensity" (Guattari 1995 29), set up by the resonances produced 
between a Spinozist and a Nietzschean framework, in which "if we 
relinquish the soul, the `subject' in general disappears. One acquires 
degrees of being, one loses that which has being" (Nietzsche 1968 § 
485). With this elimination of any adherence to the atomic subject 
Nietzsche reaches the point of seeing the "subject as multiplicity". 
Vers la Grande Identity 
As has been suggested, much of Deleuze's work, both with and without 
Guattari, is geared towards the derivation of a vital formula, that is 
"PLURALISM = MONISM" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 31/20), 
philosophically this is mapped out within the space of the concept of 
intensity. The crucial early coordinates for this are the fifth chapter of 
Difference and Repetition, `Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible', in 
which Deleuze addresses the problem of how one might produce a 
transcendental principle from energy; and the second chapter of 
Nietzsche and Philosophy, `Active and Reactive'. These two chapters 
are tied together by a number of threads that are central to this 
discussion. i) The strong identification of a subterranean line of flight 
between Nietzsche and Spinoza, the constitution, to which Deleuze has 
said all of his work in the history of philosophy leads9, of the 
"great 
identity Nietzsche-Spinoza" (Deleuze 1988c), configured here upon the 
basis of the "common sun of the Spinozist conatus and the Nietzschean 
will to power" (Zaoui 1995 71) as the operative principles of a selective 
ontology (see Deleuze 1968/94 60/41), 
ii) The attempt to produce a 
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concept of dynamic, generative force as the basis of a philosophy of 
immanence. iii) An account of the role played by thermodynamics as 
the starting point from which Deleuze and Guattari begin their non- 
dialectical, non-dualist accounts of classical philosophical questions; 
that is to say the development of the intermeshed concepts of 
intensity, drive, multiplicity. 
The Nietzschean critique of science is separated by Deleuze into three 
simultaneous levels operating, "against logical identity, against 
mathematical equality and against physical equilibrium" (Deleuze 1983 
45). These three levels are taken by Deleuze to be unified by their 
opposition to the undifferentiated, he gives as an example the promise 
of a "death (`heat' or otherwise)" (Deleuze 1983 45 and Nietzsche 1968 
§ 1053-1067), that is the cosmological ground plan of nineteenth 
century endtime thermodynamics'°. Indeed the thought of eternal 
recurrence is based, albeit complicatedly and critically as we have 
begun to see, upon that thermodynamics: "The law of the conservation 
of energy demands eternal recurrence". That Nietzsche should wed, 
albeit problematically, a critical element of his thought, to an 
understanding of physical law should make us think twice before 
subsuming him to a phenomenological tradition that has almost 
entirely limited itself to textual exposition, and become increasingly 
hostile to technoscience. But more importantly it should draw our 
attention to the limits of Nietzsche's own science, for on this point, 
Nietzsche is not abstract enough, in the sense in which Deleuze and 
Guattari praise Spinoza. That is for inventing "elements that have 
neither form nor function, that are abstract in this sense even though 
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they are perfectly real [... ] distinguished solely by movement and rest, 
slowness and speed" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 310/253). 
Nietzsche's thought of the eternal recurrence, one of the most 
important and complex elements of his thought, is inextricably bound 
up with thermodynamics. One of the most striking things about this is 
his attempt to launch, what turns out to be, an astonishingly prescient 
critique of the thermodynamics of his day, then committed to a thought 
of the universe culminating in a heat death, a cosmological, apparently 
nontheological, day of judgement, the physical levelling of differences. 
Nietzsche insists on numerous occasion in his work, principally in The 
Will to Power, that "we deny end goals: if existence had one it would 
have been reached" (Nietzsche 1968 § 55), as such Nietzsche's critique 
is also the start of an exposure of the transcendental illusion of entropy 
and of an account of the world in terms of becoming. The problem of 
abstraction here lies in the fact that Nietzsche's justification for this 
position lies in his rejection of the possibility of there being an infinite 
reservoir of novelty upon which the world may draw, an idea that he 
describes as "unforgivably insane". That Nietzsche should be led to this 
conclusion leads us to the limit of his thinking, or rather to the 
materialist limit of the possibilities for his thinking, for as Lee Smolin, 
one of the most eminent contemporary cosmologists, has put it 
"Nietzsche was right to worry about the impossibility of novelty, 
because on the physics of his time it was indeed impossible to imagine 
how it might occur" (Smolin 1997 298)'1. If on this point Nietzsche 
remains somewhat constrained by a mechanistic materialism, in other 
areas of his thought he goes far beyond this, principally in his adoption 
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of a force-point-world, or a dynamic relational view of matter deriving 
from the Dalmatian physicist Ruggiero Boscovich'. As an example of 
an advocate of such an unmitigated mechanism that presupposes a 
final state, Nietzsche refers to William Thomson (later Lord Kelvin, the 
author in 1852 of the first formulation of the second law of 
thermodynamics). Thomson's claim here lies in the introduction, in the 
second law, of the idea that there is a universal tendency operative in 
the cosmos toward the degradation of mechanical energy. In a 
somewhat complicated formulation of the impossibility of the world 
becoming "rigid, dry, dead, nothing" of its reaching "a state of 
equilibrium" Nietzsche writes: "If, eg., the mechanist theory cannot 
avoid the consequence, drawn for it by William Thomson, of leading to a 
final state, then the mechanist theory stands refuted" (Nietzsche 1968 
1066). Nietzsche's formulation of eternal return, then, offers a glimpse 
of a critique of mechanism in what is, as we have seen, a Schellingian 
fashion, followed by a magnificent vision of an infinite universe as a 
"monster of energy, without beginning or end [ ... ] as a play of 
forces and 
waves of forces, at the same time one and many [... ] a sea of forces 
flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding 
back" (Nietzsche 1968 § 1067). Nietzsche's account, when written, at 
the end of the nineteenth century, was moving in a direction 
diametrically opposed to the scientific consensus, it was utterly 
untimely. Yet it is a vision that has enormous correspondences with the 
possibilities opened up by developments since the nonlinear 
transformation of thermodynamics, the complexity of the late 
twentieth century. It demonstrates, more convincingly perhaps than 
any other element of his thought, that Nietzsche "possessed an acute 
Entropic Tendencies: Nomological Processes 
33 
untimeliness in his instincts concerning the future direction of the 
sciences" (Whitlock 1996 220). Nietzsche's own description of the 
philosopher in his `Schopenhauer as Educator' is fully applicable here: 
"Nature propels the philosopher into mankind like an arrow; it takes no 
aim but hopes the arrow will stick somewhere. But countless times it 
misses and is depressed at the fact" (Nietzsche 1983 177). 
Preindividual Sinfalarity 
r rr_. 
The point of mapping out Nietzsche's engagement with 
thermodynamics, and principally its second law, goes beyond fidelity to 
historical scholarship, and beyond an assessment of the formal 
adequation of Nietzsche's position to the contemporary (his or our) 
status of thermodynamics from the position of scientific objectivity, the 
status of the second law is anything but settled, thermodynamics as a 
discipline and as a set of metaphorics is almost by definition far from 
equilibrium'. What must be attended to here is the introduction of a 
change in the possibilities of conceptualisation opened up by the 
radicalisation of energetic and tendential categories, and the necessity 
of mapping them onto representational problems. I want to do this by 
looking in some detail at Deleuze's account of preindividual and 
impersonal singularities, and at the connection between this account 
and first, the importance to Deleuze's philosophy of an energetics, and 
second, of an account of Freud's death drive. In an immensely intricate 
passage of The Logic of Sense Deleuze recognised that the "problem of 
entropy" is crucial to his work precisely because it concentrates the 
question of singularity in a remarkably transversal fashion 
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The question whether the world itself has a surface capable 
of forming again a potential of singularities is generally 
resolved in the negative. A world may be infinite in an order 
of convergence and nevertheless may have a finite energy, 
in which case this order would be limited. We recognise here 
the problem of entropy, for it is in the same way that a 
singularity is extended over a line of ordinary points and 
that a potential energy is actualised and falls to its lowest 
level (Deleuze 1969/90 145/110) 
This is the conclusion to Deleuze's principal attempt to reconstruct a 
transcendental field, constituted by "impersonal and preindividual 
nomadic singularities" (Deleuze 1969/90 145/109), an account, that 
must be explicated here, as its implications will reverberate throughout 
this thesis. Deleuze's location of singularities as a conceptual core of his 
philosophy of energetic materiality is an attempt to guarantee its being 
founded on two principles: immanence, and intensity. This whole 
account is predicated upon an energetic basis, for the critical problem 
with transcendental philosophy in its Kantian form as identified by 
Deleuze lies in its strictly metaphysical dependence upon an 
illegitimate choice between "either an undifferentiated ground, a 
groundlessness, formless nonbeing, or an abyss without differences and 
without properties, or a supremely individuated Being and an intensely 
impersonalised Form" (Deleuze 1969/90 141/106). In other words 
Kantian transcendental philosophy remains theological: in that it is 
strictly incapable of offering a coherent account of genesis or 
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individuation, and incapable of thinking matter without imposing upon 
it a whole series of dictats which are imposed on it from the outside (eg 
Spirit, the subject, Platonic form, species, Kantian categories, all forms 
of what DeleuzeGuattari condemn as the strata or "the judgements of 
god"), all the generalities to which a thought of singularity is opposed. 
As such, we can see the great stakes, political and philosophical, 
involved in the maintenance, in transcendental thought of the 
hylomorphic schema, and correspondingly of the critique of that 
hylomorphism, and the active advocacy of a hylozoism, a philosophy 
ascribing immanent power to matter, in heretical thought. A heretical 
materialism represented here principally, by the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, and drawing substantially upon Gilbert Simondon's 
philosophy'. Kant is conventionally seen as transcending and unifying 
competing strands in philosophy (represented in Kant's own account 
principally by Rousseau and Hume), but as we will have cause to 
repeat on a number of occasions in this thesis, this was achieved on the 
basis of a hegemonised hostility to Spinozism, and the silencing of 
Spinozist questions. This silencing, though, was not entirely 
homogeneous and contained substantial cracks: their dominant names 
being Schelling, Marx, Nietzsche. Regardless of the massive differences 
between these figures, it is their common attempt to think the 
Spinozist prioritisation of the body, of materiality that is of concern 
here. Schelling for example, in what has judiciously been called "one of 
the seminal works of materialism" (Zizek 1996 7), the remarkable 
drafts of his projected Weltalter, notes that things "stand before us as 
an incomprehensible whole until we find traces of its manner of growth 
and gradual development [... ] before we learn about the distinctive 
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circumstances in which the individual developed and formed" (Schelling 
1997 121), it is as a development of this Schellingian theme that 
Simondon's account of individuation is presented in the next chapter. 
This is part of Schelling's doctrine (vital for DeleuzeGuattari) of a 
germinal life, which is precisely one of those `extraordinary moments', 
of which Deleuze speaks, in which "philosophy makes the Abyss (Sans- 
fond) speak and finds the mystical language of its wrath, its 
formlessness and its blindness" (Deleuze 1969/90 142/106). However, 
Deleuze explains, to make the formless speak is not sufficient to escape 
the alternative of transcendental philosophy and metaphysics; the 
move beyond this choice, lies in the exploration of "a world of 
impersonal and preindividual singularities" (Deleuze 1969/90142/107). 
Deleuze credits Nietzsche with this discovery, and for renaming this 
world "the will to power, a free and unbound energy", populated by 
"nomadic singularities which are no longer imprisoned within the fixed 
individuality of the infinite Being (the notorious immutability of God), 
nor inside the sedentary boundaries of the finite subject (the notorious 
limits of knowledge)" (Deleuze 1969/90 142/107). In this world, 
Deleuze's world of intensities, singularities, multiplicities, and the 
constitutive relations between series, "[c]rowned anarchies are 
substituted for the hierarchies of representation; nomadic distributions 
for the sedentary distributions of representation. " (Deleuze 1968/94 
356/278). 
Entrouic Philosonhv/Philosonhical Entropy 
The conceptual issues involved here revolve around the possibilities of 
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there being a philosophical account of entropy in its current 
manifestation, nonlinear and statistical, and as a map at the edge of 
chaos'. Critical here is a reworking of the three elements of desiring- 
machines (assemblages) in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 404/338) in terms of parts: working, 
mobile motor, adjacent; forms of energy: Libido, Numen, Voluptas; and 
finally its three operative syntheses: connective syntheses of partial 
objects and flows; disjunctive syntheses of singularities and chains; 
conjunctive syntheses of intensities and becomings. These positions 
definitively mark DeleuzeGuattari's work off from the rest of their 
philosophical milieu- the uncomfortable settlement between 
Derridean deconstruction and a defanged Frankfurt style critical 
thinking that so dominates contemporary philosophy- in a way that 
corresponds with Negri's felicitous designation of Spinoza as the savage 
anomaly. As we have already seen this breach corresponds to the 
unprecedented hostility to Spinozism ushered in by the Kantian 
reformulation of philosophy, as such we are able to reconstitute the 
moves that allow DeleuzeGuattari to claim that with them 
Philosophy is no longer synthetic judgement; it is like a 
thought synthesiser functioning to make thought travel, 
make it mobile, make it a force of the Cosmos (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/87 424/343) 
The point of this statement and the reason for its being referred to here 
is that it captures the effort made to "unite disparate elements in 
the material, and transpose the parameters from one formula to 
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another" (ibid. ), this is a path not lacking in dangers, as Deleuze and 
Guattari stress, for one might "overdo it, put too much in". It is a 
philosophy no longer subject to the tyranny of the true, one that has 
renounced "a logic of predication and truth" in favour of a "logic of sense 
and the event" (Deleuze 1969/90 151/111, emphasis added). The 
seismic importance of this move can hardly be exaggerated because it 
allows for a positive assimilation of modern information theory, that is 
the negentropy principle of information (Prillouin)' a model that is 
fundamentally energetic and so materialist, squabblings over ontology 
are reconfigured as quantitative differentiations from zero, as such one 
is able to derive a thermodynamic principle for the selection of 
problems (Prigogine and Stengers 1988 285), for the pursuit of signs- 
particles, and for the substitution of sense and affect for meaning. It is 
non-coincidental, and non-trivial, that one is able to draw some of 
DeleuzeGuattari's concepts into, and of course from, energetics and not 
least of all because there is a complex network of personal associations, 
and a two way intellectual relationship between their own thought and 
that of one of the pioneers in the field of nonlinear thermodynamics, 
Ilya Prigogine whose work we have already encountered. With, 
Stengers, his sometime philosophical collaborator, Prigogine has echoed 
a theme from Deleuze and Guattari that is critical with regard to the 
current discussion 
Matter is not given. In the present day view it has to be 
constructed out of a more fundamental concept in terms of 
quantum fields. In this construction of matter, 
thermodynamic concepts (irreversibility, entropy) have a 
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role to play (Prigogine and Stengers 1984 288)17 
Elsewhere Prigogine has noted the indissoluble relationship between the 
condition of being-far-from-equilibrium, and the immanent creativity of 
matter, "matter acquires new properties when far from equilibrium in 
that fluctuations and instabilities are now the norm. Matter becomes 
more `active' [... ] matter far from equilibrium acquires new properties" 
(Prigogine 1997 65-7)'8. 
The question of the link between energy and death in DeleuzeGuattari 
can now be restated: death they argue 
is part of the desiring machine, a part that must itself be 
judged, evaluated in the functioning of the machine and the 
system of its energetic conversions and not as an abstract 
principle (Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 397/332) 
What happens here is an attempt to extract from a Freudianism that 
has become frozen into a dualist molar overcoding system par 
excellence (all is reduced to Oedipus, or to lack, or to what ever master 
code the particular analyst chooses), an immanent function. What 
became the manipulation of a "transcendent death instinct as a 
principle" (Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 398/333), is reinserted into a 
conjunction with a Spinozist uncoupling of philosophy from what 
Deleuze calls the system of judgement. In `Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle', the Death Drive is, for Freud, ineluctably bound up with the 
energetics then available to him, specifically that of Helmholtz, it 
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expresses an irreversible tendency for entities to return to inorganic 
matter. The relationship between forms of matter (modes of substance 
in a Spinozist vocabulary), the routes between them and immanence, is 
a deep theme in their work. But note that "immanence is not said to 
substance, but substance and its modes are in immanence" (Deleuze 
1995 4)- immanence is never to something, to suggest this is to 
smuggle transcendence back in under cover of this `something' (see 
Deleuze and Guattari 1990/94 46/44), an analogous formula will be 
applied later to a Bergsonian understanding of consciousness (ie. 
consciousness is always said of something, we do not make a 
transcendental principle of consciousness per se). In A Thousand 
Plateaus they write: 
it is, in effect, a distinction between matter and life, or 
rather, since there is only one matter, between two states, 
two tendencies of atomic matter [... ] Stating the distinction 
in the most general way, we could say that it is between 
stratified systems or systems of stratification on the one 
hand, and consistent, self-consistent aggregates on the 
other. But the point is that consistency, far from being 
restricted to complex life forms, fully pertains to the most 
elementary atoms and particles (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 413/335) 
It is most important to understand that this thinking of life-death, life- 
matter does not just concern these particulars, but is said of philosophy 
itself, and of everything that comes within the purview of 
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DeleuzeGuattari's thought. This adherence to a thought of an intensive 
continuum derives from the critique of hylomorphism that will be 
elaborated in the next chapter, and is the illustration of the core 
position that the thinking of matter has to DeleuzeGuattari's thought. 
As Deleuze claims in a lecture on music: 
In every domain we are done believing in a hierarchy that 
would go from the simple to the complex, according to the 
matter-life-mind scale. It could be on the contrary that 
matter is more complex than life, and that life is a 
simplification of matter. It could be that vital rhythms and 
durations are not organised and measured by a spiritual 
(spirituelle] form but take their articulation from the 
outside, from molecular processes that traverse them. In 
philosophy as well we have abandoned the traditional 
coupling of an undifferentiated thinkable matter with 
categorical forms of thought or grand concepts. We are 
trying to work with carefully elaborated thought materials 
to render thinkable those forces that are not thinkable by 
themselves [... ] In philosophy it's no longer a matter of an 
absolute thought such as classical philosophy wanted to 
embody, but rather an impossible thought, that is to say 
the elaboration of a material that renders thinkable those 
forces that are not thinkable by themselves. (Deleuze 1978) 
To recapitulate and repeat the principal point of this chapter: entropic 
tendential analysis is not metaphorical, it is directly allied to the 
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onslaught made by DeleuzeGuattari upon the prioritisation of 
quantitative difference in every variant of metaphysical or signifying 
regime. The drives (Eros and Thanatos) belong, for Deleuze and 
Guattari to the realm of physics, that is, to recall `The Molecular 
Unconscious', "the body without organs and its intensities are not 
metaphors, but matter itself' (Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 336/283). 
The figure of entropy is not considered here to be merely a trope (as 
Martin Rosenberg suggests in his paper on the subject), nor a 
metaphor, it is an essential marker on the plane of consistency, and 
finally thermodynamics, of whatever variety, is not given the status of 
a top down royal discourse, nor is its teleological interpretation 
accepted, rather it is taken to be a fundamental element in 
constructing what DeleuzeGuattari posit as a transformative diagram. 
Entropy is sedimented into at least seven different regimes: classical 
linear, and nonlinear thermodynamics, information theory, 
molecular biology, Neo-Darwinism, economics', non Oedipal 
Freudianism', and as such is a prime coordinate for the creation of 
transversal connections, it acts as a vector of potential 
deterritorialisation in each of these disciplines. I concur here with 
Isabelle Stengers who has perfectly captured this sense of the 
peculiarly powerful position occupied by thermodynamics by suggesting 
that it offers an exemplary opportunity for "modifying the scope of 
concepts, of shifting problems into a new landscape, of introducing 
questions that drastically change the nature of disciplines" (Stengers 
1997c 36), it is precisely this modifying, shifting, questioning, activity, 
this, irrepressible inventing that characterises the philosophy that is 
argued for here`. As such entropic profiles are necessarily configured as 
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the horizon of DeleuzoGuattarian problems; problems that are simply 
not amenable to the preformed logical orders, and overcoding 
procedures characteristic of stat/e/ic thought. These questions lead us 
towards the nomos... 
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Following Matter. Tracking Haecceity 
(singiAarity/m. embr es). Transduction. Metastability 
4b 
In their book on Franz Kafka DeleuzeGuattari note that 
as long as the form and the deformation or expression are 
not considered for themselves, there can be no real way out, 
even at the level of contents. Only expression gives us the 
method (Deleuze and Guattari 1975/86 29/16) 
This proposition in the text that appears between the twin volumes of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia serves as an indicator of the centrality 
of the logic of expression, a logic that Deleuze has understood since his 
earliest work as underpinning Spinoza's monism, to their exposition of a 
philosophy of matter. The formation of a philosophy of matter deriving 
from the work of DeleuzeGuattari is forged substantially out of an 
examination of the consequences of their engagement with Gilbert 
Simondon'. The nexus of problems encountered here can be simply 
cited under the rubric of the linked critiques of hylomorphic models in 
philosophy and science and their respective approaches to concept 
formation. Hence the focus of this chapter will be a pursuit of the 
specificity of the attack launched by DeleuzeGuattari on the "classic 
image of thought" (Deleuze 1968/94), upon hitherto existent ways of 
asking philosophical questions, of selecting philosophical problems. It is 
in this particular sense that one must locate the DeleuzoGuattarian 
enterprise as a challenge to philosophy, as the attempt to make 
philosophy immanent, not just a discipline that manipulates the 
concept `immanence' but one that maintains this as practice. This then 
is a response to Deleuze's summary definition of philosophy in 
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Dialogues as "la theorie des multiplicites" (Deleuze and Parnet 1996 
179), and an attempt to learn how to become a "keeper of 
multiplicities" (Serres 1995 24). The relationship between immanence 
and multiplicity is given by Deleuze and Guattari by the above 
suggestion that expression provides us with a method. How so? As we 
have already seen, the question of multiplicity is always posed, by 
Schelling, by Bergson, and by Deleuze and Guattari, as a means of 
finding a philosophical rejection of the absolutism of dialectics or of 
dualism (they play the same ordering role in philosophy), the response 
to dualism is not to posit the one, but the multiple, and "to attain the 
multiple, one must have a method that effectively constructs it" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 33/33). That method is expression or 
immanence, and "immanence is revealed as expressive, and expression 
as immanent" (Deleuze 1968/92 159/175). The multiple, a multiplicity, 
a symbiotic becoming is understood as a means of holding together the 
heterogeneous, it is the task of philosophy to understand such 
heterogeneities, such that the "preformed logical order" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/87 307/251) of transcendental philosophy will be 
actively militated against; instead the consistency of an assemblage, a 
multiplicity, the `holding together' of the heterogeneous, can only be 
understood "case to case" according to immanent criteria. In the 
context of the present chapter, we must note here that this concept of 
consistency and its relationship to that of immanent function 
(developed in chapter one) is, like much else in Deleuze and Guattari, 
derived from Simondon who argues that "the relation to the milieu 
cannot be envisaged, either before or during individuation, as relation to 
a unique and homogeneous milieu. The milieu is itself a system, a 
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synthetic grouping of two or more levels of reality, between which there 
was no `intercommunication' prior to individuation" (Simondon 1995 
28n6) As such Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is guided by the 
principle that Deleuze sees as informing Foucault's work: "that every 
form is a compound of relations between forces. Given these forces, our 
first question is with what forces from the outside they enter into a 
relation, and then what form is created as a result" (Deleuze 1988a 
124). 
Why Simondon? 
Gilbert Simondon's unique career was dedicated to thinking. 
individuation, and to drawing attention to the extreme degree to which 
both philosophy and science are subject to the pernicious influence of 
the hylomorphic schema: the matter-form model that "assumes a fixed 
form and a matter deemed homogeneous" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 508/408). Simondon's thought is distinguished amongst the 
myriad resources drawn upon by DeleuzeGuattari for several reasons, 
each far more conceptually significant than the pedagogic task of 
tracing `influences', or of reducing DeleuzeGuattari's work to a stage in 
philosophical history. Simondon's work is singular in that amongst the 
`great' names of philosophy whose work Deleuze claims to infest in his 
account of his own philosophical formation, it is not substantially 
reconstructed, but its conceptual invention is directly utilised as a 
critical component in the diagramming of concrete assemblages. 
Second, substantial sections of his work, rather than being adapted for 
use in novel problems are used for the purposes for which they were 
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designed. Third, Simondon operates as the key conceptual resource for 
one of the most striking and distinctive, yet understudied, elements of 
DeleuzeGuattari's philosophy; that is their obscured yet trenchant 
critique of, involvement with, and recognition of, the great importance 
of, cybernetics in its most stratified form. This critique is posed in 
DeleuzeGuattari's attempt to think the meaning of the shift of man's 
dominant relationship with the forces of the outside (see the books on 
Kafka and on Foucault) from carbon to silicon. For Deleuze this means 
an attempt to think the superfold by which "the forces within man 
enter into a relation with forces from the outside, those of silicon 
superseding those of carbon" (Deleuze 1988a 131). In fact Simondon's 
critique, simultaneous with the development of second-order 
cybernetics (in which the observer is taken to be an intrinsic 
component of any adequate description of a system), is decisive for that 
of what we might call third order cybernetics', its current generalised 
applications in the cultural sphere. This new phase of cybernetics, 
arguably inaugurated by the libidinal materialism of the 1970's and 
precursed by Bataille's general economics, is perhaps one of the most 
significant features of the Mechanosphere in the late twentieth 
century. As such, one might venture to say that any philosophy that 
doesn't attempt to make a response to cybernetics is almost by 
definition going to be politically and culturally irrelevant. Of those 
philosophies that do engage with cybernetics, they either reject the 
`science of control and communication in the animal and machine' in the 
name of some kind of defence of what is proper to the human, a 
technophobia of distinctly HeidteSge NO inspiration; or else on the other 
hand offer an equally anthropocentric and mindless celebration of all 
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things cyber that imagines that the coming of the computer is the first 
time that man has come into contact with a prosthetic. 
DeleuzeGuattari and the biologists of symbiosis show to the contrary 
that life has always been a question of a coeval relationship between 
the bios and technics to the extent that a separation of these terms is 
almost meaningless, and can only be made on the basis of an arbitrary 
anthropocentrism. As one of Deleuze and Guattari's great heroes, 
Samuel Butler, wrote in his astonishingly prescient novel Erewhon 
(1872) "Where does consciousness begin, and where end? Who can draw 
the line? Who can draw any line? Is not everything interwoven with 
anything? Is not machinery linked with animal life in an infinite variety 
of ways? " (Butler 1965)'. One of Deleuze's teachers, the historian and 
philosopher of science, Georges Canguilhem merely updates Butler 
when he writes that one must "consider technology as a universal 
biological phenomenon and no longer simply as an intellectual operation 
to be carried out by man" (Canguilhem 1992 64). Furthering this 
lineage DeleuzeGuattari declare: "There is no biosphere or noosphere, 
but everywhere the same Mechanosphere" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 89/69). Fourth, Simondon, by lodging his work so concretely 
within a problem, that of individuation, is able to performatively 
demonstrate the immanent efficacy of his critique to so central a 
philosophical complex as that of hylomorphism. Fifth, it is by pursuing 
the limitations and edges of Simondon's work that one is put into 
contact with the serious challenge posed by DeleuzeGuattari's 
achievement to other schools of philosophical research. 
Finally, and as if in illustration of the above, we can consider Deleuze's 
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own account of the importance of Simondon to his thought given in a 
note to Logic of Sense (Deleuze 1969/90 136n. 1/344n. 3). Deleuze 
credits Simondon with inspiring perhaps his most important and radical 
philosophical legacy, that of the creation of a new, non-Kantian and 
non-phenomenological, basis for the transcendental field, "the idea of 
singularities, and thus of anti-generalities [... ] must now serve as our 
hypothesis for the determination of this domain [the transcendental, 
EA] and its genetic power" (Deleuze 1969/90 122/98). Deleuze writes 
that the five characteristics of this transcendental field, composed of 
impersonal and pre-individual singularities, are all given in Simondon's 
L'individu et sa genese physico-biologique and that the only difference 
between the two writers lies in their conclusions. Just to ensure that 
the importance of this is not missed. I reiterate that what is being 
proposed here, amounts to a radical break with both the 
phenomenological and analytic traditions, in so far as both are 
committed, albeit in different ways, to a philosophy of subject-object, to 
a transcendental field populated by such unities, and to the parallel of 
the transcendental and the empirical (as found in Husserl and Derrida). 
Taking this as the basis of his philosophy marks Deleuze's, and 
DeleuzeGuattari's, very serious challenge to the philosophical 
alternatives. The Mawr characteristics of this new transcendental 
field 
are given as: 
1. internal resonance of series 
2. topological surface of membranes 
3. organisation of sense 
4. status of the problematic (Deleuze 1969/90 136n. 
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1/344n. 3) 
Simondon and the Critique of Cybernetics: 1e Devenir sans Fin 
In the same way that Deleuze and Guattari describe Spinoza's Ethics 
as the great book of the BwO, I would like to describe Vladimir 
Vernad. sky's The Biosphere as the great book of the geology of morals, of 
more specifically, the plane of consistency. For Vernadsky went further 
than anyone in the direction of the cosmic monism elaborated in the 
account of the abolition of all distinctions. It is Vernadsky who first 
attempted an answer to the question "Who does the Earth think it is? ". 
The Biosphere offers an extended account of the "relationship between 
the development of life on earth and the formation of the biosphere- 
the envelope of life where the planet meets the cosmic milieu" 
(Vernadsky 1998 39), which demonstrates how the "plane of 
consistency knows nothing of differences in level, orders of magnitude, 
or distances. It knows nothing of the difference between the natural and 
the artificial. It knows nothing of the distinction between contents and 
expressions, or that between forms and formed substances" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 89/69). 
Following Simondon explicitly, and I hope to show Vernadsky indirectly, 
Deleuze and Guattari have gone some way towards constructing a set 
of concepts that together form a highly original and extremely powerful 
critique of the problems that riddle Wienerian canonical cybernetics 
and the autopoietic orthodoxy that (in certain domains) passes for its 
successor. Whilst Deleuze and Guattari rarely address these questions 
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directly, an exception being perhaps Guattari's brief discussion of 
autopoiesis in his Chaosmosis, one can argue on the contrary that the 
idea that underpins everything that we are about to discuss, that of the 
concept of system and in particular the difference between open and 
closed systems, is all that they have ever written about. In a discussion 
of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze makes it clear that he considers the 
guiding idea of that book, the rhizome, to be "precisely one example of 
an open system" and goes on in the same work to discuss the concept of 
the "open totality" (Deleuze 1990/95 43/32). 
Autopoiesis is a term and a body of theory developed by Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela in the 1970's as an attempt to 
characterise the `organisation of the living'. The term is self- 
explanatory when returned to its Greek components: auto (self) poiesis 
(creation/production). As such it characterises the living as that which 
replicates itself. As Maturana put it, the construct of autopoiesis: 
"resulted from the direct attempt [... ] to provide a complete 
characterisation of the organisation that makes living systems self- 
contained autonomous unities, and that makes explicit the relations 
among their components which must remain invariant under a 
continuous structural transformation and material turnover. " 
(Maturana 1980 45). 
The systems theorist George Kampis, one of the few to seriously and 
sympathetically engage with Bergson, has an assessment of 
autopoiesis with which I fully agree, he writes that the "music of 
autopoiesis harmonises with our own efforts [... ] however the 
details 
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and implications of Maturana and Varela's and our developments differ 
considerably. The words that describe what an autopoietic system 
looks like could be our words; this is not true for the logic behind [sic] 
and for some of the conclusions" (Kampis 1991 387). As such, Kampis 
expresses my own reservations about autopoietic theory. Maturana 
and Varela seem to be inspired by laudable intentions, and their theory 
appears to be consonant with the positions expressed here. They insist 
for example, that their approach is a materialist one in that "no forces 
or principles will be adduced which are not found in the physical 
universe". Similarly, the potentially nonessentialist approach given in 
the statement that "our problem is the living organisation and 
therefore our interest will not be in properties of components, but in 
processes and relations between processes realised through 
components" (Maturana and Varela 1980 75) seems promising at least 
from the perspective of the relational, machinic materialism argued for 
here. In spite of this apparently m. achinic character of autopoiesis, the 
first quote from Maturana reveals the fundamental problem with their 
approach, and it lies in the deployment of the term `autonomy'. For 
autopoiesis, as the rest of this section will show, is organised at its 
deepest level around a fundamentally reactionary, metaphysical, and 
molar understanding of what it is that characterises an entity (the 
molar-molecular distinction in DeleuzeGuattari is not a question of 
scale, but one of the nature of the organisation of the entity concerned). 
It is this metaphysical prejudice that leads Isabelle Stengers, in one of 
the volumes of her remarkable seven volume series, Cosmopolitiques, 
to deliver a judicious judgement on autopoiesis when she writes that one 
must be suspicious [il faut se mefier] of Maturana and Varela's attempt 
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to "found a general epistemology of the living on the basis of the 
concept of autopoiesis" (Stengers 1997b 123) and that autopoiesis 
simply "does not explain the living". 
Maturana and Varela rely upon an ill conceived understanding of the 
nature of both the organism and of the machine; an understanding that 
when pushed, reveals itself to be thoroughly metaphysical, relying upon 
eighteenth century physicalist models of both terms, and is as a 
consequence, utterly incapable of conceptualising both individuation 
and the machinic thinking in terms of assemblages and becoming that 
this latter initiates in DeleuzeGuattari. The metaphysical prejudice 
that, I have suggested, pervades autopoiesis is revealed by an 
investigation of the starting point, and perhaps the most important 
point, of Simondon's extensive critique of hylomorphism. 
Simondon starts out from a fundamental critique of all philosophies 
that remain attached to a transcendent principle, on the basis that, in 
varying forms they all rely upon the ontological presupposition that the 
concept of an individual is a meaningful one, they claim, in Simondon's 
words, "that it is the individual as already constituted individual that is 
the reality of interest, the reality to be explained" (Simondon 1995 21). 
Kant, for example, insists that "one must make one's beginning 
something that human reason is utterly incapable of deriving from any 
previous natural causes [... 1 one must begin with man as a fully formed 
adult" (Kant 1983 49). Simondon continues by arguing that scientific 
work carried out on such assumptions "accords an ontological privilege 
to the already constituted individual" (Simondon 1995 21). For 
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Simondon then, the problem to be addressed is that of the assumption 
of the unified one as the starting point of any philosophy or science. In 
contrast to this, Simondon proposes that the starting point must be 
"the idea of a principle of individuation [... ] which would provide a 
sufficient explanation of how the individual had come to be an individual 
and account for its singularity (haecceity)" (Simondon 1995 21). We 
have already seen in chapter one that this critique was adopted by 
Deleuze in his positing of difference in itself. As if to provide a case in 
point, Maturana and Varela start out from precisely the kind of 
assumption that Simondon suggests must be avoided: they posit the 
autopoietic unity. Simondon's, and by extension DeleuzeGuattari's, 
critique clearly applies to autopoiesis, for it should be apparent from 
our brief look that autopoiesis relies upon an a priori division between 
the organism and the world, and hence renders itself impervious to the 
critical distinction between the machine and the assemblage pursued in 
A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 411/333). In 
contrast to this presumed unity, Deleuze and Guattari posit the 
concept of the assemblage or multiplicity. Following Bergson, Deleuze 
and Guattari make the multiple into a substantive, into a noun: a 
multiplicity, and in this way sever all connection with the one. "An 
assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity 
that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 15/8). An assemblage then is always 
open to, in fact constituted by the outside, whilst the paranoiac nature 
of autopoietio theory is exposed 
by its terror of the outside. In 
autopoiesis, the concept of autonomy 
dictates that an autopoietic 
entity is destroyed by being contacted 
by the outside. Deleuze and 
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Guattari's concept of the assemblage corrodes any false security given 
by the assumption that the outside can be separated from the inside 
and vice versa. 
We have already seen the acuity of Isabelle Stengers critique of 
autopoiesis, however she goes on to become inexplicably soft on 
autopoiesis, for she moves from her justified suspicion of its claims, to 
thinking that Guattari's modifications of autopoiesis in C'haosmosis are 
sufficient to make it workable. 
In spite of the implied critique of autopoiesis that Guattari had helped 
to develop in the joint work with Deleuze, in his sole authored book, 
Chaosmosis, he is oddly optimistic of the possibilities for a peculiarly 
modified autopoiesis. What Ansell Pearson has written of Deleuze and 
neo-Darwinism, seems especially apposite here of Guattari, that he 
"does not appear to appreciate [... ] that his thinking 11... ] presents a 
fundamental challenge to some of the core tenets of" (Ansell Pearson 
1997 129) autopoiesis. As we shall see Guattari does not seem aware 
that his earlier work constituted, albeit indirectly, a devastatingly fatal 
critique of the autopoiesis that he here tries to save. Like Stengers, 
Guattari concedes that autopoiesis "lacks characteristics essential to 
living organisms, like the fact that they are born, die and survive 
through genetic phyla" (Guattari 1995 39). Given that autopoiesis only 
claims to explain the biological, it is mysterious as to why Guattari 
would want to save it given that it clearly cannot explain even that. 
Guattari's next move is even more inexplicable, given that he has at his 
disposal the superbly mobile concept of the assemblage with which to 
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assess the "institutions and technical machines" which he now 
proposes to account for on the basis of a rethought autopoiesis. 
Autopoiesis, he writes, "deserves to be rethought in terms of 
evolutionary, collective entities, which maintain diverse types of 
relations of alterity, rather than being closed in on themselves [... ] 
institutions and technical machines appear to be allopoietic". This 
latter term is merely Maturana and Varela's for systems which "have 
as the product of their functioning something different from 
themselves" (Maturana and Varela 1980 135; Varela, 1979 15), in 
other words: man or indeed, animal, made machines and technologies 
are allopoietic, `natural' machines are autopoietic. Guattari goes on to 
regress from the level of sophistication reached in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia with the suggestion that autopoiesis be viewed "from the 
perspective of the ontogenesis and phylogenesis proper to a 
mechanosphere superposed on the biosphere" (Guattari 1992/95 
62/40). In order not to be too uniformly hostile to Guattari's solo work it 
is worth noting that in his earlier Cartographies schizoanalytiques, he 
marks the distance between schizoanalytics and general systems 
theories, vis. that their utility is limited to the extent to which "their 
principles of intelligibility renounce all universalist pretensions and 
admit that they have no other mission than that of combining in a 
cartography of existing territories" (Guattari 1989 12). 
In his article `Du Chaos et de 1'Auto-Organisation comme Neo- 
Conservatisme Festif 25, Gilles Chätelet sets up what is politically and 
mathematically regressive in most complexity thinking, but his 
thought could be applied directly to autopoiesis. Contrary to most 
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commentary on these questions Chatelet aligns l'enthousiasme 
chaotique and le cyber betail with the Robinsonade Right, and clearly 
demonstrates the collusion of much cybernetic thinking with rampant 
free market individualism'. Whilst, autopoiesis is clearly not the only 
attempt to adequate a revamped cybernetics to developments in a 
range of sciences developed since the instantiation of the cybernetic 
project it is important a) for its claims to provide a general model for 
the biological and b) for its impingement upon certain attempts to give 
Deleuze and Guattari's work a hard edge in these areas. In these 
respects Simondon's work is an essential counterfoil. On other strata it 
is apparent that connectionism is a more important field to grapple 
with, locked as it is in to the architecture of parallel distributed 
processing, and problems within cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence, the questions at stake here seem to be variants upon those 
attached to the critique of dynamical systems. George Kampis' 
summary assessment of the extremely limited utility of the autopoietic 
model is devastatingly simple and revolves around the observation that 
the problem with autopoiesis is that it "excludes external control or 
selection" on the basis that these are "allopoietic notions of a higher 
level, that would destroy the autopoiesis of the given level" (Kampis 
1991 390). Ultimately, autopoiesis is on the one hand true, but only 
trivially so and only at the level of the basic statement embodied in its 
own definitional terms ie. that self-production is a characteristic of the 
living; but more perniciously its conclusions only allow for closed "self- 
referential, autonomous units" (Kampis ibid. ), artificially 
insulated from 
the outside. Like Jakob von Uexküll, whom we shall encounter 
in the 
next chapter, Maturana starts off as a 
Kantian, unlike Uexküll, he 
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remains one, and his autopoietic units cannot be estranged from this 
02'lgl L 
To continue this critique from DeleuzeGuattari's position would be to 
argue that like classical cybernetics with its feedback loops, 
autopoiesis sets up closed systems as idealised entities and so 
forecloses upon their essential innovation of the predication of external 
metastable milieus and therefore singularities. Maturana himself 
seems to suppose that it is legitimate to take the biological entity as 
operationally closed to the world. From our perspective, and that of 
Vernadsky, Bataille, Deleuze and Margulis such a position is entirely 
untenable. It might be counterclaimed that Margulis herself uses the 
word autopoiesis, but it is clear on closer examination that she uses the 
term in an extremely limited fashion and that her substantial position 
actually goes way beyond it- and not only because Margulis' work is 
central to problematising the distinction between the living and the 
dead that Maturana assumes to be resolved by the imposition of the 
autopoietic scheme. The conception of `operational closure' that 
Maturana and Varela attribute to a discriminable unity (see Varela 
1979 54-9), such that "mechanistic (dynamic) systems [are] defined as 
a unity by their organisation. We shall say that autonomous systems 
are organisationally closed. That is, their organisation is characterised 
by processes such that (1) the processes are related as a network, so 
that they recursively depend on each other in the generation and 
realisation of the processes themselves, and (2) they constitute the 
system as a unity recognisable in the space (domain) in which the 
processes exist, " (Varela 1979 55) must then be rejected in 
favour of an 
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understanding of all entities as open to the cosmos across selective 
semipermeable membranes, open to flows of matter and energy, 
subject to alien becomings. The only entity to which Maturana and 
Varela's definition can be applied, without making an illegitimate 
metaphysical assumption, is the entirety of the known universe. 
Nietzsche then is prescient in insisting that "it is part of the concept of 
the living that it must grow - that it must extend its power and 
consequently incorporate alien forces [... ] it is all the same whether one 
has in view an individual or a living body, an aspiring `society'" 
(Nietzsche 1968 § 728). Maturana and Varela's world is, ultimately, 
composed of dead, metaphysically legislated, artificially sterile, closed 
entities. One final point that renders autopoiesis incompatible with 
Deleuze and Guattari's thought is the assumption of a binary 
distinction between the living and the dead. As we have seen, Deleuze 
and Guattari posit the concept of a noncorporeal transformation to deal 
with precisely such a question. In his superb study of artificial life, 
Claus Emmeche critiques Maturana on the grounds that, for him 
"there is no such thing as being half-dead" (Emmeche 1994 25), and he 
goes on to write that "rather than being an all-or-nothing concept" as 
Maturana suggests, "life has continuum-like features: it is a continuum 
property of organisational patterns, some of which are `more alive' than 
others" (Emmeche 1994 39), and for Margulis and Sagan "there 
is no 
really convincing way to point your finger and say this is where 
life ends 
and this is where the inorganic realm of nonlife 
begins" (Margulis and 
Sagan 1986 92). We have seen that autopoiesis evades the question of 
individuation: it also evades that of the limits of life, and of the 
transformation between the two, most contemporary research on 
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which, suggests that "the roots of life reach down into the realm of 
nonliving matter" (Capra 1997 94), and that it is "virtually impossible 
to give a concise definition of the difference between living and nonliving 
substance" (Margulis and Sagan 1986 72). Deleuze and Guattari 
suggest too that there can be no strict distinction between life and 
death, arguing, with Emmeche, Margulis and Sagan, and against 
Maturana, on the basis of a continuum, or of intensity, that "if we ask 
where life fits [... ] we see that it undoubtedly implies a gain in 
consistency, in other, words, a surplus value (surplus value of 
destratification). [... ] But the question is almost contradictory, because 
asking where life fits in amounts to treating it as a particular stratum 
having its own order and befitting order, having its own forms and 
substances [ ... ] From this standpoint, we may oppose the consistency 
of assemblages to the stratification of milieus. But once again, this 
opposition is only relative, entirely relative" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 414-5/335-7). It is to questions of intensity and individuation 
that we now turn. 
Intensive Individuation 
transduction [... ] denotes a process-be it physical, 
biological, mental or social - in which an activity gradually 
sets itself in motion, propagating within a given area, 
through a structuration of the area over which it operates. 
(Simondou 1995 31)' 
Simondon then provides the concepts necessary for a powerful, 
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pragmatic critique of scientific research programmes which start out 
from an assumption of the one, of unity. I want to develop this by 
examining three key concepts that contribute to Simondon's proposal 
of an alternative: haecceity (thought of in terms of membrane and 
singularity), transduction, metastability. These three concepts are 
extensively worked out in Simondon with decisive results for 
DeleuzeGuattari, it is also worth noting that haecceity is also a term 
proper to the Leibnizian and Spinozist components of their work, 
deriving as it does from Duns Scotus, one of the key figures in the line of 
univocal ontology (in Difference and Repetition, Duns Scotus is the third 
name besides the more familiar ones of Spinoza and Nietzsche), it is 
therefore the pivot around which one brings an unexpected Spinozist 
thought into the set of problems generated by Simondon. It is perhaps 
a little surprising then that the helpful footnote on the history of the 
word haecceity does not mention Simondon, instead it reads "This is 
sometimes written `ecceity', deriving the word from ecce, `here is'. This is 
an error since Duns Scotus created the word and the concept from haec, 
`this thing'. But it is a fruitful error because it suggests a mode of 
individuation that is distinct from that of a thing or a subject" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 318n1/540n33), a derivation then from the 
author of the "greatest book of pure ontology" (Deleuze 1968/94 57/39). 
Nonetheless we are still dealing with Spinozist questions, for, 
individuation is a thought of intensity, and it is Spinoza who gives to 
Deleuze his concept of intensive quantity, and for whom individuation is 
"neither qualitative nor extrinsic, but quantitative and intrinsic, 
intensive" (Deleuze 1968/92 181/197). Deleuze recognises that to 
attribute such a position to Spinoza is difficult and heterodox, and that 
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Spinoza "does not appear to have had any clear solution at the outset, 
nor even a clear statement of the problem" (ibid. 178/197), however it is 
not difficult to see that an intensive theory of individuation is the only 
possibility entailed by modal difference and Spinozist univocity: 
individuations on a plane composed of one substance can only be posed 
as individuations of degree- matter congealed at different degrees, of 
whiteness, of heat, of latitude and longitude. In Difference and Repetition 
the link is made even more direct: "The essential process of intensive 
quantities is individuation. Intensity is individuating, and intensive 
quantities are individuating factors" (Deleuze 1968/94 317/246). 
Hvlozoic Pragmatics 
We can turn now to an assessment of the pragmatic distinction 
elaborated in Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2 between reproduction 
and following. First however, we must, to quote Eric Alliez, but to 
displace his comments from What is Philosophy? to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 2, elaborate how DeleuzeGuattari "sketch the 
programme of a physical ontology which follows on from, but at the 
same time surpasses the opposition between `physicalism' and 
`phenomenology', by integrating the physico-mathematical 
phenomenology of scientific thought to a speculative materialism 
founded upon a generalised dynamics" (Alliez 1993 48)'. Alliez' 
characterisation is problematic in that it seeks to return the specificity 
of the DeleuzoGuattarian moves back to two discredited philosophical 
endeavours: those of ontology and phenomenology. Any phenomenology 
however, any ontology, that emerges from DeleuzeGuattari's 
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programme would be entirely unrecognisable to those who currently 
practice those disciplines. Here their innovations are located as 
relentless rejections of the assumptions of the above principally vis a 
vis the issue of individuation. The axis for their move consists in taking 
the problem of the individual, the entity, whatever it might be in the 
case under consideration, out of its ontological founding and replacing it 
with the resolutely materialist set of concepts deployed by Simondon. 
Deleuze and Guattari follow Simondon in this move, such that the 
critical issues are displaced from the (post) metaphysical obsessions 
with Being, identity, absence and presence and switched to 
diagrammatisations of becoming, singularity, and assemblage. Central 
to Simondon's own agenda is the consignment of this former set of 
categories to the reservoir of redundant metaphysical baggage, the 
"metaphysical bog where", Bataille reminds us "it sometimes seems a 
serious person would only go for a good laugh" (Bataille 1988 79). 
"Unity and identity" Simondon writes "are useless in helping us to 
discover the process of individuation itself", metastability, potential 
energy and entropy are amongst their replacements, (Simondon 1995 
24). For as Simondon goes on to argue, the terms and concepts of 
classical ontology are utterly incapable of comprehending individuation: 
they are too static, too dualistic and as a consequence "none of them 
can completely explain to me the simple process of becoming" 
(Nietzsche 1983 188)- as such new concepts must be invented. 
Simondon is determined on this: "we will have to use both new methods 
and notions" and refuse to "construct the essence of a given reality by 
means of a conceptual relation" (Simondon 1995 30). Relation rather, 
must be understood as constitutive, as part of the entity under 
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consideration, for as we shall see again in the context of the critique of 
DNA, ontology only perceives a diminished being "due to its having been 
separated out into milieu and individual. They do not refer to the whole 
[... ] to the totality that will be formed later by the individual together 
with the milieu" (Simondon 1995 30). It is on the basis of this 
Simondonian critique of ontology that Deleuze Guattari say "What is 
real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly 
fixed terms through which that which becomes passes" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/87 291/238). This interweaving of, and mutual 
interdependence between, individual and environment, is taken up 
wholesale by Deleuze and Guattari, and comes to them via a direct line 
of thinking. Claude Bernard's distinction between `milieu interieur' and 
`milieu cosmique' was taken up both by one of the early cyberneticists, 
Walter Cannon (originator of the concept of homeostasis), and by 
Vernadsky. It is the latter who makes a point directly paralleling that 
made above by Simondon, he writes "in most of their works studying 
living organisms, the biologists disregard the indissoluble connection 
between the surrounding milieu and the living organism. In studying the 
organism as something quite distinct from the environment, the cosmic 
milieu, as Bernard said, they study not a natural body but a pure 
product of their thinking" (Vernadsky 1998 30). 
Alliez' final term `generalised dynamics' is also problematised as 
DeleuzeGuattari's position is seen to eliminate any kind of 
transcendentally generated general systems theory as well as 
dynamics. Their demand for a return to pragmatics, that in which 
"language never has universality in itself, self-sufficient formalisation, 
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1980/87 140/111), necessitates precisely this attack. The pertinent 
characteristic of the latter being an attachment to invariance and 
simplicity- not as opposed to complexity in any technical sense- to 
a degree that verges on the theological, although Deleuze will write in 
the Logic of Sense that simplificatio, or the "identity of the One or the 
unity of the Whole" (Deleuze 1969/90 398/297) is quite precisely, 
Christian. Attention must also be paid to the directly political element 
of the critique of hylomorphism, that is to stress the origin of 
hylomorphic schemas in top down control systems. Deleuze and 
Guattari write that "[r]oyal science is inseparable from a `hylomorphic' 
model implying both a form that organises matter and a matter 
prepared for the form; it has often been shown that this schema derives 
less from technology or life than from a society divided into governors 
and governed" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 457/369). Gilbert Hottois 
in his Simondon et la philosophie de la `culture technique' has gone some 
way towards explicating an ethics, in the Spinozist sense of course, of 
hylozoism. We will see later how those thinkers who have followed 
Bruno's advocacy of a thesis of animate matter have all been led 
ineluctably along the road of political and theological heresy, and also 
how his critique of Copernicanism is intimate with a radically 
democratic, bottom-up politics. Against dynamics we counterpose 
attention to singularities (haecceities), coupled with the position that 
Deleuze was developing in Difference and Repetition where contra 
general systems, emphasis is placed upon the distinction between 
different types of system (physical and biological) on the basis of the 
"process of individualisation which determines that actualisation" 
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(Deleuze 1968/94 328/255). Similarly for Simondon, "the notions of 
substance, form and matter are replaced by the more fundamental 
notions of primary information, internal resonance, potential energy 
and orders of magnitude" (Simondon 1995 30). As such Simondon 
places considerable emphasis upon the political charge of the words 
chosen to express his position, and demonstrates that his range of 
concepts are all concepts of intensity and dynamism, rather than fixity 
and stability; it is also clear that Simondon's choice of terms is a direct 
parallel with Deleuze and Guattari's outline of the terms associated 
with the Spinozist analysis of affective bodies. As we shall see, this 
latter thesis is ramified and radicalised into an onslaught on ontological 
generalities in Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2. As we have already 
seen, the only other position, albeit one embedded in an entirely 
different disciplinary assemblage, that seems vaguely close to, or as 
conceptually rigorous and productive as, that of DeleuzeGuattari, is 
that of George Kampis, his positive engagement with Bergson seems to 
be critical in this regard. I shall draw upon Kampis' work, mostly 
implicitly, throughout this chapter and in the rest of the thesis in 
general. 
Nomadism and Life at the Limit 
The section of Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2 with which we are 
directly concerned is 
Proposition III: The exteriority of the war machine is also 
attested to by epistemology, which intimates the existence 
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and perpetuation of a `nomad' or `minor science' (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 446/361) 
The critical question asked here concerns the isolatable "modes of 
formalisation" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 448/362) operated by 
these generic types of scientific enterprise. The distinction between 
reproduction and following is a properly pragmatic one derived from 
different modes of concept production, they are the modes of operation 
appropriate to the `royal' and the `nomadic' sciences respectively. Here 
we must take note that there is more at stake in the declension of the 
nomad than is frequently assumed- particularly in a certain way of 
reading DeleuzeGuattari as operating a quasi-Feyerabendian 
epistemological anarchism, or its equally simplistic political analogue. 
The concept of the nomadic is itself deeply embedded in several layers 
of Deleuze and DeleuzeGuattari's work, here briefly enumerated 
i) in a reading of the great Nomadic socioeconomic formations and their 
modes of implication with metallurgical technologies; 
ii) as the figure par excellence of the society that defines itself through 
geography rather than history (a principle of number against one of 
Euclidean geometry; this latter being frequently identified as a 
paradigmatic State science); 
iii) perhaps more importantly and less romantically as a society that 
deploys a principle of movement against the fixity of the sedentary 
state form (the condensed form of the enemy against which 
the 
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entirety of DeleuzeGuattari's thought is directed). In this respect 
Deleuze's work is unique amongst that of his contemporaries, in being 
one of the only attempts to follow the positions sketched out in 
Nietzsche's singularly important essay on `Schopenhauer as Educator' 
(the major discussion of the `following-reproducing' distinction is directly 
related to this essays' magnificent assault on State philosophy, the 
conversion of the philosopher into a "public professor or State 
functionary"); the value of this is attested to by taking Kant as 
representative of State thought. For Kant has a firm grasp upon the 
threat posed by the nomad to sedentary thought, declaring that "the 
sceptics, a species of nomads, despising all settled modes of life, broke up 
from time to time all civil society. Happily they were few in number, 
and were unable to prevent its [that is the government of sedentary 
reason, EA] being established anew" (Kant 1929 Aix). Kant is further 
credited with giving philosophy a juridical form and "tracing its doctrine 
of faculties onto the organs of state power" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 466/376). This theme will be further pursued in the final two 
chapters examining Giordano Bruno and the inscription of the state in 
the cosmos. 
iv) as a critical figure in the utter devastation launched upon ontological 
questions from Difference and Repetition onward, and in the role played 
by the concept of distribution, which from Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia onwards is joined by population, for it is within 
distribution that a split occurs between the "logos and the nomos" 
(Deleuze 1968/94 54/36)30. In this distinction a form of distribution is 
discovered that is accorded the name `nomadic', the effect of which is 
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the introduction of "unsettling difficulties [... ] into the sedentary 
structures of representation" (Deleuze 1968/94 55/37). Crucially, the 
nomos, denoting a distribution in space, marks out the importance of 
the topological dimension of the membrane/limit as operator of 
transductions (transcodings), the flattening or equivalence of exchange 
and production, the redundancy of the bounded entity. As Simondon 
writes 
the living lives at the limit of itself, on the limit [... ] the 
characteristic polarity of life is at the level of the 
membrane; it is here that life exists in an essential fashion 
as an aspect of a dynamic topology which maintains the 
metastability by which it exists [... ] the entire content of 
internal space is topologically in contact with the content of 
the exterior at the limits of the living (Simondon 1995 
224-6). 
The theme of the constant topological contact between organism and 
milieu, and the assault upon the integrity of that distinction, is a 
consistent refrain in the DeleuzoGuattarian corpus and finds itself 
worked out across all of the strata with which they deal, the 
anthropomorphic no less than the more obviously germane 
physicochemical and organic (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 627/502). 
It is necessary to insist again that DeleuzeGuattari's deployment of 
Simondon also pays attention to the political implications of the 
critique of hylomorphism, as well as the replacement of its terms form- 
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matter, with the more mobile content-expression. The embeddedness of 
politics in this seemingly abstruse critique is already well attested to in 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia 1 where Simondon is credited for 
discovering the roots of the machinic phylum, and for rendering 
technological developments immanent and allowing them to be 
conceived as a "relation that is subordinated to a field of forces 
operating as a concrete physical system" rather than as "an abstract 
unity or intellectual system reigning over separate subaggregates" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 262/221). Similarly, the problem of the 
state in those lineages of political theory, in which it is conceived of as 
an abstraction, is transformed so that "it is no longer the 
transcendental law that governs fragments"; rather "it must fashion as 
best it can a whole to which it will render its law immanent"(Deleuze 
and Guattari 1974/83 262/221). This opposition is the Spinozist 
tradition constructed by Hardt and Negri, which "against the negative 
movement of the dialectic [... ] present a positive process of constitution 
[and] conceive of democracy as an absolute, completely immanent 
government, free from any transcendent norm" (Hardt and Negri 1994 
285 and 6). It is at this point that it becomes possible to insert the 
importance of the Spinozist move for Deleuze and DeleuzeGuattari on 
the grounds of the centrality of the logic of expression, of capturing the 
specificity of the ways in which the State instantiates itself according 
to precise diagrammatisations. Read in this way the immense range 
and power of the attack upon hylomorphism reveals itself in the most 
diverse corners of the DeleuzoGuattarian trajectory in all strata where 
it lays bare specific modes of individualisation without positing the 
necessity of there being a bare form welded to abstract substance. 
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Deleuze's destruction of the "fallacious concept of a sadomasochistic 
entity" (Deleuze 1967/89 50/57), for example, is implemented in 
precisely these terms; briefly, it is suggested that this entity cannot be 
described using either material or moral categories of identity, but must 
be tracked formally with attention fixed on the specificity of its 
patterning. Ultimately then, masochism, and sadism, like other 
material instantiations cannot be flattened out "with an abstract `grid', 
as though a common libidinal substance flowed now into one form, now 
into another" (Deleuze 1967/89 41/45). In the same fashion, in Cinema 
2: The Time-Image, the traditional canons of film theory are 
economically reduced by taking the components of cinematic 
representation as produced out of "a material not formed linguistically 
even though it is not amorphous, and is formed semiotically, 
aesthetically and pragmatically" (Deleuze 1985/89 33/29). These two 
cases could be multiplied endlessly, but the result is a significant move 
towards developing a radically new philosophical pragmatics. 
Simondon with Spinoza 
An important Spinozist dimension to the critique of hylomorphic 
schemas lies in the opposition of the plane of transcendence to that of 
consistency. In Deleuze's significantly titled little Spinoza 
book, 
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, these types of plane are accorded the 
respective characteristics of the organisation or 
development of the 
transcendent or theological, as opposed to the composition of the 
immanent or consistent. In this case, in the chapter `Spinoza and Us', 
in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy an ethological plane is constructed 
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couched in terms of milieu, unformed elements, composition, and 
velocity, a conceptual spine that effects a transductive operation 
between different material and conceptual strata. Critical in this 
respect is the working of the concept of immanence as an aspect of 
expression. The earliest location for this is in Expressionism in 
Philosophy: Spinoza, where Plotinus and Spinoza are praised for 
creating an expressive immanence. The latter plane, that of consistency 
or immanence, is explicitly conceived of as being built out of 
components from the Spinoza-Simondon conjunction, and as the 
rejection of any transcendentally governed schema of formation, pre or 
otherwise, structure or genesis. What is offered instead are "only 
haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective 
assemblages" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 326/266): 
Spinoza writes 
Bodies are reciprocally distinguished with respect to 
movement or rest, speed or slowness, and not in relation to 
substance (Spinoza 1989 E II P 13 L I)31 
Similarly for Simondon: 
The existence of a plurality of systems of norms can be 
interpreted in a way other than as a contradiction. There is 
only a contradiction resulting from the multiplicity of norms 
if one makes of the individual an absolute and not the 
expression of an individuation creating a metastable state 
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only and provisionally as a discontinuous phase of transfer. " 
(Simondon 1995 245). 
Having made this connection between Spinoza and Simondon it seems 
necessary to point out Simondon's own, I have tried to show misplaced, 
and somewhat conventional hostility to Spinoza (in this connection one 
might bear in mind that Wiener's own attitude to Spinoza was equally 
negative, if considerably less nuanced, and highlighted by his 
championing of Leibniz as the "patron saint for cybernetics" for three 
reasons, the third being the most pertinent: i) for his pursuit of a 
universal symbolism, ii) the avowal of a calculus of reasoning, from 
which Wiener with his modernist orientation derives mathematical 
notation and symbolic logic, iii) and less directly, for his adherence to 
dynamics as against Spinozist geometry'). Simondon objects to 
Spinoza's "substantialist monism" (Simondon 1995 238) on the basis 
that all theories of substance, and here Simondon is using the terms of 
the above quoted Spinoza passage, but misreading them, "rely on a 
conception of exchange and modification which only know alteration 
and stable equilibrium, not metastability" (Simondon 1995 238)'. From 
the perspective of a conventional understanding of Spinoza, Simondon's 
point is a valid one, but it is clear that one of the major claims of the 
way in which we are-- following Deleuze, Negri and Balibar- reading 
Spinoza, is that this critique is seriously misplaced. 
The Vampire of Thought 
The distinction then is set up in this way: reproduction is said to "imply 
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the permanence of a fixed point of view that is external to what is 
reproduced", similarly- and in a sense that could be seen to ally it to 
those sciences that are mechanical, dynamic (linear), or take a 
perspective of reversibility vis a vis physical processes- reproducing 
"treats differences of time and place as so many variables" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 461/372), ultimately then these positions remain 
within the Kantian orbit, and are irrevocably transcendental. As early 
as Difference and Repetition Deleuze had realised that the concept of 
difference was only to be conceived in an empirical and materialist 
fashion, and was equating difference with intensity, "`difference of 
intensity' is a tautology" (Deleuze 1968/94 287/222). In Logic of Sense 
the constitution of difference as intensity is again taken up (as noted 
above) as an elaboration of Simondonian themes, a transcendental field 
composed of "pre-individual and impersonal singularities" (Deleuze 
1969/90 348/297). Singularities in this Deleuzian and Simondonian 
sense are always multiple in and of themselves, composed of intensive 
degrees, each of which is already difference in itself: "Intensities 
comprehend in themselves the unequal or the different- each one is 
already different in itself- so that all of them are comprehended in the 
manifestation of every one" (Deleuze 1969/90 348/297). Intensity is 
never equal to the one, but to n -1, such that "philosophy is not 
concerned with the one, being (l'etre)" (Deleuze 1997), but with 
multiplicity. 
It is also in Simondon that Deleuze discovers the positing of the 
condition of metastability- a prior material grounding for the 
problematic of individuation--- "the existence of a `disparateness' such 
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as at least two orders of magnitude or scales of heterogeneous reality 
between which potentials are distributed" (Deleuze 1968/94 317/246). 
Metastability is defined by Deleuze as the constitutive condition in 
which a world composed of singularities-events exists, contrasted in 
equal measure to stability and to instability. Metastability refers to the 
state in which concatenations of multiplicities are "endowed with a 
potential energy wherein the differences between series are distributed" 
(Deleuze 1969/90 136/103). Metastability is the ground of a cosmos of 
febrile becoming, as supposed in contemporary complexity theory, 
which proposes to map the dimensions of physical systems whose 
condition is always far-from-equilibrium, just this side of chaos, it posits 
that all entities from the level of a cell, to an animal, to a society, a 
global economy, a planet, and a cosmos are in a permanent state of 
active becoming, of perpetual disequilibrium, or intensive difference 
generating new series continually. It is only now, with what is coming to 
be recognised as a third scientific revolution (to surpass the Newtonian, 
and Quantum') that theoretical models, and empirical studies, can be 
made of such a realm. Nevertheless such a realm has been glimpsed 
before, in Bruno's infinite, acentric cosmos governed by a permanent 
will-to-form (Mendoza 1995 222-4), what Bloch, perhaps poetically has 
described as "the formative power inherent in things [which] never 
wearies of creating new forms" (Bloch 1986 849). It had been suggested 
in Bataille's Accursed Share, a grand attempt to create an abstract 
diagram adequate to such entities as disparate as "atom, molecule, 
micelle, cell, organism, society" (Bataille 1988 75) to the idea that all 
are characterised by an excess, a part maudite, it is this excess energy 
that is "translated into the effervescence of life" (Bataille 1/199120/10). 
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In this sense Nietzsche is quite literally correct when he writes "that a 
state of equilibrium is never reached proves that it is not possible" 
(Nietzsche 1968 § 1064), a world that is a "monster of energy, without 
beginning, without end" (Ibid. § 1067). Since equilibrium is the absence 
of difference, it is equality, quite literally death, for as Depew and Weber 
write summing up the copious literature on the biological definitions of 
life and death: "the only time" that entities "achieve thermodynamic 
equilibrium is when they are dead [... ] that is probably the best 
definition of biological death" (Depew and Weber 1996 466), stasis. 
*ollowing' is the term that Deleuze and Guattari give to the only mode 
of investigation appropriate to the cosmos of "endless becoming" 
(Simondon 1995 21) that opens to thought that has apprehended the 
critique of hylomorphism. A mode in which one sets out in "search of 
the `singularities' of a matter [matieere], or rather of a material 
[materiau], and not out to discover a form" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 461/372), in Simondon's language it is precisely within 
metastability that singularities are located and isolated by potentials, 
this then is where one becomes involved with the specific form of 
pragmatic immanentism that marks out the DeleuzoGuattarian 
programme. 
At the heart of DeleuzeGuattari's frequently invoked critique of 
representation then, is this elaboration of a practice of 
`following', 
nonetheless, it will be critical to show that the 
figure of `following' 
cannot be constructed in a transcendent 
fashion, a problem that 
frequently plagues attempts to deploy the figure of the abstract 
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machine. There is no transcendent method of following, that can be laid 
out in the abstract, for "thought is like the Vampire, having no image, 
either to make a model of or to copy" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 
467/377). The warning that Isabelle Stengers attached to the concept 
of transduction also applies to that of `following'. She warns that 
anyone who thinks that they can derive from the notion of transduction 
the "power to recognise that the production of a child having an 
individuated relation to language responds to the `same' problem as the 
genesis of a crystal would have completely misunderstood the concept 
[utilise le concept a rebours] and would moreover pay for it with the 
derision that would be aroused! " (Stengers 1997b 137)'. Following, like 
transduction, can only be emplaced in relation to concrete edges of 
decoding and deterritorialisation that are constructed in relation to 
specific bodies, problems and concepts. "Each abstract machine is a 
consolidated aggregate of matters-functions (phylum and diagram)" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 637/511), that can only be invented in 
immanently derived analyses based on micropractice. 
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Qrganisation as Stratification: Immanent Relations in 
DeleuzeGuattari's Pragmatic Materialism 
There is no great difference between false materialism and 
typical forms of idealism. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 29/22) 
Two great traditions clash, therefore, in the history of 
philosophical thought, setting up that Kampfplatz that is 
philosophy. But these two traditions are not those of idealism 
and materialism. They are the tradition of `aleatory 
materialism' and all the rest. 
(Negri 1996b 61) 
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Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Deleuze and Guattari's 
polyvocal work and the feature that distinguishes them most sharply 
from their contemporaries in both Continental and Anglo-American 
philosophy who have taken, to varying degrees, the `linguistic turn', is, 
as we have seen, their dedication to thinking a philosophy of matter, 
endowed with, amongst other things, the wholly new terms forged by 
Simondon in his critique of hylomorphism. This new materialism must 
attempt, as Toni Negri has claimed of A Thousand Plateaus, "construct 
the terrain upon which to redefine the materialism of the twenty first 
century" (Negri 1998a 86), and as such, must adequate to the global 
conditions of the late twentieth century, its cultures, sciences, politics. 
This c4wp Qr attempts to test this claim on the basis of a series of 
implementations. The peculiar difficulty of their work lies in its 
simultaneous performance and explication of the principle of the 
rhizome, by which it is immensely difficult to isolate single strands from 
within it, for their entire thought form is so very tightly enmeshed, each 
element with each other, that to examine one is to start dragging the 
entire oeuvre out with it. Nonetheless, in this (L U-, attention is paid to 
the thorough critique that DeleuzeGuattari offer of the principle of 
organisation and their advocacy, in its stead, of a principle of 
composition or consistency: "the plane of consistency or composition is 
opposed to another plane, that of organisation or formation" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 456/368), the former is that encountered in 
following, the latter in representation. The route to this question 
involves a detour through an examination of the relationship between, 
on the one hand, the material cases and their conceptualisation given in 
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A Thousand Plateaus and, on the other hand, certain elements of 
Simondon's work on the interrelated questions of the limit and 
individuation. Arnaud Villani has paid some attention to the role played 
by the `the material cases' in what he calls the physical geography of A 
Thousand Plateaus. I concur with Villani's claim that the principal 
characteristic of these `cases' is the way in which they "effect the 
movement that they describe" and that in their singularity constitute 
series of "immanent syntheses" (Villani 1985 331)"6. As such Deleuze 
and Guattari's concepts are invented, or extracted from a case study or 
body of disciplinarised knowledge and then given a transversal direction, 
in an attempt to achieve a flatness with those cases. It is this flatness 
that constitutes what Deleuze and Guattari call the plane of 
immanence, which "has no supplementary dimension; the process of 
composition [of the plane, EA] must be apprehended for itself, through 
that which it gives, in that which it gives. It is a plan of composition, 
not a plan of organisation or development" (Deleuze 1988b 128). 
Horizontal and Vertical 
This process of concept building on a plane of immanence, which aims 
at the horizontal extension of the horizons of conceptual space, is 
counterposed by Deleuze and Guattari to verticality as the dimension 
of metaphysical thought. In What is Philosophy? they go so far, on 
occasion, as to make verticality synonymous with the transcendent. 
This idea of the pushing of horizons is used extensively throughout the 
chapter devoted to `The Plane of Immanence' 
in What is Philosophy? 
such that "it is the horizon itself that 
is in movement: the relative 
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horizon recedes when the subject advances, but on the plane of 
immanence we are always and already on the absolute horizon" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 40/38). Deleuze and Guattari define two 
types of horizon: the relative and the absolute; the former functions as 
a limit "which changes with an observer and encloses observable states 
of affairs" whilst the latter, the absolute is "independent of any 
observer, which makes the event as concept independent of a visible 
state of affairs" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 39/36). The distinction 
is posed in a distinctly non-Kantian fashion, for Kant every concept 
"has its own horizon, that is a variety of things which can be 
represented, and, as it were, surveyed from that standpoint. This 
horizon must be capable of containing an infinite number of points, 
each of which has its own narrower horizon" (Kant 1929 A 658/B 686). 
The Kantian horizon then is an ordering concept, an imposer of 
hierarchy, a standpoint from which one proceeds up to the "universal 
and true horizon" (Kant 1929 A 659/B 687). Deleuze and Guattari's 
horizontality, is on the contrary, an extension of the abolition of 
hierarchy performed by Cusa and Bruno's thought of immanence, 
"opposed to any [... I hierarchical conception of the world" (Deleuze 
1968/92 157/173), as in the various Medieval chains of being. Antonio 
Negri explains that Neoplatonism is interesting to Deleuze insofar as 
it's own subordination of the "'horizontal' relation to the order of the 
`vertical' creation and hierarchisation" can be, and was, transformed 
into a philosophy of expression (a philosophy which as he have already 
seen, and as will continually be stressed, is central to Deleuze's 
thought), "a philosophy of surfaces, in order to eliminate any aspect of 
transcendence, of hierarchy, of emanation" (Negri 1991a 18), this 
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aspect of Neoplatonism is also stressed in Alliez' commentary on 
Plotinus (Alliez 1991/95 63-123/27-74). Deleuze suggests that there is 
a counter tradition to this hierarchical thinking, and it is one that 
revolves around the linked terms immanence and expression, also 
identified with the terms complicare and explicare in a note he writes 
that it is "above all in Nicholas of Cusa and in Bruno that the notions 
acquire a rigorous philosophical character" (Deleuze 1968/92 159 n. 
1/377 n. 12). In one of the most thorough statements of the direct 
relationship between immanence and expression, `Immanence and the 
Historical Components of `Expressioif7, Deleuze argues that the 
pursuit of univocal ontology, given in Spinozist immanence constitutes 
the only pure ontology. That is a "pure ontology" in which "Unity is only 
a property of substance and of what is" in which immanence "requires 
as a principle the equality of being, or the positing of equal Being [... ] not 
defined by their rank in a hierarchy" (Deleuze 1968/92 157/173). It is 
the contrast offered between the rhizome, and the tree or arborescence 
that best captures the importance of the determination of these two 
dimensions: horizontality and verticality. It is precisely these kinds of 
transcendentally imposed schemas that Deleuze characterises as 
organisation, a plan imposed on an inert matter, presupposing the 
existence of stable entities. This critique is, as we have seen, coupled in 
DeleuzeGuattari's thought to Simondon's revolutionary thinking of 
individuation, a thinking that he describes as focusing on the process of 
individuation grasped as "an operation resulting from the meeting 
between, and compatibility of, a singularity and energetic and material 
conditions". Hence for Simondon 
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To seek the principle of individuation in matter, form, or 
force, is to restrict oneself to being able to explain 
individuation only in those particular cases that seem 
simple, such as the atom or the molecule that is instead of 
taking the genesis of the individual and supposing that 
genesis to be already made in formal, material or energetic 
elements, and owing to these elements already bearers of 
individuation, generating by composition an individuation 
which is actually simpler. It is for this reason that we have 
never wanted to undertake the study of the individual as 
starting from the elementary particle (Simondon 1995 79- 
80) 
Go and Chess 
The significance of the above statement for this thesis and, I would 
argue, for the DeleuzoGuattarian project in general, is revealed by 
examining one of the most important strategic moves made by Deleuze 
and Guattari in the plateau entitled `1227: Treatise on Nomadology: -- 
The War Machine'. This strategic move will be used here to position 
DeleuzeGuattari in a critical relation to two of the most radical projects 
in contemporary systems theory and second-order cybernetics. That is 
George Kampis' work embodied in his theory of `component systems', 
and the project of `relational biology' pursued by Robert Rosen and 
Nicholas Rashevsky'. My starting point is the apparently banal 
observation that 
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Chess pieces are coded; they have an internal nature and 
intrinsic properties from which their movements, 
situations, and confrontations derive [... ] Go pieces, in 
contrast, are pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, and 
they only have an anonymous, collective or third-person 
function [... ] elements of a nonsubjectified machine 
assemblage with no intrinsic properties, only situational 
ones (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 436/352) 
Thinking along a parallel path, Rosen suggests that 
once we talk about organisation, we are in a relational 
context. We are basically defining a machine as a material 
system that admits (ie., that realises) a relational 
description, a description in terms of sets and mapping, and 
entailments between them (Rosen 1991 183) 
Rosen's concept of entailment perfectly captures the idea of absolute, 
generative relationality that permeates this thesis; his argument is 
that the properties of components are strictly emergent and only 
generated from their position in a system, their "description changes as 
the system to which it belongs changes" (Rosen 1991 121). It is this 
complex concatenation of individuations and their material coordinates 
to which Simondon refers above that provides the motivation for 
Deleuze and Guattari in their pursuit of the (dated) event, which is "not 
only made up from inseparable variations, it is itself inseparable from 
the state of affairs, bodies, and lived reality in which it is actualised or 
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brought about" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 150/159). The crux of 
these investigations turns around the concept of organisation, and it is 
to organisation that we now turn. 
Immanent and Transcendent 
If, as Michel Foucault once claimed, Deleuze and Guattari offer an 
`introduction to the non-fascist life', and if the mode of living such a life 
is embodied in the set of practices (and hence it is a process) known as 
the Body without Organs ("you can't reach it, you are forever attaining 
it, it is a limit" Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 186/150), then the 
principal object of DeleuzoGuattarian critique is organisation (such an 
emphasis is of course in accordance with the lead given by Nietzsche to 
what would become, with Whitehead, a process philosophy, to prioritise 
and treat "Processes as `entities'" Nietzsche 1968 § 655). Organisation, 
for Deleuze and Guattari is homologous with stratification, and it is 
within the regime of signs' constituting science that organised, 
stratified matters are of utmost importance. ' 
Running throughout the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
Deleuze and Guattari raise and elaborate upon a distinction between 
axiomatics and codes. It is made clear that this difference is crucial to 
understanding the differing modes of immanent and transcendent 
thought. In addition to this the concomitant attachment of 
stratification to axiomatisation is made. It is with the identification of 
axiomatics with a transcendent organisation, and code with immanent 
composition that this distinction assumes its importance 
(compare 
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Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 567/454 and 174/143). The axiomatic is 
taken to institute a regulative order (stratification), "an axiomatisation, 
a semiotisation, a physicalisation" which is contrasted to "a diagram 
[... ] the programme of a stratum, against the diagram of the plane of 
consistency" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 179/143). The 
mathematician Robert Blanche, the principal source of 
DeleuzeGuattari's understanding of mathematical axiomatics, insists 
that the axiomatic is no longer an analytic proposition, but is "a 
convention that delimits a certain field" (Blanche 1990 19, -my 
t tion). Finally, Isabelle Stengers and Bernadette Bensaude- 
Vincent in their History of Chemistry give specific content to this in the 
field of chemistry, more precisely with reference to the history of 
crystallography, by suggesting that "the multiplicity and often the 
industrial interest of the properties linked to `deviations' from the `rule' 
were substituted for the conventional differentiation between the 
`normal case' (an illustration of the rule) and `defects' (a nonhierarchical 
group of cases, each associated with the circumstances that favour it)" 
(Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers 1993 259). The line taken by 
Stengers and Bensaude-Vincent lies in close proximity to that taken by 
DeleuzeGuattari, and what it helps to focus is the idea that for those 
disciplines that manifest the characteristics associated with the minor, 
the bodies or states of affairs that are of interest are, like Thom's seven 
catastrophe's, concerned with limit phenomena (when using Thom's 
model one must take great care not to import the Platonic basis of his 
mathematics, to ensure that they remain diagrams to be implemented 
rather than plans to be imposed), displays of rupture and 
heterogeneity: systems made perceptible only when they are in a state 
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of collapse, systems in variation defined not by "constants and 
homogeneity but on the contrary by a variability whose characteristics 
are immanent, continuous, and regulated in a very specific mode 
(variable or optional [facultatives] rules)" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 118/94). This is a thought that has preoccupied Deleuze since 
at least Difference and Repetition in which a concept only becomes real 
to the extent that "it designates catastrophes: either breaks of 
continuity in the series of resemblances or impassable fissures 
between the analogical structures" (Deleuze 1968/94 52/35); and it only 
ceases to be reflexive in order to become "catastrophic". Another 
implication to which I return shortly: catastrophe bears witness to "an 
irreducible ground which continues to act under the apparent 
equilibrium of organic representation" (ibid). That is to suggest that 
Deleuze's foundation of concepts of irreducible difference or fissure is a 
corrosive acid in the classical fixity of ontological grounds. The critique 
of the concept of partial objects, so important in the Anti-Oedipus, is a 
key element of this critique of unity, and at the same time one aimed at 
the dominant theme of Derrida's Heidegger inspired lament for lost 
presence. DeleuzeGuattari pointedly write: "We no longer believe in the 
myth of the existence of fragments that, like pieces of an antique 
statue, are merely waiting for the last one to be turned up, so that 
they 
may all be glued back together to create a unity [... 
] We no longer 
believe in a primordial totality that once existed, on in a final totality 
that awaits us at some future date" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1974/83 
50/42). This indeed is the grand thought to which the entirety of 
Difference and Repetition is dedicated: that "Difference, 
is in-itself 
already Repetition" (Deleuze 1968/94 
169/129), that there is no 
Organisation as Stratification 
89 
"ultimate or originary fixed term" (ibid. 139/105) to be uncovered; put 
thus, it is also crucial in the critique of Freudianism, of signifying 
systems, that there is no originary trauma to be resolved; only the 
effects of the concatenation of heterogeneous series. But this, is to run 
ahead of ourselves, and so let us return to another aspect of the 
question of organisation. 
In a lecture entitled `The Nature of Flows' Deleuze insists that the 
concept of flow is to be thought in relation to five others: that of pole; 
code or accounting system; stage of material or legal transformation; 
sector; and stock (the specific inflection of these terms is given by their 
imbrication in, and derivation from, the discourse of Keynesian 
economics). However it is the relation of flow to the second of these five 
correlates, ie. code, that is insisted upon as of primary importance. And 
in regard to a philosophy of matter this is entirely apposite. It is 
impossible writes Deleuze to "seize flows other than by and through the 
operation which codes them: the fact is that a non-coded flow is, strictly 
speaking an unnameable or merely a thing" (Deleuze 1971). 
As we have seen, code is associated with flux, and axiomatics is, as 
DeleuzeGuattari note, intimately involved with stratification (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 75/57). If one goes along with Deleuze and 
Guattari here, it follows that organisation is to be rejected in favour of 
an approach predicated upon composition, immanence, univocality. 
In 
such an approach/ matter is taken to be differentiated, 
both 
philosophically and empirically, only by virtue of intensities, 
in which 
particles, or the objects of an individuation, can only 
be differentiated 
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by their "speed and that enter into this or that individuated assemblage 
depending on their connections, their relations of movement" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 312/255). It is against this background that 
classical ontological questions predicated upon Being are severely 
problematised, the temptation is to say that there is no space for what 
counts as ontological questions in a DeleuzoGuattarian cosmos, simply 
because the focus cannot be placed upon a being but rather upon the 
dynamic relationships that hold them together. Ontological questions 
for DeleuzeGuattari can only be asked from the perspective of 
Spinozism, and in this latter, ontology is always a substrate of politics 
(Antonio Negri's formula for Spinozism is `ontology + politics = 
materialism'). An account, of this character, predicated upon 
relation/force (an index of consistency, or of consolidation) or the 
intermezzo, is not a moderated or different ontology: it is a different 
species of analysis altogether, the Greek on is non-existent, and its 
study does not figure, what does figure then is what Nietzsche described 
as the "seductive flash of gold on the belly of the serpent vita" 
(Nietzsche 1968 § 577). Haecceities, degrees, intensities, individuation 
each having their own modes of interrogation, which refuse the rigidity 
of all ontologies which are by default locked into sedentarisation. This 
latter is expressed by the return to pragmatics, "in which language 
never has universality in itself, self-sufficient formalisation, a general 
semiology, or a metalanguage" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 
140/111), an utter rejection of all philosophical positions that fail to 
produce themselves as modes of realisation immanent to that 
"energetic, molecular dimension", a space "that deploys its materiality 
through matter, a number unto itself that propels its traits through 
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form" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 509/409). This formulation will 
assume greater importance later when we see it emplaced in a 
discussion of morphogenesis. 
Excursus on Affective Bodies 
It is absolutely vital to pause here, to stand back, and to note the role 
played by Deleuze's reading of the bellicose Spinozist doctrine of 
affective bodies. Both Negri and Deleuze make it perfectly clear that 
they consider Spinozism to have been a declaration of war in 
philosophy, and the ground staked out, the Kampfplatz, is always that 
of the body, or of materiality. For Negri, Spinoza's corporeal 
transformation of the scene of philosophy marks a "horizon of war" 
(Negri 1991a 144), whilst for Deleuze, Spinoza's great provocation that 
"no one has yet determined what the Body can do" (Spinoza 1985 E 
U P2D) is a battle cry, a demand to shift the ground of philosophy from 
the abstract to the material. To respond to Spinoza, to be a Spinozist is 
a great refusal, a refusal to think in accord with what Deleuze calls the 
"traditional image of thought" by which he means "a more or less 
implicit, tacit or presupposed image of thought which determines our 
goals when we try to think" (Deleuze 1994 xvi)'. In this case, the move 
beyond the image of thought constitutes a refusal to 
define a thing by its form, nor by its organs and its 
functions, nor as a substance nor as a subject C... ] we will 
define it by longitude and latitude. A body can be anything; 
it can be animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an 
idea; it can 
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be a linguistic corpus, a social body or a collectivity. We call 
longitude of a body the set of relations of speed and 
slowness, of motion and rest, between particles that 
compose it from this point of view, that is, between 
unformed elements. We call latitude the set of affects that 
occupy a body at each moment, that is, the intensive states 
of an anonymous force (force for existing, capacity for being 
affected). In this way we construct a map of the body. 
(Deleuze 1988b 127) 
What is important though, is to realise that we have also gained, as a 
byproduct, an insight into the apparently flippant designation of Louis 
Hjelmslev as a "Spinozist geologist" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 
58/43), on the basis that, as John Deely writes, the "priority of relations 
over the intrinsic constitution of subjective being in the case of objects 
in their difference from things has best been stated in semiotics by 
Louis Hjelmslev" (Deely 1994 217). The horizon of ontological questions 
is the Spinozist one of speed, that is to say of an intensive multiplicity, 
and as such is not concerned with form, but rather with "a complex 
relation between differential velocities" (Deleuze 1988b 123). Correlate 
with this is the locking of ontological questions into the horizon of the 
concrete, as questions about individuation, the pursuit of "internal 
genesis" which in Deleuze's terms "consist[s] of intensive quantity 
rather than schema" (Deleuze 1968/94 26/40). In this Deleuzian 
understanding, Spinoza and Simondon are fused, such that the 
"individuation of the finite [... ] proceeds from an infinite quality to a 
corresponding quantity, which divides into irreducible 
intrinsic or 
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intensive parts" (Deleuze 1968/92 182/199)'. The novelty then of the 
ontological position staked out by the tradition in which Deleuze and 
Guattari position themselves lies in its predication- contra the 
philosophies of representation-- not on a fixed ur-ground, not on a 
search for a lost plenitude or origin, or for ideal forms, but on intensive 
difference. An ontological perspective cognisant only of the intensities 
generated from what we might call cosmic heterogenesis, something 
akin to Bruno's will-to-form (Mendoza 1995 222-4). Intensity is locked 
into affect, and affect is always a question about relation and 
production, such that this recasting of ontology has a further aspect. 
The prioritisation of relation (we have already seen that intensity is 
only generated out of relation, the concatenation of heterogeneous 
series), which is illustrated on certain strata by Deleuze, and 
DeleuzeGuattari's, deployment of the ethology- the Umwelt 
research- of Jakob von Uexküll, the inventor of "an admirable theory 
of transcodings" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 386/314)'. Or better 
still, it is not a deployment, but a becoming-Spinozist of Uexküll: in 
which "an animal, a thing" or indeed any entity that Deleuze would 
identify as a body "is never separable from its relations with the world. 
The interior is only a selected exterior, and the exterior, a projected 
interior" (Deleuze 1988b 125). The discussion of Uexküll in the plateau 
`1837- Of the Refrain' has two principal results. First, in Deleuze and 
Guattari's hands, Uexküll's work, that of a self-confessed Kantian for 
whom "the task of biology is to expand the result of Kant's research" 
(Jakob von Uexküll quoted in T. von Uexküll 1992 288), and who 
Heidegger saw fit to describe as the most interesting biologist alive, 
becomes an interesting and unexpected elaboration of Spinozism. That 
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is to say it lays the grounds for a possible displacement of the study of 
consciousness and subjectivity from its current dominance by rivalling 
schools of behaviourism and some form of Kantian or Heideggerian 
phenomenology, to a Spinozist concern with affect, power and 
relation-- a decidedly nonhumanist and nonanthropomorphic approach. 
Second, it allows for a Spinozism expressed in the terms of Simondon's 
analysis of the role of the membrane in the living. Needless to say, this 
detour through Uexküll, gives us a central mechanism of the Spinoza- 
Simondon conjunction or thought-event, in which all questions which 
had previously been subject to the stultifyingly artificial, reifying 
distinctions between subject and object, organism and environment, 
come to reside in relation, in the intermezzo". The combination of 
Simondon and Uexküll is of especial importance here because in 
addition to a philosophical programme for a recasting of an ontology of 
becoming, and a critique of the stasis of Kantianism, they offer 
concrete studies of the mechanisms of individuation (Simondon), and of 
the formation of milieus of becoming from the perspective of the 
nonhuman. 
The `thing-in-itself nonsensical. If I remove all the 
relationships, all the `properties', all the `activities' of a 
thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness 
has only been invented by us owing to the requirements of 
logic, thus with the aim of defining, communication (to bind 
together the multiplicity of relationships, properties, 
activities). (Nietzsche 1968 § 558) 
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The emphasis on production, or alternatively becoming, is a necessary 
component of an ontology predicated upon the priority of relation or of 
force. In Deleuze and Guattari force and relation are almost 
synonymous. In his discussion of the diagram, Deleuze writes that "the 
power to be affected is like a matter of force, and the power to affect is 
like a function of force" (Deleuze 1988a 72), it is then in force or relation 
that one apprehends mutant emergences, the creation of the new. This 
emphasis on both being affected and having the power of affecting 
makes clear that we are dealing with a concept with both Nietzschean 
and Spinozist elements, that conatus and will to power are to be 
understood conjointly, as means of understanding that mutual process 
in which organisms both make, and are made, by their worlds. Acting in 
the world adds a new strata to it: affections, forces are never single, it is 
in fact absurd to think of them as such, they are always, already plural, 
in relation. Massumi and Dean posit this force-relationality pair as the 
basis of a materialist political philosophy, they state that "force is 
relational, it is the very stuff of relationality: non-coincidence, 
differential, vector, less a thing than matter and energy at their point of 
indiscernibility E... ] it is becoming" (Dean and Massumi 1992 157). This 
set-up and its relationships with the Uexktill schema outlined above 
gives us the basis to liquidate questions of subjectivity, meaning, 
ideology, in both materialist political philosophy, as Massumi and Dean 
state, and in studies of the nonhuman world, which 
have been 
dominated by the importation of such anthropomorphic terms. 
It is in the tradition of such a political philosophy that Michael Ryan 
can write, that Spinoza privileges "potential 
(potenza) against power" 
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and that "Potential is the materialist production and constitution of 
being in Spinoza" (Ryan 1991b 216). It is on this basis that we can say 
that this process of production, individuation in Simondon, becoming in 
Nietzsche and Deleuze is not to be understood as tending towards a 
finished state, a final entity, as Bergson puts it "matter or mind, reality 
has appeared to us as a perpetual becoming. It makes itself or it 
unmakes itself, but it is never something made" (Bergson 1913 287). 
Further, "it does not aim at a final state, does not flow into `being' 
(Nietzsche 1968 § 708), any attempt at positing either ends or 
beginnings is irreducibly theological, it has an "ulterior theological 
motive" (Ibid. § 1066). This realisation is crucial to Giordano Bruno and 
it is the starting point for his conception of an infinite universe with 
neither centre, nor limit. This materialist thought is by definition anti- 
teleological, opposed to every shred of transcendence, any attempt to 
reintroduce a notion of God: "Becoming must be explained without 
recourse to final intentions; becoming must appear justified at every 
moment [... ] To this end it is necessary to deny a total consciousness of 
becoming, a 'God', to avoid bringing all events under the aegis of a being 
who feels and knows but does not will" (Nietzsche 1986 708). From this 
perspective, Nietzsche's scrutiny of the science of his day offers the 
vital basis for a critique of those trends in contemporary science and 
technoculture that are attempting to reintroduce a thought of God into 
cosmology`. 
Incorporeal Materialism and Schelling 
The relationship between philosophy and science being sought 
here is 
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asymmetric and is bound up with a conceptualisation of the limit, or 
rather with what it is that the limit materialises in the specific case in 
which it is embedded: 
- -philosophy is dependent upon the passing of words to the limit, the 
deformation of concepts, as in Whitehead's demand that "[w]ords and 
phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their 
ordinary usage", (Whitehead 1978 4) or Ciliberto's description of 
Bruno's concept of language as "an expressive reality" in which "the 
linguistic plane becomes interwoven with the essential planes of human 
history'" (Ordine 1996 154)4x. 
- -science is dependent upon bodies overstepping "the limit of their 
figures" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 138/108), in defects, 
instabilities, that are subject to what DeleuzeGuattari call incorporeal 
transformations (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 132/108). 
I propose that the development of an incorporeal materialism is 
another Schellingian element in DeleuzeGuattari's work, derived as it is 
by Schelling from his critique of dialectics, and from his deep immersion 
in Bruno (for Bruno's account of incorporeal transformation see his 
1998 75 - 9). As a critique of dialectics it is doubly connected to Deleuze 
and Guattari. The Schellingian critique is, as we shall see, a direct 
precursor of the one incorporated by Deleuze from Bergson. In a 
pointed reference to Hegel, Schelling suggests that the problem with 
contemporary philosophy is "its lack of intermediary concepts [... ] what 
is not morally free is straightaway mechanistic, what is not spiritual in 
the highest sense is corporeal", such concepts are, he argues "the only 
genuinely explanatory concepts in the whole of science" and to be 
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without them is to be "fully incapable of discovering truth" (Schelling 
1997 150). It is this insight that leads Schelling to propose a concept of 
the incorporeal, for the above citations are in response to the question 
"what is it that leads most people to slander matter? " Schelling argues, 
on the basis of his concept of the intermediary (or multiplicity) that the 
accepted understanding of "the construction of matter out of forces" 
coupled with the fact that forces "are undeniably something 
incorporeal" compels one to comprehend matter as being constituted 
by the incorporeal. He goes on to argue that without a "point of 
transfiguration" the "transition from the inorganic to the organic would 
be inconceivable" (Schelling 1997 151). 
This Schellingian concept of the incorporeal transformation is 
absolutely critical to DeleuzeGuattari's philosophy of matter, because 
it is here that the relationship between bodies, the immanent limit and 
an infinitely variable matter is thematised, a matter no longer subject 
to the statistical capture of hylomorphic determinations. To quote from 
A Thousand Plateaus "an incorporeal transformation is still attributed 
to bodies, but it is now a passage to the limit: that is the only way, not 
to eliminate death, but to reduce it or make it a variation itself" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 137/108). This passage goes on to 
introduce the opposition between the major and minor sciences such 
that the attachment of pragmatics (materialist philosophy) to minor 
science and the philosophy of matter is clarified. 
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Spinozist Bodies 
From the distinction given above it can be seen that philosophical 
assemblages are those in which it is "words that pass, words that are 
components of passage" that are to be constructed, as opposed to 
"order-words [that] mark stoppages or organised, stratified, 
composition" and in which one is attempting to "transform the 
components of order into components of passage" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/87 139/110). Whilst scientific assemblages depend upon 
the recognition of matter in states in which it is bodies that pass to 
"bifurcations, slowing-downs, and accelerations produce holes, breaks 
and ruptures that refer back to other variables, other relations, and 
other references" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 118/124). 
This condition of dependency denotes a criticality which can be indexed 
as a vector of deterritorialisation (transversality), and as such, the 
relationship between science and philosophy becomes one that is 
processed as autonomous, yet linked or articulated. Hence we confront 
a problem of organisation (which is, as we have seen, necessarily an 
axiomatic or a stratification), because science also has passwords and 
philosophy has bodies, Spinozist bodies. Superficially this can appear to 
be implicit (hence the rampancy of antiphilosophical tendencies in 
science best embodied perhaps in the work of such figures as Sokal and 
Brigmont'), nevertheless concepts can always become given in science. 
This denotes an ambulant coupling of affectation and event, by drawing 
the distinction in this way it becomes apparent that there are both 
incorporeal and corporeal events, and it is philosophy that is associated 
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with the former, and science with the latter. These assays of the limit 
concur with the attempt by DeleuzeGuattari to conceive of a historical 
breach between minor and major sciences (see in particular the 
discussion in the plateau `November 20,1923: Postulates of 
Linguistics', Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 137-9/108-10 and 
passim). The ultimate object of forcing this distinction is not the 
resurrection of some binary choice or prioritisation, but the active 
invention of a philosophy and science of matter subject to infinite 
variation, the creation of a plane of "a single liberated matter that 
contains no figures, is deliberately unformed, and retains in expression 
and in content only those cutting edges, tensors and tensions" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 138/109)'. 
Immanence partout 
Any attempt to do philosophy under the aegis of DeleuzeGuattari must 
be welded to a pragmatic commitment that it is materiality and 
immanence that are primary, immanence partout. This will mean that 
in sharp contradistinction to philosophy understood as the protector of 
images of thought, as an affinity with the true (the philosophy of the 
State), or the transcendent and absolute; philosophy in the way in 
which DeleuzeGuattari practice it, declares that the concept is lacking 
in meaning "to the extent that it is not connected to other concepts and 
is not linked to a problem that it resolves or helps to resolve" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1991/94 76/79). This, as we saw in the 
first chapter, is to 
characterise Deleuze and Guattari's concepts as produced 
in concrete 
analyses, and bearing an immanent relationship 
to a body of 
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knowledge, of historical, technical and political procedures. The 
immanent character of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts then is posed 
in direct contradistinction to Kant's declaration that "reason is never in 
immediate relation to an object, but only to the understanding [... ] it 
does not, therefore, create concepts (of objects) but only orders them" 
(Kant 1929 A 643/B 671). DeleuzeGuattari's philosophy is, therefore, 
distinctly n, even anti-Kantian, in that it is only concerned with the 
production of concepts that are, in the words of What is Philosophy?, 
situated by a distinction found within the scientific function around the 
interlinked questions of inseparable variations (philosophy), and 
independent variables (science). "Events on a plane of immanence and 
states of affairs in a system of reference (the different status of 
intensive ordinates in each case derives from this since they are 
internal components of the concept, but only coordinates of extensive 
abscissas in functions, when variation is no more than a state of 
variable). Concepts and functions thus appear as two types of 
multiplicities or varieties whose natures are different" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1991/94 121/127). It is in the selection of problems then that 
one draws the singular relation between a minor science and a minor 
philosophy. A point of note here is that whenever Deleuze deploys the 
concept of the multiplicity or of the multiple he is signalling the 
embeddedness of this concept in a resolute opposition to dialectic, 
deriving from his longstanding commitment to Bergson, and in 
particular to the decisive influence exerted on him 
by Bergson's 
analysis of the two kinds of multiplicity in the second chapter of 
his 
Time and Free Will. This is of course especially pertinent when 
it is a 
question of methodology. Consider 
for example this introduction of the 
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issue in Deleuze's `The Theory of Multiplicities in Bergson', "the very 
notion of multiplicity taken as a substantive implies a displacement of 
all of thought: for the dialectical opposition of the one and the multiple, 
we substitute the typological difference between multiplicities"'. The 
introduction of the concept of multiplicity is important for another 
reason beyond its role in a demonstration of the abstract (in a 
pejorative sense) character of dialectics. Multiplicity gives Deleuze and 
Guattari a criterion for the selection of true problems, the discernment 
of false ones: it allows them to invent problems, and as such gives their 
philosophical symptomatology a genuinely pragmatic basis. It is no 
mere coincidence that it is precisely at the point that Deleuze is giving 
his account of this invention, in the first chapter of his Bergsonism, that 
he cites Marx's dictum: "Humanity only sets itself problems that it is 
capable of solving" (Marx quoted in Deleuze 199116)'. Marx's sentence 
continues, "it will always be found that the problem itself arises only 
when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at 
least in the 
; process of 
formation". Invention means the shattering of 
the frameworks imposed on thinking by the orthodox canons of 
knowledge (Marx's ruling ideas). Deleuze calls it a prejudice transmitted 
by order-words towards accepting ready-made problems, accepting 
`Being', for example, as the philosophical problematic par excellence, it 
means the invention of minor disciplines with their own problematics. 
The rejection of ready-made problems is a refusal to think in accord 
with the State-form and its various intellectual and cultural 
assemblages (what Althusser would approximate to 
in his concept of 
the `Ideological State Apparatus' or ISA). The character of these minor 
disciplines, of this invention, however is not arbitrary, this is no 
license 
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for extreme subjectivism, for as we are always concerned to show, the 
thought of the State and the thought of heresy each have their own 
abstract diagrams, and an invention is always made on the basis of the 
possible, in Marks words, "when the material conditions for its solution 
already exist". 
Philosophical invention 
Philosophical concepts then can be characterised as being produced 
locally, embedded in machinic assemblages of thought and matter, as 
being immanent to a specific case, and as located on a transversal line 
drawn through the-strata. Immanence becomes resolved as method 
and content. This philosophical mode runs a line in tandem with what 
Antonio Negri calls the constitutive criteria of Marx's materialist 
method, a method whose criteria are determinate abstraction, 
tendency, practice, principle of `constitution' (of the structure), it is 
barely surprising, given that in Negri's construction -of 
Marx's 
philosophical genealogy his only philosophical predecessor is Spinoza, 
that the moment in the Grundrisse from which these criteria spring is 
that at which Marx identifies production with consumption, 
a and in turn 
identifies this with the Spinozist determinatio est negatioM. This 
Spinozist Marx will become increasingly important as this thesis 
progresses, both in terms of philosophical practice and the formation of 
concepts, the selection of problems. 
The profound singularity of DeleuzeGuattari's joint work is marked not 
just by a mode of conceptual invention, prodigious as it is, nor by a 
Organisation as Stratification 
104 
CC= 
mere recasting of philosophical concerns in the crucible of a sustained 
critique of a series of legacies, Freudian, Marxist, structuralist, 
phenomenological, cybernetic, and analytic. The shattered detritus of a 
series of modes of thinking all of which were, to varying degrees, 
characterised by a confidence as to their ability to secure an absolute 
point of view, by their harbouring of some kind of progressivist illusion, 
and all of which sought to sketch a "transcendental genesis of meaning, 
truth, or the conditions of possibilities of every truth" (Althusser 1997 
11). Rather, with Deleuze and Guattari one is led to the invention of a 
plastic and positive set of precise theses, which constitute the 
fundamenta of what we are describing as immanent or pragmatic 
materialism (Hardt and Negri 199417). 
The task here then is to continue with the elaboration of the essential 
productive propositions of such an enterprise. I have suggested that a 
critical precursor for this enterprise is Simondon's projection of his own 
mode of conceptual production as an allagmatic theory, "the theory of 
operations" in contradistinction to, and symmetrical with the theory of 
structures (Simondon 1995 260). Robert Rosen too, in outlining his 
attack on reductionism, dynamics, and mechanism in the Newtonian- 
Cartesian model of science proposes that what is called for is a form of 
relational modelling in which the component is championed against the 
particle; the component for Rosen is, crucially, the "particle of function" 
(Rosen 1991 120), Rosen's position is explicitly cast in terms that are 
critical to what he takes to be the ontology of stasis and discrete things 
underpinning most science. In a direct parallel to Rosen's work, Karl 
Pribram", one of the most interesting of contemporary neuroscientists 
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has explicitly followed Bergson in developing a position that seeks to 
move beyond both state and process classifications. Pribram found 
that when attempting to classify brain cells by function, both of the 
traditional options, that is state and process, were severely deficient, on 
the basis of such categories, he writes, he could "no more classify the 
brain cells than [he] could classify people". In their stead, he found that 
it was only a schema based on "the properties of a network or group of 
cells that permitted classification" (Pribram 1987 165). Pribram's work 
then points to the necessity of a relational, pragmatic and intensive 
modelling, and in this respect recalls Rosen's concept of entailment that 
we encountered earlier. From a vantage point similar to that of George 
Kampis, Rosen castigates most of what passes for revolutionary 
science (here I refer to the rhetoric of what is vaunted as the 
complexity revolution) as being fundamentally traditional at the level of 
ontology and epistemology'. Rosen's position may be seen as a 
continuation of the scientific tradition tracked in Gilles Chatelet's 
recent Les enjeux du mobile: mathematique, physique, philosophie. 
Chätelet focuses upon those recurring moments in the history of the 
physical sciences in which the virtual has erupted to displace the 
dominance of the Aristotelian presumption of stable forms. He notes 
for example that Galois' Theory of Algebraic Equations "no longer 
searches for `solutions' (in an expression such as x =... ) but describes 
the very dynamics of this research through the gradual individuation of roots"64. It 
is no surprise then that in Herbert Simon's genealogy" of versions of 
complexity in his The Sciences of the Artificial those in which we are 
interested are distinctly absent. This absence is resultant from the fact 
that the versions of complexity cherished by Simon remain within the 
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orthodox ontological framework whose persistence and whose unique 
claim to authority is undermined by, amongst others, Chätelet and 
Rosen. 
Immanent Criteria. Practice 
It is imperative to note here, that one of the results that is being 
claimed for DeleuzeGuattari's work, as exemplified principally in A 
Thousand Plateaus (and perhaps somewhat formalised in What is 
Philosophy? ) is that it represents a thorough break with currently 
disciplined modes of theoretical work. It is suggested that this break is 
not just on the level of the ontological and epistemological positions that 
it assumes, but, that embodied in Deleuze and Guattari's work is a 
unique attempt to respond to the unavoidable challenge thrown down to 
philosophy by Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. The claim then is 
that Deleuze and Guattari are announcing a renewal of a philosophy of 
practice, an interventionist, pragmatic, materialist philosophy. The 
critique of organisation is seen in this light as an imperative element of 
the "long tradition that had fostered heresy and struggle [... ] that 
organises itself as a theoretical practice that, on the battlefield 
between ideologies that philosophy represents, sustains and imposes 
an antidialectical, antihumanist, antihistoricist point of view. " (Negri 
1996b 61). A point of view that refuses all teleologies and finitude, and 
that positively maintains the "search for an open subjectivity that 
would construct theory and practice together,. that is to say a concept 
of practice in which to resolve philosophy" (Negri 1996b 59), a practice 
adhering to what Etienne Balibar, in a fine analysis of Spinoza's 
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politics, calls the "continuous production" of human individuals (Balibar 
1998 65)', and that Simondon calls the "fundamental mode of 
becoming: the living being conserving in itself an activity of permanent 
individuation' (Simondon 1995 27). For Deleuze and Guattari, as for 
Negri and Balibar, this cannot be a question of making revolutionary 
proclamations, the question of practice must be an immanently 
conceived and executed part of the analysis at hand, they are 
inseparably intertwined and constitutionally indivisible from each 
other. Practice in Deleuze and Guattari's understanding is the art of 
forming multiplicities or becomings (the two are synonymous), and this 
cannot be done according to a "preformed logical order" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/87 306/251), this however is not to counsel the random, 
the unthought, or the simplemindedness of the anarchic. The formation 
of multiplicities, whilst lacking in "preformed logical order"- 
transcendental blueprints such as the dogmatic adherence to a stable 
and universally applicable revolutionary programme (see for example 
the politics of the Stalinised Third International, a classic case of top 
down politics), or the imposition of abstract schemata- does have 
criteria. These criteria are local, immanent, micrological decisions that 
utilise the material at hand, for nothing can be brought in from the 
outside. They write: 
Practice does not come after the emplacement of the terms 
and their relations, but actively participates in the drawing 
of the lines: it confronts the same dangers and the same 
variations as the emplacement does. Schizoanalysis is like 
the art of the new. Or rather, there is no problem of 
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application: the lines it brings out could equally be the lines 
of a life, a work, of literature or art, or a society, depending 
on which system of coordinates is chosen (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/87 249/203) 
In a parallel move, George Kampis writes 
By describing the general `laws' of component-systems 
independently from their material realisation (molecular, 
cellular, organismic, mental, cultural), a deep unity of the 
various phenomenological domains can be recognised, and 
this makes a metatheory of systems that range from 
biology to society possible (Kampis 1991 275) 
To reiterate, what is derived from the drawing of lines is a set of 
concepts, concepts of matter, concepts demonstrating a pragmatic and 
an immanent character. The terms `pragmatic' and `immanent' 
themselves differ radically from their canonical usage within 
philosophical history by their activation as questioners of 
disciplinarisation, by their being conceived on, and as, concepts of the 
limit, a limit that is always conceived by DeleuzeGuattari as material 
and numerical (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 112/118). As we saw in 
chapter two, DeleuzeGuattari unquestionably follow Simondon in the 
construction of the most innovative and radical elements of their logic 
of expression, the spine of their distinctive materialism; as such, we will 
maintain that the question of the limit occupies un role primordiale 
(Simondon 1995 91). The limit or membrane is where for Simondon 
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"everything happens" (Simondon 1995 26), and where for microbiologist 
Lynn Margolis, life happen'. 
Margulis' theory of symbiotic evolution is predicated upon and develops 
a profound meditation upon the meaning of membranes for the 
identitarian sanctity of the bounded entity, and upon the "old 
metaphysical prejudice, [... ] the thinly disguised axiom [... ] that human 
beings are radically separate from all other organisms" (Margulis and 
Sagan 1986 19). She anatomises those philosophies and sciences that 
take it upon themselves to search for a mark of distinction whether it 
be the possession of a soul, of language, of technology "something, 
anything" that can be used to "unequivocally distinguishe[s] people 
from `lower' life forms" (loc. cit. ). Margulis' work constitutes powerful 
ammunition in the philosophical critique of the unitary self, of the eidos, 
and of the species, and provides the necessary scientific basis for a 
materialist, energetic, contagious antihumanism. So far as Margulis is 
concerned, one can develop the argument of the `Memories of a 
Bergsonian' plateau (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 290-2/237-9), in 
which a becoming communicative or contagious is proposed, such that 
the thesis of symbiosis as conceived under the aegis of the concept of 
the block of becoming, is mobilised as a key concept in the development 
of a critique of molar Darwinism: "Becoming is involutionary, involution 
is creative" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 292/238). Similarly, against 
Darwinism, "becoming is" shown to be "not an evolution, at least not an 
evolution by descent and filiation". 
Evolution, for Deleuze and Guattari, only contains veritable becomings, 
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and this is a truly Margulisian thought, in the "domain of symbioses, 
that bring into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms, with 
no possible communication" (loc. cit. ). This transversal communication 
across the heterogeneous is at the heart of the machinism of 
DeleuzeGuattari's thinking; the machine in their work is defined, beyond 
any technical specification, as the assemblage of the heterogeneous. It 
should be apparent how this critique reiterates a point raised earlier as 
an element in the construction of Deleuze and Guattari's ontology: the 
championing of the horizontal as a principle of immanence against the 
verticality of the transcendent. Molar Darwinism is built upon pure 
vertical lines of descent and filiation (the perfectionism of Linnaean 
forms), and critiqued by DeleuzeGuattari and Margulis' horizontal 
contagious involution. Contagious communication. "Contagion, 
epidemic, involves terms that are entirely heterogeneous: for example, 
a human being, an animal and a bacterium" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 295/242). This is indeed the case with the relationship between 
deep sea fish and the bioluminescent bacteria that inhabit them, 
permitting their hosts to illuminate the Hadean darknesses of the 
bottom of the seas (Pain 1999), and between fungi and trees, indeed the 
main reason, Margulis points out for the latter's resistance to 
cultivation is the intense degree of the symbiotic relationship, non- 
replicable in the factory conditions of modern agriculture'. "There is a 
block of becoming between young roots and certain microorganisms, 
the alliance between which is effected by the materials synthesised in 
the leaves (rhizosphere)" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 291/238). A 
contiguous path opens here, and it is one that will remain largely 
implicit in my remarks, leading to the beginnings of an attack upon the 
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assumptions of the Neo-Darwinism that Lynn Margulis has aptly 
described as "a minor twentieth century religious sect within the 
sprawling religious persuasion of Anglo-Saxon biology" (Margolis 1997 
100), an attack born out of the congruence between Simondon, 
Margulis, Rosen, and DeleuzeGuattari'. The biological tradition that 
this would most closely resemble would be that of a revivified 
developmentalism, what has been dubbed the "new Geoffroyism" 
(Depew and Weber 1996 433), in particular its emphases on 
morphogenesis, which as Deleuze suggests "is all about folding" 
(Deleuze 1990/95 216/158), and thermodynamics as applied to radically 
open systems, the historical names to which this tradition is attached 
would be Geoffroy, d'Arcy Thompson and arguably those elements of 
Waddington's work where it is inflected by Thom, an affective, 
intensive, contagious biology. A figure such as Kauffman would also be 
important here, as he assigns a critical role to morphogenesis, indeed 
his account of rhythmic phenomena, and his opposition to a 
theorisation of evolution that operates according to filiation, concurs 
with the DeleuzoGuattarian prioritisation of consistency in the 
examination of assemblages or organisms, with the opposition of 
"epidemic to filiation, contagion to heredity, peopling by contagion to 
sexual reproduction [... ] Unnatural participations [ ... ] spanning the 
kingdoms of nature. Propagation by epidemic, by contagion, has 
nothing to do with filiation by heredity" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 
295/241)'. It is these morphological practices that tend towards the 
characteristics of nomad science, continuous variation, the display of 
adequation, inequations, pursuit of singularities in matter, folding 
specifications, hylozoism, material-forces contra matter-form (vis. 
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Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 458/369). The question of consistency is 
crucial here as it operates as a central weapon in any attempt to 
shatter the stratifying procedures of molar or royal science: 
the problem of consistency concerns the manner in which 
the components of a territorial assemblage hold together. 
But it also concerns the manner in which different 
assemblages hold together, with components of passage 
and relay (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 403/327). 
Topololical Thermodynamics. Simondon Again 
the living lives at the limit of itself, on the limit [... ] the 
characteristic polarity of life is at the level of the 
membrane; it is here that life exists in an essential fashion 
as an aspect of a dynamic topology which maintains the 
metastability by which it exists [... ] the entire content of 
internal space is topologically in contact with the content of 
the exterior at the limits of the living (Simondon 1995 
224-6). 
The most perceptive observers of the scientific revolution currently 
underway, the explorers of that unstable realm on the edge of chaos: 
the complexity revolution, have noted that its most radical implications 
are being overlooked. Those implications are at the level of the 
challenges posed to an epistemology and ontology welded to stability. 
What is missing is a philosophy sufficiently powerful to take cognisance 
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of these explorations. I have tried to suggest that one place to look for 
such a philosophy is Deleuze and Guattari's critique of organisation, the 
inverted vitalistic philosophy of matter that is produced by their work. 
What I have initiated then is an examination of that "whole history on 
the level of the membrane or limit" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 
67/51) that DeleuzeGuattari seek to uncover. 
The problem of morphogenesis introduced above is part of a minor, 
philosophically aware biology, and it is one that sits well within the 
range of DeleuzeGuattari's scanning of critical problems in the natural 
sciences. In a sense, it is something of a testcase for their theoretical 
work, encapsulating as it does, so many of the key issues in their 
discernment of problematics. Morphogenesis, with its hylozoic, 
expressive collapsing of the categories of matter and form into those of 
matter and intensity. As such it acts as a condensation of the 
questions that index the critique of hylomorphism as a basic structure 
for scientific and philosophical practice. Simultaneously it poses severe 
difficulties for molar, zoocentric biology predicated upon the species. 
In a paper entitled `Visual Models of Morphogenesis' Przemyslaw 
Prusinkiewicz notes that two types of approach can be discerned in the 
study of morphogenesis (the development of patterns and forms in the 
domain of the living) 
1. the first tradition following d'Arcy Thompson, is where one would 
locate figures such as Rosen, in which form is taken as a 
derivative of growth: "It is obvious" Thompson writes "that the 
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form of an organism is determined by its rate of growth in 
various directions; hence rate of growth deserves to be studied as 
a necessary preliminary to the theoretical study of form, and 
organic form itself is found, mathematically speaking, to be a 
function of time" (Thompson 1952 79). 
2. the second approach, deriving from Turing, focuses on the flow of 
substances through a medium, in which "the systems considered 
consist of masses of tissues which are notgrowing, but within 
which certain substances are reacting chemically, and through 
which they are diffusing" (Turing 38). 
Evidently, this first tradition is one that exhibits, what Deleuze had 
identified in his work on Spinoza as intensive quantity, Spinozist 
individuation is "neither qualitative nor extrinsic, but quantitative and 
intrinsic, intensive" (Deleuze 1968/92 181/197). That this principle is 
critical to Deleuze and Guattari's critique of biology, and that it brings 
them into direct relation with the former morphogenetic tradition, is 
evidenced by the following citation, a key statement of their 
comprehension of morphogenetic growth. Occurring in the middle of one 
of the most intricate, iconoclastic, conceptually fertile and at the same 
time rarely considered passages in A Thousand Plateaus, this passage 
makes clear that questions of individuation in the natural world from 
the crystal to the organism are as central to Deleuze and Guattari as 
they are to Simondon. Moreover it demonstrates that these questions 
are not to be treated as metaphor, but rather as distillations, and 
pragmatic deployments, of transversal concepts derived from a range 
of diverse disciplines and rendered immanently functional in defined 
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milieus: 
When content and expression are divided along the lines of 
the molecular and the molar, substances move from state 
to state, from the preceding state to the following state, or 
from layer to layer, from an already constituted layer to a 
layer in the process of forming, while forms install 
themselves at the limit between the last layer or last state 
and the exterior milieu. Thus the stratum develops into 
epistrata and parastrata; this is accomplished through a 
set of inductions from layer to layer and state to state, or at 
the limit. A crystal displays this process in its pure state, 
since its form expands in all directions but always as a 
function of the surface layer of the substance, which can be 
emptied of most of its interior without interfering with the 
growth. (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 78/60) 
Schizoanalytic questions concerning the limit are cemented into a 
highly complex, mobile and immensely powerful abstract machine, or 
minor philosophical assemblage. The elements contributed by Margulis 
and Simondon are taken up as finely honed cutting edges of 
deterritorialisation aimed at symbiosis and individuation respectively, 
the nomos and transduction (transcoding). But to unleash its full 
potential requires carefully delineated operations. These operations do 
not amount to an abdication of philosophy to the supposedly superior 
clarity of concepts forged in the implementations and encodings of the 
physical sciences, the implementation of empirical practices, the 
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encoding of material phenomena in physical law. Nor can they be 
contained by the Kantian prescription of the limits of scientific 
theorisation. Instead, the full weight of DeleuzoGuattarian pragmatics 
is directed at the production of transversal concepts which dislodge, and 
then follow, singularities produced in a range of cases, across the 
strata, always governed by a pursuit of materiality and its generative 
diagrammatisation, this pursuit is always creative, for having liberated 
philosophy from the tyranny of the true, its object is emergence, the 
creation of the new. The meaning of the heterogenesis of the concept 
becomes particularly pertinent at this point, as it is the basis for 
philosophy's dignity and autonomy, it is no longer the servant of science 
nor the interpreter of art, it regains its own creativity. The convergence 
that is run here is between parallel theses in minor disciplines, a minor 
science and a minor philosophy. It is in this sense then that at the 
micrological level the structure of a philosophy, its production of affects 
and concepts, and at a macrological level, the history, and this term will 
be a misnomer, of philosophy and that of the relationship between 
philosophy and its outsides (nonphilosophy, art, science) is cognised as 
"becoming, not history; it is the coexistence of planes, not the 
succession of systems" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 59/59). Hence 
philosophical time is a time of coexistence, a time that superimposes 
the before and after in a "stratigraphic order" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1991/94 58/59). As Isabelle Stengers and Ilya Prigogine write of the 
dispute between Bergson- and his rejection of "homogeneous and 
independent time" in favour of "many different rhythms which, slower 
or faster, measure the degree of tension or relaxation of different kinds 
of consciousness" (Bergson 1991207) - and Einstein- who had sought 
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to eliminate time from physics altogether- on the questions of the 
existence of a plurality of durations, of time and its irreversibility, 
"[e]very complex being is composed of a plurality of times, connected 
together by way of subtle and multiple articulations" (Stehgers 1997c 
42). Indeed, prioritised by Deleuze and by Guattari (see in particular 
the latter's Cartographies schizoanalytiques) are geographic as opposed 
to historical principles, the multidimensional complexities of topology 
and cartography against the simplistic rigidity of monodimensional, 
oppositional or dialectical schemas. 
Che at vero filosofo oM i terreno 0 xýatria6' 
Deleuze and Guattari's work is replete with references to the sciences 
of the earth, from the continually reiterated demands for a new earth in 
both Anti-Oedipus and What is Philosophy?, to the great concepts of de- 
and reterritorialisation, stratification, folding, and sedimenting, culled 
from geomorphology and geology, Guattari's cartographic strategies, 
and the emphasis on the mapping of milieus in the joint works- the 
insistence that "we are not even doing history [... ] we are trying to 
make maps of regimes of signs" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 
149/119), and of course the plateau `10,000 BC: Geology of Morals 
(Who Does the Earth Think It Is? )'. Arnaud Villani, as we have seen, 
describes A Thousand Plateaus as containing a physical geography, and 
one of the chapters of What is Philosophy?, an exceptionally 
programmatic chapter, calls for a geophilosophy which puts "thought 
into a direct relationship with the earth" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 
82/85). This adoption of a tellurian emphasis, a geomorphism, is 
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deployed to deliberate pragmatic ends, as a key tactical move. 
Principally it serves as a means to ward off "the slightest risk [... ] the 
slightest interpretation" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 392/318) of 
anthropomorphism. To make philosophy a geophilosophy is a great 
affront to the way in which Deleuze had been taught the discipline (as 
he reminds us in Negotiations), that is as the history of philosophy. It is 
also of course a rejection of the dominant forms of philosophy adhered 
to by Deleuze and Guattari's contemporaries, whether they be 
Heideggerian or Hegelian, which remain avowedly historicist in their 
various narratives of the unfolding of the concept, "inasmuch as they 
posit history as a form of interiority in which the concept necessarily 
develops or unveils its destiny" (Deleuze and Guattari 1990/94 91/95). 
This transformation of philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari write, is 
imagined in much the same way as Fernand Braudel's transformation 
of history itself, into a geohistory. Braudel's work is concerned with 
"this rich zone, like a layer covering the earth [... ] material life or 
material civilisation" (Braudel 1985 23), and his questions always ask 
about the `where', the `what', and the `how many' (recall our comments 
above on Bergson and multiplicity') rather than the `when', he talks of 
history in terms of "numbers, lines of force, repetitions and typologies" 
(Braudel 1985 92), and of certain events, here, the coming of the 
Nomads, as an attraction towards a "cyclonic zone, an enormous 
vacuum" (Braudel 1985 96), and of towns as "electric transformers [... ] 
restrictive and distinctive geometries" (Braudel 1985 479,491). For 
both DeleuzeGuattari and Braudel, the geographical is associated with 
the irreducibility of the contingent as opposed to the cult of necessity 
harboured by the historical (Deleuze and Guattari 1990/94 92/96), with 
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the currents of winds and oceans, the shearing points of ice masses, the 
speed of overflowing lavas, and shifting magmas. It is this same 
contingency that provides the character of Deleuze and Guattari's 
becomings, the meetings of the heterogeneous, hence their association 
of the concept with becoming, and so with geography. They write 
"becoming is the concept itself. It is born in history, and falls back into 
it, but is not of it. In itself it has neither beginning nor end but only a 
milieu. It is thus more geographical than historical. " (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1990/94 106/110). 
In the next chapter we turn to a critique of a work that seeks to pursue 
the meeting of DeleuzeGuattari's geophilosophy and Braudel's 
geohistory. 
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In this way the boundless refuse of activity pushes human 
plans- including those associated with economic operations- 
into the game of characterising universal matter; matter, in 
fact, can only be defined as the nonlogical difference that 
represents in relation to the economy of the universe what 
crime represents in relation to the law. 
(Bataille 1/1985 319/129) 
Hence it happens that one who seeks the true cause of 
miracles, and is eager, like an educated man, to understand 
natural things, not to wonder at them like a fool, is generally 
considered and denounced as an impious heretic by those 
whom the people honor as interpreters of nature and the 
Gods. For they know that if ignorance is taken away, then 
foolish wonder, the only means they have of arguing and 
defending their authority, is also taken away. 
(Spinoza, 1985 EI appendix) 
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In the `Conclusions and Speculations' to his A Thousand Years of 
Nonlinear History (De Landa 1997 257-74) Manuel De Landa 
describes his book as offering a "historical survey of these flows of 
`stuff, as well as with the hardenings themselves" (De Landa 1997 
259). The stuff referred to is broken down in the structure of the book 
into three sections, each corresponding to one of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari's three major strata, that is, the "physicochemical, 
organic and anthropomorphic" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 
627/502), which for De Landa are taken to be `Lavas and Magmas', 
`Flesh and Genes', and `Memes and Norms'. The hardenings, or 
elsewhere `slowings down' of this stuff, or matter-energy in movement, 
take different forms on the three strata: the formation of features of 
the geological landscape by the hardening of the eponymous lavas and 
magmas; the coagulation of the flows of biological matter, "biomass, 
genes, memes and norms" (De Landa 1997 258) into human and 
animal bodies; the extrusion of languages from the "momentary slowing 
downs or thickenings in a flow of norms", and the creation of 
institutions considered as "transitory hardenings in the flows of money, 
routines and prestige" (De Landa 1997 259). A further qualification is in 
order before we go any further: the hardenings to which flowing matter 
is subject come in two different forms, forms named by Deleuze and 
Guattari as strata and self-consistent aggregates, and renamed, it would 
appear quite arbitrarily, by De Landa as `hierarchies' and `meshworks'. 
In executing this analysis De Landa builds a conceptual armature out 
of a weave of two elements: first, a historical perspective closely 
patterned on Fernand Braudel's magisterial Civilisation and 
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Capitalism: 15th-18th Century, the fine grain of the micrological 
secured by the perspective of the longueduree and an attention to the 
cycles and flows of economic life: Kondratieff waves seen through the 
lenses of nonlinear dynamics. Second, and perhaps more important 
here is De Landa's extensive engagement with key concepts drawn 
from the two volumes of Deleuze and Guattari's Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, in particular from the second volume, A Thousand 
Plateaus. What would appear to be most in accord with the approach to 
these concepts argued for in this thesis, is De Landa's attention to the 
pragmatic emplacement of the concepts in an empirical study, the 
attempt to lodge them on a specific stratum. The DeleuzoGuattarian 
concepts with which De Landa is most concerned are those of De- and 
restratifccation, nonorganic life, the Body without Organs, and the 
machinic phylum. The result of the fusion of these two elements, allows 
one to read A Thousand Years as a sustained attempt to demonstrate 
the validity of Guattari's claim in his article `The Plane of Consistency' 
that "what makes the thread of history- from protohistory until the 
scientific revolutions- is the machinic phylum" (Guattari 1977 315). 
In a certain respect A Thousand Years presupposes a familiarity with 
De Landa's first book, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines as it is 
there that he first detailed his understanding of the way in which the 
machinic phylum is imbricated with human, and in particular military, 
history. De Landa contends that it is only by detailing this relationship 
that a genuinely materialist history can be written. 
Lurking not too far beneath the surface of De Landa's work is an 
unexpected agenda, one most clearly revealed 
in his spoken 
Schizoanalytic Materialism 
123 
presentations of his research: that is an unmitigated attack upon, and 
rejection of, Marxism as a tool of historical analysis, it is significant in 
this respect that the only overt criticism of Deleuze and Guattari given 
inA Thousand Years is precisely for their commitment to Marxism: 
[d]espite the fact that their philosophical work represents 
an intense movement of destratification, Deleuze and 
Guattari seem to have preserved their own stratum, 
Marxism, which they hardly touch or criticise (De Landa 
1997 331). 
The problem with this attack is principally this: commitment to 
Marxism on Deleuze and Guattari's part is by no means accidental or 
liminal, it plays, I want to suggest, a privileged role amongst the 
cornucopia of sources from which they draw. Indeed it plays a critical 
role in organising a key set of concepts, most dominant in Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia. such that the substantial third chapter of Anti- 
Oedipus, `Savages, Barbarians and Civilised Men' can barely be 
understood, is scarcely comprehensible, without reference to Marx's 
Grundrisse, the chapter is in fact best read as an attempt to rewrite 
and expand certain fundamental themes of the Grundrisse, and in 
particular that section of it that deals with `Precapitalist Economic 
Formations'. At the same time, this chapter is preoccupied with a 
debate central to Marxist theory, that of the presence or absence of 
teleology in Marx's account of human history. Marx himself was 
resolutely clear in his opposition to any semblance of teleology 
identifying it as a "metaphysical spectre" (Marx and Engels 1976 59), 
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writing that "history is nothing but the succession of the separate 
generations [... ] This can be speculatively distorted so that later history 
is made the goal of earlier history [... ] thereby history receives its own 
special goals and becomes a person ranking with other persons' (to wit: 
`self-consciousness, criticism, the unique', etc), while what is designated 
with the words `destiny', `goal', `germ', or `idea' of earlier history is 
nothing more than an abstraction from later history" (Marx and Engels 
1976 59). Such is Marx's consistently held position on this subject. Let 
us be perfectly clear about this: impositions of telos, necessary 
progress on the course of history imputed to Marx or Marxism are 
distortions introduced by, on the one hand, Stalinists, who had political 
reasons to do so, and later Marxists who failed to understand the 
radicality and depth of Marx's critique of Hegel (as is well known Marx 
sharply disassociated himself from much of the thought that claimed to 
be produced under his aegis). All of the latters' categories are for Marx 
irretrievably theological; and, on the other hand, by opponents of any 
form of Marxism. As Marx makes clear, in his analysis of the "ruling 
class and the ruling ideas", and of ideology in general, and as we have 
repeatedly shown in this thesis, Deleuze and Guattari concur in their 
analysis of State science, teleological ideas are of necessity cast in the 
same mould as theological ones. This philosophical event is called Hegel 
ou Spinoza", and in it Hegel is a functionary of the State, and Spinoza 
its most virulent critic. It is on these grounds that we can "regard 
Spinoza as Marx's only direct ancestor, from the philosophical 
standpoint" (Aithusser and Balibar 1970 102)'. Understood in this way 
it is possible to reconceptualise the political stakes invested in 
Deleuze's continual prioritisation of Spinoza over Hegel. For all of these 
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reasons, any project that attempts to account for social history in a 
way that claims some fidelity to Deleuze and Guattari is ultimately 
doomed if it pretends that Marxism is an irrelevance or a nostalgic 
affectation hung onto by disappointed soixante-huitards. Deleuze and 
Guattari's attempt to understand capitalism as a voracious, ever 
expanding, all consuming producer of axiomatics is incomprehensible 
without reckoning with the event of Marx. De Landa states that there 
are "at least two things" that prevent him from subscribing to Marxist 
concepts, these are "the labour theory of value which Piero Schraffa 
[sic. this should read `Sraffa', EA] has clearly shown to be a redundant 
part of Marxist economics [... ] and the built-in teleology in the 
traditional Marxist periodisation of history" (De Landa 1997 281). Both 
of these are, for reasons that I shall demonstrate entirely insufficient 
and function as the crudest caricature. Whilst it is true that Sraffa 
launched an attack on the labour theory of value and by so doing exited 
from Marxist economics it is also the case that the one need not lead to 
the other. Support for the labour theory is by no means a prerequisite 
of Marxism, indeed there is a long tradition within Marxism (one that 
starts arguably with Marx) that also rejects it. A contemporary, and 
virulently Marxist, argument in favour of rejecting the labour theory is 
presented by Antonio Negri under the rubric of the real subsumption of 
society to capital. For Negri the redundancy of the labour theory of 
value is tied "to a previous and out-dated organisation of labour and 
accumulation" and goes on to write that a major shift has taken place 
in the political landscape of the developed world (or the core) and that 
problems exist for a politics maintained in the name of a hypostatised 
industrial proletariat. Negri assesses his project as the bringing of 
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two traditional thematics, the question of the validity of the 
law of value, and the development of the transition between 
socialism and communism, into contact with the new phase 
of political history: the subsumption of the entire society 
under capital in the process of capitalist accumulation, and 
therefore the end of the centrality of the factory working 
class as the emergence of revolutionary subjectivity (Negri 
1996a 149). 
It is the conjunction of "post-Fordism as the principal condition of the 
new social organisation of labour and as the new model of 
accumulation, and post-Modernism as the capitalist ideology adequate 
to this new mode of production" that together form the assemblage 
named by Negri "the real subsumption of society within capital" (Negri 
1996a 154). De Landa is constitutionally incapable of recognising this 
because his understanding of Marxism is as a set of incontrovertible 
empirical truths rather than as a method. Felix Guattari lucidly points 
out that it is Marx in the Grundrisse who "insisted on the absurdity and 
the transitional character of a measure of value based on work time" 
(Guattari 1996 205), the simple reason for this is that as Marx 
recognised, there is a growing discrepancy between the machinic, 
intellectual and manual components of labour, such that "Human time 
is increasingly replaced by machinic time" (Guattari 1996 207). A 
crucial factor in this of course is the transition of the economies of 
Europe, Japan, and North America from being based on the production 
of physical commodities to the predominance of the information and 
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service industries. De Landa's second reason for rejecting Marxism ie. 
that it is beholden to a predetermined teleological progression of stages 
is simply, and I return to this point later, laughable. Such an argument 
is a fatuous irrelevance that can only be countenanced seriously in a 
culture where Marxism's image has been so thoroughly tarred with the 
brush of Stalinism that it is possible to present it in such a caricatured 
form. 
Unevenness and Heterogeneity 
De Landa's book then is significantly marred by the total inadequacy of 
this attack, and it is upon this that I wish to concentrate. The Marxism 
that he professes to reject is one entirely stripped of subtlety, one 
ignorant of the extensive debates that have raged within Marxist 
theory on the genesis of different modes of production, and of the 
concomitant literatures on `stageism', on the origins of capitalism (the 
various positions in this debate are collected in the volume The 
Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, and assessed in Aidan 
Foster-Carter's important survey article `The Modes of Production 
Controversy'), the nature of the world system (a concept cursorily 
rejected by De Landa in classic postmodernist terms as being a "great 
master concept, the great homogenisation", De Landa 1997 267), and 
most notably the concept of combined and uneven development. It is 
this latter idea which plays a crucial role in DeleuzeGuattari's reading 
of Marx, in particular in Anti-Oedipus, a text, the sense of which De 
Landa has, in recent spoken presentations', demonstrated an 
apparent and curious ignorance. Marx explicitly discusses the 
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continued existence of the symptoms of a previous social form in a 
period when its material base or `cause' has long vanished: "Alongside 
the modern evils, we are oppressed by a whole series of inherited evils, 
arising from the passive survival of archaic and outmoded modes of 
production, with their accompanying train of anachronistic social and 
political relations. We suffer not only from the living, but from the dead. 
Le mort saisit le vif. /" (Marx 1976 91). So much for linear causality in 
Marx. Rather we have here the presaging of a complex view of 
involution that Deleuze and Guattari describe as "reverse causalities 
that are without finality but testify nonetheless to an action of the 
future on the present, or of the present on the past", and note this well, 
"it is these reverse causalities that shatter evolution" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/87 537/431). On this latter point De Landa suggests 
that only his model, nominally derived from the application of nonlinear 
dynamics to economic theory, can account for a situation such as that 
in which one sees the existence of an urban agglomeration evincing 
nominally capitalist relations of production surrounded by a rural 
expanse dominated by feudal relations. It is however precisely such 
assemblages of heterogeneous elements that are accounted for by the 
concept of combined and uneven development (see for example Marxist 
analyses of the situation in Tsarist Russia on the eve of the 1917 
Revolution, in which one finds large urban centres, Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, characterised by advanced capitalist relations of 
production including the largest factories then extant in Europe- 
Trotsky notes for example that, in 1914 in the US 17.8% of the 
workforce was employed in factories of 1000 workers or more, in Russia 
the corresponding figure was 41.4% - surrounded by a countryside in 
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which social relations were entirely feudal, peasants were still, in 
Gogol's phrase, and as detailed in his novel of the same title, dead souls 
that is chattels bound to, and sold with, plots of land rather than being 
free agricultural labourers selling chunks of variable capital embodied 
in their labour, the existence of serfdom was a de facto reality into the 
early 1920's even though it was juridically annulled in the reforms of 
1861). Here, then is the classic statement of the principle: 
"Unevenness, being the most general law of the historic process, 
reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of the 
backward countries [... ] From the universal law of unevenness thus 
derives [... ] the law of combined development- [... ] an amalgam of 
archaic with more contemporary forms" (Trotsky 1980 6). This law 
finds its direct correlate in DeleuzeGuattari's theorem eight of 
generalised double deterritorialisation which states that "one 
assemblage does not have the same forces or even speeds of 
deterritorialisation as another; in each instance, the indices and 
coefficients must be calculated according to the block of becoming 
under consideration" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 377/307). It is to 
the mechanisms by which these grotesque dissymmetries are 
generated between different economic zones by the Capitalist 
axiomatic that Samir Amin has dedicated a major part of his project. 
Amin's work, we should note, plays a critical role in Deleuze and 
Guattari's account of contemporary Capitalist axiomatics in the 
thirteenth plateau `7000 BC: Apparatus of Capture'. This account is 
one that Antonio Negri has described as becoming evermore prescient, 
and consequently he has suggested, the time of Mille Plateaux is still in 
the future, it is in the process of becoming, and it is "Becomings, 
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becomings-animal, becomings-molecular, [that, EA] have replaced 
history, individual or general" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 200/162). 
Whilst one may critique Amin's proposals for escaping from the 
progressive impoverishment generated by the development of 
underdevelopment which is contingent upon these asymmetrical 
relations as being ludicrously idealist. Put briefly, Amin proposes and 
advocates a model of autarchic economic development which directly 
opens onto and supports the third-worldist ideology rampant in the 
1970's, one cannot help but find his general thesis, which serves as a 
caustic rejoinder to the patent inanities of the bourgeois faith in the 
generosity of the trickle down effect played out on a global scale, to be 
convincing'. 
The Internal I, mit. Spinoza 
'Integrated World Capitalism', to use Alliez and Guattari's terminology 
and contrary to de Landa's claims, is never characterised in Marxist 
theory as a smooth space of homogeneous relations, but rather is 
marked by the radical coexistence of unevenness at every level of 
investigation. Marxist economics at its most powerful, is committed to 
an anti-Platonism precisely in the sense that it rejects the possibility of 
the existence of pure forms, an evolutionary procession of stages, it is 
indeed predicated upon the existence of noncapitalist relations, the 
global axiomatic of capitalism, to quote Deleuze and Guattari, has "no 
laws but immanent ones. It would like for us to believe that it confronts 
the limits of the Universe, the extreme limit of resources and energy. 
But all it confronts are its own limits" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 
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579/463) so that according to the "deepest law of capitalism; it 
continually sets and then repels its own limits, but in so doing gives rise 
to numerous flows in all directions that escape its axiomatic" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/87 590/472). In more orthodox Marxist terms, 
Capitalism "is born and develops within the framework of a pre- 
capitalist mode of production" (Mandel 1977 125). The model that De 
Landa projects onto Marxism is one that the Trotskyist economist 
Ernest Mandel has diagnosed as "isolat[ing] `pure' forms which in real 
life are combined, or have more or less degenerated. To reduce economic 
history to a series of `stages' or to the successive appearance of 
`categories' is to make it excessively mechanical, to the point of 
rendering it unrecognisable [... ] The Marxist conception of economic and 
social change has no place for any fatalism or automatism. No phase of 
social organisation `must' necessarily succeed another" (Mandel 1977 
91). As such the development of Capitalism, for both Deleuze and 
Guattari and for Marxism, is predicated upon the existence of the 
uneven development of different sectors, that is to say, it is an axiom of 
Capitalism, a structural necessity. This difference has a structure 
demonstrating selfsimilarity on each and every scale from the global 
(between hemispheric sections), to the national (between regions), to 
the local (between and within, for example, the different areas of a city). 
This proposition takes the form of the internal limit, "the South is an 
abstract term designating the Third World or the periphery, and even 
that there are Souths or Third Worlds inside the centre" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/87 585/468). The problem with De Landa's position as 
staked out in this book, is that whilst he claims to be consistent with 
DeleuzeGuattari's project he has in fact chosen to ignore or reject an 
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absolutely fundamental part of their work, a part of their work to which 
the bulk of Anti-Oedipus and at least two plateaus of A Thousand 
Plateaus is dedicated, and that is their account of Capitalism's spread 
across the globe in terms of "(t)he four principal flows that torment the 
representatives of the world economy, or of the axiomatic, [which] are 
the flow of matter-energy, the flow of population, the flow of food, and 
the urban flow [... ] the axiomatic never ceases to create all of these 
problems, while at the same time, its axioms, even multiplied, deny it 
the means of resolving them" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 585/468). 
This account is explicitly given in terms derived from, and consistent 
with, the most sophisticated Marxist accounts of the functioning of the 
Capitalist world machine or axiomatic, and Deleuze and Guattari's twin 
volumed Capitalism and Schizophrenia is nothing else if not a 
sustained engagement with Marx. There seems to this reader to be no 
possible way around this without committing the most grotesque 
misrepresentation of their work. Hence, whilst the critique of, and 
engagement with, Freud in the two volumes of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia is often remarked on, the equally important development 
of Marx, the attempt to think a Marxism, is overlooked. The entire 
point of the already remarked on third chapter of Anti-Oedipus is to 
secure an account of universal history which will escape its Hegelian 
determination as a theology (teleology) by seizing hold of "the conditions 
of its contingent, singular existence, its irony, and its own critique" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 324/271). Deleuze and Guattari's work 
then can be seen as having far more to do with that particular French 
school of Marxism, which inspired by Althusser, sought to develop a 
Marxism inspired by Spinoza rather than by Hegel. Why? "Because 
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Spinoza is the founder of an absolutely original conception of praxis 
without teleology, because he thought the presence of the cause in its 
effects and the very existence of structure in its effects and in 
presence" (Negri 1994/95 125/12). One can only agree with Fredric 
Jameson's judgement on this: "Deleuze is alone among the great 
thinkers of so-called poststructuralism in having accorded Marx an 
absolutely fundamental role in his philosophy" (Jameson 1997 395). 
Machinic Critique 
To return to this question of the nature of the Capitalist machine we 
must ask what, in this sense, in the sense understood by 
DeleuzeGuattari, is a machine? In beginning to address this question we 
must be quite clear that we are in a way approaching one of the most 
distinctive elements of their thinking and that is precisely their attack 
upon one of the great structuring dualisms of Western thought, that 
between mechanism and vitalism, and their transcending of the split 
with the proposal of a great machinic thinking, a machinism ', "which is 
something else entirely: it designates every system that cuts off fluxes 
going beyond both the mechanics of technology and the organisation of 
the organism, whether it be in nature, society, or man" (Guattari 1995 
99). Deleuze and Guattari go to great lengths to stress that what is 
being proposed here is in no way subject to the great dispute between 
mechanism and vitalism alluded to above, they are not alone in this for 
the biologist Robert Rosen too makes clear that there is a third way 
passing beyond these two immutable alternatives, for Rosen it is called 
complexity, he notes that biology must- and indeed for some biological 
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scientists, notably Rosen, Margulis and Kauffman this is a basic 
starting point- move beyond mechanism, and the "alternative is not 
vitalism, it is complexity" (Rosen 1991 262)'. Deleuze and Guattari 
make much of this set of distinctions, recall the section of Anti-Oedipus 
entitled `Beyond vitalism and mechanism', a beyond that returns us to 
the opening of this section: with the machinic phylum. 
In the present circumstances it will have to suffice to note that the 
machine in DeleuzeGuattari's work is by no means something 
metaphorical (something of which de Landa gave an exemplary 
demonstration in his previous book's discussion of Sadi Carnot's 
discovery of the abstract diagram in relation to his research into the 
construction of a heat engine, De Landa 1994 141). The machine 
denotes something that is "constituted from the moment there is 
communication between two portions of the outside world that are 
really distinct in a system that is possible although less probable" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1974 466); it is axiomatic then that a machine is 
composed of heterogeneous elements and also that its definition goes 
way beyond the merely technical. The analysis of the machine is 
extended towards, for example, its historicopolitical deployment in 
Deleuze's article on `Controle et devenir' focusing on the intimacy 
between the changing nature of the abstract diagram through time and 
the different societal forms in which it is embedded: think of the 
relationship between clockwork and the absolutist state, disciplinary 
societies and thermodynamic machines, "control societies [... ] with 
information technology and computers" (Deleuze 1990/95 237/180). 
Pierre Levy has extended some of these considerations in his account of 
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the virtualisation of the tool and his demonstration that "material 
instruments and artifacts provide us with a large number of concrete 
and socially shared models, with which we can metaphorically 
apprehend more abstract phenomena or problems" (Levy 1998 125). 
This machinic account is one that is philosophically and pragmatically 
rigorous, one that operates according to an expanded logic of general 
economics to the scale of the universe. Intimately connected to the 
DeleuzoGuattarian concept of the machine is that of machinic 
enslavement, now the Marxist concept of the machine obviously has a 
direct correlate to this in that of exploitation, but anything even 
vaguely resembling such a concept is entirely absent in De Landa, 
essentially he elaborates a concept of capitalism (and indeed of all 
social regimens) that is devoid of conflict either endemic or accidental, 
he leaves therefore no space for politics, class or otherwise, and 
ultimately presents an entirely theoreticist position devoid of praxis, 
devoid of any conceivable pragmatic implementation or implication. 
The ultimate reason for the absence in De Landa of an understanding of 
conflict or exploitation lies in his utter misunderstanding of the theory, 
crucial to Marxian analyses, of surplus-value, which is as Antonio Negri 
notes "the centre, now and always, of Marxist theory" and the key to 
demonstrating the "productive materialisation" of its method (Negri 
1991b 60). Hence the deformations and deployments that the theory of 
surplus value undergoes in Capitalism and Schizophrenia (principally 
as surplus value of code, and in the distinction between machinic and 
human surplus value with the concomitant distinction between 
machinic enslavement and social subjection) constitutes a critically 
important element in the DeleuzoGuattarian conceptual assemblage. 
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The transfiguration of the theory of surplus value into one of surplus 
value of code is to be understood as the principal mechanism of 
DeleuzoGuattarian thought. A mechanism cutting across the three 
principal strata, as follows: "Each chain captures fragments of other 
chains from which it `extracts' a surplus value, just as the orchid code 
`attracts' the figure of a wasp: both phenomena demonstrate the 
surplus value of a code" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 47/39). The 
ramifications of this transfiguration are wide, because in 
DeleuzeGuattari's hands the concept of the surplus value of code, the 
capture of code fragments, has two principal results. First, it gives the 
principal mode of understanding deterritorialisation processes, they are 
indeed functionally identical in the analysis of the flows of capital in the 
substantial third chapter of Anti-Oedipus (as well as in Deleuze's 
weekly seminar at the University of Vincennes in the 1970's) ', which 
is, as we have seen, principally an engagement with the Grundrisse and 
in which we witness the "great movement of decoding or 
deterritorialisation" (Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 308/259). The 
second fundamental result of the analysis of the surplus-value of code 
is to produce the principal mechanism whereby philosophy avoids 
representation (the goal of a nonrepresentational thought): "the wasp 
in turn deterritorialises by joining with the orchid: the capture of a 
fragment of the code, and not the representation of an image" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1975/86 26/14, trans. altered). Lacking a theory of 
surplus value and consequently one of machinic surplus value, De 
Landa has no means of constructing a concept of conflict, neither one of 
class nor one of minorities and majorities, consequently his work, 
whatever it's other merits, and contrary to its author's claims, 
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constitutes not a development of, but a definitive break with 
DeleuzeGuattari's theoretical innovation, which, whatever else it is, has 
always been, as Deleuze reminds us, Marxist (Deleuze 1990/95 
232/171)'. 
De Landa makes a number of grand claims for the originality, 
perspicacity and cutting edge nature of his work, however throughout 
this thesis I want to demonstrate that far more effective analyses of 
the kinds of phenomena that preoccupy De Landa exist; the tradition 
that I am thinking of here is that deriving from the genuinely 
revolutionary work of the long neglected Russian biogeochemist 
Vladimir I. Vernadsky whose 1926 magnum opus, The Biosphere has 
only this year been translated into English in its entirety'. It is to 
Vernadsky and under his explicit and cited influence, Bataille in his 
Accursed Share (and not, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, 
De Landa) that we owe the complimentary modern conceptions of the 
earth as an open dynamic system subject to flows of matter and 
energy (precursor to Lovelock and Margulis' Gaia theory), and that of 
matter as living, the prodigious realm of nonorganic life spoken of in A 
Thousand Plateaus and constantly affirmed and reiterated throughout 
Deleuze's work from Bergsonism, to the two books on Cinema, to The 
Fold. It is this theme that runs like a transversal spine throughout the 
invention of the bastard line of philosophy, from Bruno, to Leibniz, 
Nietzsche and Bergson all united under the arch of a stripped down 
Spinozism directed towards the empirical discovery of haecceity, 
singularity, number and intensity in and of matter. Deleuze and 
Guattari's concentration on a "matter that is no longer a chaos to 
Schizoanalytic Materialism 
138 
conquer and organise, but matter moving in continuous variation" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 419/340 trans. altered, EA) is given in a 
process of creative discovery. Such a discovery is in turn an opening of 
philosophy to the enormity of its altneu task of confronting a matter no 
longer subject to its expulsion from the realm of the living, beyond 
theological and hylomorphic constraint, no longer subject to the 
determinations of theological philosophy. It is a granting to, and a 
gaining by, philosophy of a new set of objects, beyond the frozen 
rigidities of philosophical dualisms, a philosophy, not of the inert and 
finished, but of "unformed and unstable matters [... ] flows in all 
directions [... ] free intensities or nomadic singularities [... I mad or 
transitory particles" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 54/40). A 
philosophy of processes rather than goals, of becoming rather than 
being. The discovery of a new Earth. 
In the next chapter we turn our attention to the production of this 
vision in the interstices between Deleuze and a thinker about whom he 
rarely writes, but whom we shall argue makes a crucial contribution to 
the vital intellectual tradition of which Deleuze is just the most recent 
great representative- Giordano Bruno, the apostate Dominican of 
Nola. 
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Elaborations on Materialism Between Bruno and Deleuze 
The general framework seems at first to be an animist, 
hylozoist, pre-Socratic one. But vitalism finds itself inverted at 
the very moment that it is asserted, for it does not present 
itself either as an envelope of the real, or as a conception of 
the world, nor as a force which is not distinct from the 
production of the real, whether natural or historical, but as all 
of these elements at once, placed at the service of the 
production of singularity, of the emergence of singularity 
(Negri 1995 99) 
Life is not only everywhere, but souls are everywhere in 
matter 
(Deleuze 1988/93 15/11) 
A Thousand Plateaus [... ] remains forever open is constantly 
being reopened through an amazing will to theorise, and with 
a violence worthy of heretical proclamations. 
(Negri in Deleuze 1990/95 232/171) 
What is it that leads most people to slander matter as therdo? 
In the end, it is only the modesty of matter that is so offensive 
to them. But this very composure proves that something 
dwells within matter, something of that original essence, of the 
germ and primordial material of existence, something that is 
passive on the outside but is in itself the purest spirituality 
(Schelling 1997 150) 
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chlasm 
There is a sense shared by many commentators on Deleuze and 
Guattari's work that their power "stems from the fact that [they] 
succeed in detaching themselves from Parisian temporality" (Land 
1993 66)73. The question to be pursued in this case then is, in what time 
can Deleuze and Guattari best be located? The implication made here is 
that Deleuze, principally, be located in the period prior to the invention 
of Kantian critique, and hence prior to the conventional location of the 
birth of modernity with Kant and the Aufklärung. That is on the cusp of 
the Renaissance and the Baroque. The towering figure of this period is 
without doubt, Bruno, and in these theses it will be shown how, on a 
number of crucial issues, lines can be drawn directly between him and 
Deleuze. These lines descend from those elements of Bruno's thinking 
that are most heterodox to those in Deleuze that are most untimely. 
The questions to be activated here are: the truth of the relative; the 
invention of haecceity as a concept of individuation; the doctrine of 
active matter and the dissolution of the hylomorphic glue that this 
entails; ontology of eternal flow; concept of the universal nous, 
immanent in the universe; revised vitalism; hylozoism. A chasm can be 
opened that separates Deleuze from his contemporaries, it lies in his 
immersion in a conceptual world that is resolutely, pre-Kantian? 4, and in 
the identification of Deleuze's most radical and distinctive concepts as 
being clearly adumbrated in Bruno. Principal in this regard is the 
rejection of the hierarchy of being (a rejection initiated by Cusa and 
decisively developed by Bruno), in favour of philosophy as survey of a 
flat zone of immanence, univocal ontology: "Immanence [... ] implies a 
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pure ontology, a theory of Being in which Unity is only a property of 
substance and of what is. [It] requires as a principle the equality of 
being, or the positing of equal Being [... 1 not defined by their rank in a 
hierarchy" (Deleuze 1968/92 157/173). Recall here Deleuze's succinct 
letter to Badiou, which read in its entirety: "immanence = univocity" 
(Badiou 1998 28). 
For critics of Bruno like Frances Yates, who is, as some have pointed 
out, the last in a long line of his Catholic detractors, Bruno is to be 
identified as a heretical priest preoccupied with the founding of a new 
religion or cult, a neo-Egyptianism (hence her insistence upon 
identifying him with Rosicrucianism, the precursor of Free Masonry, 
which does draw for its rituals principally upon a language derived from 
Egypt). Following Deleuze and Guattari however, it is clear that Bruno 
can be read instead, with his absolute insistence upon immanence, 
flatness, the spiral, and his opposition to hierarchy, as being committed 
to philosophy understood in part as naturalism. "Whenever there is 
transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, 
there is religion; and there is philosophy whenever there is immanence" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 46/43). It is imperative in setting up 
such a reading of Bruno that one avoids the sickness that Antonio 
Negri, in his magisterial reading of Spinoza, The Savage Anomaly, has 
diagnosed as afflicting philosophical historiography, that of "orienting 
the alternatives toward the past" (Negri 1991a xxi). So rather than 
offering "a study in cultural genealogies" what is at stake 
here is "a 
material genealogy of conditions and functions of thought", this 
is not 
merely the setting of a thought within its sociopolitical context, such 
is 
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all that can be done by standard materialist accounts, what are 
engaged in Negri's proposed superior materialism are the contours of a 
conceptual work's constitutive-productive profile: thought rendered as a 
material force, the interweaving of the linguistic with the human 
historical planes alluded to above. For Negri the "liberation of a 
cumbersome past" will be worthless "if it is not carried through to the 
benefit of the present" and critically, "to the production of the future". 
Bruno, treated in this way becomes the conceptual architect of such a 
future. The point then is not to ask such questions as "What does 
Deleuze say about Bruno? " or "What is the influence, direct or other 
wise, of Bruno on Deleuze? ", but rather to examine in a non-personalist 
fashion the force or life of concepts, the degree to which they become 
material forces. The mode then of this investigation is resolutely non- 
Kantian in its refusal to be bound by subjectivity; rather, it is 
concerned with the force of the concept as event, with conceptual 
personae (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 chapter 3). 
Eternal Return of the Machinic P1ylum 
A fundamental claim made by and for Deleuze and Guattari's 
materialist monism is that of the (re)discovery, sedimented into 
thought, of a distinctive mode of apprehending matter. This 
apprehension, opposed to the hylomorphic model that had presupposed 
"a fixed form and a matter deemed homogeneous" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/87 508/408), is of a matter reconceptualised, redefined, 
as the machinic phylum, it is an approach to matter as "materiality, 
natural or artificial, and both simultaneously, it is matter in movement, 
in flux, in variation, matter as a conveyor of singularities and traits of 
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expression" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 509/409). The sixteenth 
century materialist heretic, Giordano Bruno, had also offered a vision of 
this phylum in his Anti-Aristotelian formulation: "matter produces 
forms from itself [... ] and does not receive them as from outside" (Bruno 
1998 81), and this is no surprise, for as Whitehead notes "the non- 
evolution of matter has been a tacit assumption throughout modern 
thought. Until the last few years the sole alternatives were: either the 
material universe, with its present type of order, is eternal; or else it 
came into being, and will pass out of being, according to the fiat of 
Jehovah" (Whitehead 1978 95). Hence, the indication that the 
machinic phylum was to be "(re)discovered" is predicated upon 
supposing it to be the guiding axis of a longstanding, serpentine 
tradition within philosophy and science. For Whitehead the thought of 
the phylum is one that erupts periodically into history, crystallising in 
particular thinkers. It is a thought that had forced its way into view 
with Bruno, and that had, I have argued appeared in Spinoza; it is 
expressed in Bergson's Creative Evolution at the turn of this century, 
and now in Deleuze. The concept of the machinic phylum lies within the 
purview of the, oft simplemindedly, derided tradition of vitalism, but it is 
a certain vitalism construed in such a way as to be one of the 
constituent elements of the counter-tradition already alluded to, put 
succinctly it is a vitalism in which the place of Geist or spirit is taken by 
the brain75. This is, to follow Bergson, a brain only actualised in 
immanence, a brain that is recognised in consciousness of x. 
Consciousness severed from the transcendental, it is always of 
something. A brain, moreover, that is multiple, fractured, riven by 
synaptic clefts, no longer the homogeneous object of phrenology; rather 
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one in which the "model would be rather a state of things which would 
constantly change, a flowing-matter in which no point of anchorage nor 
centre of reference would be assignable" (Deleuze 1983/86 33/57). It is 
such a state of affairs, this coexistence of structure and change that 
von Bertalanffy was attempting to capture in his dynamic descriptions 
of `flowing balance' or Fliessgleichgewicht (Capra 1996 48). Now 
vitalism, as Deleuze and Guattari insist has never been one, indeed it is 
multiple and "has always had two possible alternatives: that of an Idea 
that acts, but is not -- that acts therefore only from the point of view of 
an external cerebral knowledge (from Kant to Claude Bernard); or that 
of a force that is but does not act- that is therefore a pure internal 
Awareness (from Leibniz to Ruyer) [... ] the second interpretation seems 
to us to be imperative" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 201/213). The 
variant of vitalism, described on occasion as a "technological vitalism' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 507/407) that is being suggested, is not 
the vitalism that is usually baldly counterposed to mechanism. Indeed 
as some contemporary biologists have recognised, the alternative to 
mechanism is not vitalism, but complexity, and this latter is an 
imperative component of the contemporary form of superior 
materialism'. This is a vitalism that has ceased to posit entities 
mobilised by an extra, or metaphysical, force, a "supplementary 
dimension" in Deleuze's terminology, but rather one that opens entities 
to the outside, and stands in counterposition to the metaphysical 
legislation of the one, unity. It is a thought of infinite variation and 
modal being pace Spinoza. As Bruno, the "philosophical minnesinger of 
infinity" (Bloch 1986 848), suggests "there is no thing which is all it can 
be. Man is what he can be, but not all he can be" (Bruno 1998 66) and 
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Spinoza proclaims: "For indeed, no one has yet determined what the 
Body can do, ie. experience has not yet taught anyone what the Body 
can do from the laws of nature alone" (Spinoza 1985 E IIIP2D); the 
driving thrust of this thought marks a definitive move away from 
classical ontology for it refuses to think the entity as static, as the on, 
but rather makes bodies into a locus of force, a condensation of affects, 
it makes potentia constitutive". For Bruno, Spinoza and Deleuze the 
task of thinking is open to the future, to becoming, haecceitas (Scotus's 
univocal ontology) and singularisation. 
Expression-Immanence-Neonlatonism 
Eric Alliez is quite adamant that his treatment of Plotinus should resist 
the dominant trend of Neoplatonic scholarship that "fraudulently 
reintroduces Plotinus into the Judeo-Christian mould" (Alliez 1991/95 
37/77), and he notes secondarily that Plotinus introduces something 
into his system that decisively distinguishes it from Platonism- I take 
this novel non-Platonic addition to be the most important element of 
Plotinus' system that Bruno adopts - and it is the distillation here of a 
thought that resists capture by the dominant trends that constitute 
early modern philosophy in being neither Judeo-Christian nor Platonic 
(it is obviously non-Aristotelian, by virtue of its being a part of 
1eoplatonism). The distinctively non-Platonic idea that Plotinus adds, 
is that it is the "immanent soul, and not the demiurge, that engenders, 
like a living organism, a kosmos through the sole force of its silent 
contemplation of the intelligible identified with that life of the 
intelligence from which it proceeds" (Alliez 1991/95 80/39), and as 
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Deleuze confirms in his preface to Alliez' book "there is a world soul, 
and the soul is itself a world" (Alliez 1991/95 8/xii). It is this account of 
the immanent creative force that runs through Bruno's philosophy of 
expressive matter as the anima mundi. 
It is only now with the development of the theory of self-organisation 
and the new understanding of dissipative structures that we are 
beginning to create the scientific models that can adequate to this, the 
great tradition of expressive immanence in philosophy. 
Seen in this light, it becomes clear that the tradition in which Deleuze's 
philosophy of matter is best placed is one that he often describes as 
being open to the danger of pantheism, "always subject to the charge of 
pantheism" (Deleuze 1968/92 12/16). Seen in more contemporary 
terms, this is the accusation of vitalism, one that has often been 
levelled at Spinoza, at Leibniz and at Bergson, amongst others, as is all 
too familiar these figures are amongst Deleuze's philosophical heroes, 
and as such he is happy for his own philosophy to run the risk of this 
apparently lethal accusation. It is precisely lethal: for to be accused of 
the charge of being a pantheist or a vitalist is equivalent to that of 
irrationalism, mysticism, it is to find oneself beyond the remit of sound 
philosophy and science. For Deleuze however, there is a vitalism 
subject to the power of nonorganic life, "a profound link between signs, 
events, life and vitalism [... ] Everything I've written is vitalistic, at 
least I hope it is, and amounts to a theory of signs and events" (Deleuze 
1990/95 197/143). 
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In the following passage in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari 
explicitly lay out the political stakes at play in philosophy, as well as 
the necessary relationship between philosophical heresy and the 
thought of the State on the one hand, and the philosophy of immanence 
and monism on the other: "Putting their work and sometimes their lives 
at risk, all philosophers must prove that the dose of immanence they 
inject into world and mind does not compromise the transcendence of a 
God to which immanence must be attributed only secondarily (Nicholas 
of Cusa, Eckart, Bruno) [... ] Immanence can be said to be the burning 
issue of all philosophy because it takes on all the dangers that 
philosophy must confront, all the condemnations, persecutions and 
repudiations that it undergoes. " (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 47/45). 
Deleuze notes that this tradition labours under the aegis of the concept 
expression, and that this concept as invented by Spinoza and Leibniz, 
"takes on the force of an Anticartesian reaction [... ] It implies a 
rediscovery of Nature and her power and a recreating of logic and 
ontology: a new `materialism' and a new `formalism' (Deleuze 1968/92 
300/322). The true target of this Anticartesianism in Deleuze's hands is 
the profoundly fractured world given in dualism, whether it be of the 
Platonic, Cartesian, or Kantian varieties, and as such the concept of 
expression comes to occupy a position at the heart of monism. 
Expression has two complementary components: "implication and 
explication, involution and evolution" bound together in the synthesis of 
complicatio, the "inherence of multiplicity in the One, and of the 
One in 
the many", ie. the pluralism-monism identity of A Thousand Plateaus. 
As Deleuze points out, complicatio is both, central to Neoplatonism and 
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alien to Christian thought, this latter being subject to the simplificatio, 
the "identity of the One or the unity of the Whole" (Deleuze 1969/90 
398/297). As I have already suggested, complicatio is also critical to 
both Spinoza and Leibniz, there is however a gap, both historical and 
conceptual, between Neoplatonism on the one hand and Spinoza and 
Leibniz on the other. Who fills the gap? In Difference and Repetition 
Deleuze suggests a possible answer, when he writes that it is Giordano 
Bruno who is the "theoretician of complicatio" (Deleuze 1968/94 
161/123). Put this way, Bruno is quite convincingly the true dark 
precursor of both Spinoza and Leibniz, and so ultimately of Deleuze. 
Moreover, it is precisely those elements of Bruno that influence 
Spinoza and Leibniz respectively that Deleuze picks up on and 
elaborates in his own work. 
Immanence. Conatus and Death by Degrees 
The Gay Science § 109 is the nexus for a number of convergences 
between Nietzsche, Spinoza and Bruno. Greg Whitlock and Yirmiyahu 
Yovel note that in developing his unified theory of force and in particular 
the will to power Nietzsche draws on the Spinozist conatus, classically 
expressed as 
The endeavour (conatus) wherewith a thing endeavours to 
persist in its being is nothing else than the actual essence of 
that thing (Spinoza 1985 E IIIP7) 
For our purposes however we cannot stop with Spinoza, for the doctrine 
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of conatus can be found directly prefigured in Bruno (Deleuze of course 
identifies the Lucretian clinamen as a "kind of conatus -a differential of 
matter and, by the same token, a differential of thought" Deleuze 
1969/90 365/269. Bruno was a voracious reader of Lucretius and the 
former's work is redolent with Lucretian tones). Conatus is not just one 
theory amongst many, it constitutes the second major axis of the line of 
thought embodied in Bruno, Spinoza, Schelling, Nietzsche and Deleuze: 
on the one side is expression and on the other, conatus; these two taken 
together constitute the plane of immanence drawn by this philosophical 
tendency. Conatus gives us an account of internally driven 
development, that is to say the immanent involution of form, or put 
otherwise and in a scientific register, it gives us an account of self- 
organisation, which is nothing other than an account of order, of 
Spinoza's persistence being driven entirely internally without the 
stamp of any transcendent influences, without the slightest trace of a 
mysterious deus ex machina. This then is the sense in which, as Negri 
suggests, vitalism inverts itself at the very moment of its enunciation. 
This inversion of vitalism will be seen as the horizon of any philosophy 
attempting to adequate itself to recent conceptualisations within 
science of the various manifestations of self-organisation, of 
autocatalysis. That which Nietzsche calls will to power, and Spinoza 
calls conatus, Bruno terms "vital principle" (Bruno 1995 156) or 
elsewhere "the internal artificer" (Bruno 1998 38), and he is quite 
explicit that this principle is part of immanence, so even earlier than 
expected we find that Bruno had posited a vitalism already purged of all 
metaphysical residues. 
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it shapes matter, forming it from inside like a seed or root 
shooting forth and unfolding the trunk, from within the 
trunk thrusting out the boughs, from inside the boughs the 
derived branches, and unfurling buds from within these 
(Bruno 1998 38) 
Everything is caused by the sufficient interior principle by 
which it is naturally stirred, and not by an external principle 
(Bruno 1995 156) 
Kant, however, desperate to hold onto the metaphysical inheritance 
which by rendering matter as lifeless refuses this possibility of an 
inverted vitalism, of a hylozoism, outright, he insists that "the 
possibility of a living matter is quite inconceivable [... ] since lifelessness, 
inertia, constitutes the essential characteristic of matter" (Kant 1952 
§ 73). Kant offers not an argument, but bald assertion from accepted 
definition, from ideological necessity, that hylozoism is atheism- 
matter cannot be living because matter is characterised by inertness. 
The preceding accusation is levelled, albeit indirectly, at Spinoza, but of 
the two it is Kant's system, which whilst it may not be theist, and not 
Spinoza's, that reintroduces a transcendental agent into its account of 
self organised matter. The difference between Bruno, Spinoza, 
Schelling and Nietzsche on the one hand, and Kant on the other is given 
by Deleuze in his distinction between two different "conceptions of the 
word `plan'". He writes, "any organisation that comes from above and 
refers to a transcendence, be it a hidden one, can be called a theological 
plan [... ] it will always be a plan of transcendence that directs forms as 
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well as subjects, and that stays hidden [... ] always has an additional 
dimension; it always implies a dimension supplementary to the 
dimensions of the given. " Thus Kant. On the other hand "a plane of 
immanence has no supplementary dimension; the process of 
composition must be apprehended for itself, through that which it gives, 
in that which it gives. It is a plan of composition, not a plan of 
organisation or development" (Deleuze 1988 128). Kant certainly would 
have had nightmares had he access to recent experiments, principally 
those of Stanley Miller and Harold Urey that have attempted to 
recreate the conditions for the "slow brewing of early life from nonlife" 
(Margulis and Sagan 1997 51). As should be apparent from our earlier 
discussion, these experiments serve as an empirical exploration of a 
noncorporeal transformation, showing the roots of life in the realm of 
nonorganic matter. 
The view of death posited in both Nietzsche's The Gay Science, in 
particular in § 109, and in Bruno's Ash Wednesday Supper are also 
identical: Nietzsche writes that "Once you know there are no purposes, 
you also know that there is no accident; for it is only beside a world of 
purposes that the word `accident' has meaning. Let us beware of saying 
that death is opposed to life. The living is merely a type of what is dead, 
and a very rare type" (Nietzsche 1974 § 109). So too for Bruno death is 
merely a change of composition, of intensity: "when we see something 
which is said to die, we must not believe that that thing dies but rather 
that it changes and terminates its accidental composition and unity" 
(Bruno 1995 157), that is to say: it undergoes a change of organisation, 
of consistency. To send out a further link to themes pursued elsewhere 
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in this thesis, it must be noted that in the same passage Bruno 
expresses the view that "since everything participates in life, many and 
innumerable beings live not only within us but also in all composite 
things" (Bruno 1995 157, emphasis added), this is a line of thought that 
passes directly into Leibniz's Monadology, Nietzsche's critique of the 
unitary subject, Deleuze and Guattari's affective, contagious view of 
biological involution, and eventually finds empirical confirmation in 
Lynn Margulis' account of the birth of the eukaryotic cell through the 
capture of the once independent cyanobacteria that live in every cell 
and still maintain an entirely separate DNA and RNA. Every living 
cell contains aliens crucial to its survival, Deleuze's "thousands of little 
witnesses which contemplate within us" (Deleuze 1968/94 103/75), 
Nietzsche's alien forces (Nietzsche 1968 § 728). To follow 
DeleuzeGuattari and their source on the concept of consistency, 
Eugene Dupreel, "life went not from a centre to an exteriority but from 
an exterior to an interior, or rather from a discrete or fuzzy aggregate to 
its consolidation" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 405/328). 
Nietzsche ends The Gay Science § 109 with the programmatic question, 
"When may we begin to `naturalise' humanity in terms of a pure, newly 
discovered, newly redeemed nature", and as if in response avant la 
lettre, Spinoza had written to Oldenburg that "the human body is a part 
of Nature. As regards the human Mind I think it too is a part of nature" 
(Spinoza 1966 III). There is a consistent tradition in philosophy 
that seeks to carry out precisely this naturalisation stretching from 
Lucretius to the Arab historian Ibn Khaldün whose startling book of 
1377, The Mugaddimah, holds that "man belongs to the genus of 
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animals [... ] created from a drop of sperm, a clot of blood, and a lump of 
flesh" (Khhaldfn 1967 340), and from Bruno to Spinoza and Nietzsche. 
A Rather Forbidden History 
Amongst the philosophically significant results of this approach is the 
fusion of production and expression (and hence the dissolution of 
dualism), and with it the possibility of gaining access to a certain 
subterranean philosophical tradition, a tradition with "a rather hidden, 
and a rather forbidden history" (Deleuze 1968/92 322/300). A tradition 
that is most forcefully and subversively represented in the work of 
Giordano Bruno. Whilst Deleuze's direct references to Bruno are few, 
two to be precise, they are exceptionally important and philosophically 
fecund. These two references stand as brackets around Deleuze's 
philosophical career appearing as they do at its two ends (in 1968's 
Difference et Repetition and Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque written in 
1988). These two direct references stand facing each other on the 
Moebius strip that represents Deleuze's thought, for they both refer to 
Bruno as the great expositor of the theory of complicatio. Deleuze's 
entire career can be understood then as a vigilant pursuit of what can 
now be seen as a great Brunian theme, as a perpetual spiralling around 
a development of this complicatio in the shape of the magic formula 
"PLURALISM = MONISM" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 31/20); this 
formula is the basis upon which the DeleuzoGuattarian philosophy of 
matter is built, and it is the seed that generates the peculiar intimacy 
of the questions of individuation, singularity, intensity in that 
philosophy. 
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Bruno. Philosophy, Creation 
For Bruno the hylomorphic couple is broken by rendering form 
immanent to matter, and different entities (formed matters) aspects of 
the singular substance (it is from this that Spinoza derives his 
intensive understanding of the modes), it is the continual generation of 
form from within matter that is constitutive of reality. Without using 
the terms of the critique of hylomorphism, Hilary Gatti assesses 
Bruno's critique of contemporary science in a way that reflects some of 
its concerns, she notes that Bruno takes "the new mathematics [... ] as 
a schematic abstraction attempting to imprison the vital vicissitudes 
of matter into static formulae of universal validity" (Gatti 1999 3), 
hence State science is characterised as a mode of capturing, of 
overcoding, an inert matter, contrary to the hylozoic, vitalistic practice 
of following singularity. Ilya Prigogine expresses this Brunian project as 
being the quest of those explorers of the contemporary sciences who 
have understood the need to undergo the complexity revolution, the 
abolition of the counterposition between being and becoming. For 
Deleuze this has both epistemological and ontological ramifications, for 
"there is no other truth than the creation of the New: creativity, 
emergence" (Deleuze 1985/89 191/147). It is Bruno who first provided 
an ontological picture powerful enough to sustain this, in his 
understanding that "when form is separated from matter it ceases to 
exist, as is not the case with matter" (Bruno 1998 86). Nuccio Ordine, 
in his remarkable book on Giordano Bruno and the Philosophy of the 
Ass, is also cognisant of the importance of invention to philosophy, 
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noting that Bruno's "concept of language [... ] expresses a strict 
relationship with philosophy. Words and terminology become malleable 
materials that are controlled and shaped to express a view of the world 
[... ] Bruno reaffirms the possibility of inventing new words [... ] `[Bruno's 
concept of] language, ' writes Ciliberto, `is an expressive reality [... ] The 
linguistic plane becomes interwoven with the essential planes of human 
history'" (Ordine 1996 154). Gatti suggests that Bruno's critique of 
language, principally in A General Account of Bonding (De vinculis in 
genere), represents an attempt to "demonstrate the ways in which 
language in all its forms acts on human behaviour, influencing and even 
enslaving the will" (Gatti 1999 3), in other words, she attributes to 
Bruno, albeit in very different terms, an account of the linguistic order 
close to Deleuze and Guattari's account of the language of the State as 
one of overcoding. Bruno's demand that philosophy become a creative 
endeavour is enunciated, as is every point of his metaphysics, in 
parallel with a political critique, and forges and is forged in, what Ordine 
calls a "structurally anti-pedantic language". Given that Ordine's final 
chapter, `Natural Science and Human Science: A `Nouvelle alliance" 
refers to the title of Isabelle Stengers' and Ilya Prigogine's book of the 
same name, it is perhaps not surprising that he is uncannily close here 
to what Isabelle Stengers has called the "the real risk of speculative 
thought", that is, the creation of concepts which permit an 
"experimentation of which our habits are at once both the ingredient 
and the target [cible]" (Stengers 1997b 142). Creation, the invention of 
the new, is converted from being a subjective demand for freedom of 
expression to embodying yet again a Brunian plane of immanence; he 
writes "we will be the inventors of new words for new things, wherever 
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these words might come from. Let Grammarians be the servants of 
words, we will have words serve us. "" 
Bin Bialo 
Arguments similar to that espoused here, specifically that Bruno's 
work is peculiarly untimely, and has a particular relevance for 
contemporary scientific debates, have come to prominence in various 
ways in recent Bruno scholarship, in particular in work by Gatti, 
Mendoza, and to a degree Ordine. Gatti offers a concrete genealogy to 
account for this, suggesting that the interest in Bruno in the Romantic 
period, in particular by Schelling and Coleridge focused on his "vitalistic 
concept of matter" (Gatti 1999 141). She notes that in the late 
nineteenth century "several commentators would consider Bruno one of 
the principal forerunners of an idea of natural evolution" and cites H. F. 
Osborn's 1894 work, From the Greeks to Darwin: An Outline of the 
Development of the Evolution Idea to this effect, curiously enough 
Vernadsky thought that Osborn was "one of the most eminent 
naturalists and thinkers of our time" (Vernadsky 1998 111). Gatti goes 
on, somewhat unfortunately, to claim that it is "interesting to think of 
[Bruno] in reference to the newest biological discoveries such as DNA" 
(Gatti 1999 142). Unfortunate because DNA is a peculiarly bad 
example for reasons that I shall attempt to explain. 
Bruno is relevant to contemporary scientific debates, but not for 
Gatti's reasons, and not to the debates that she suggests. The problem 
with Gatti's account and with her example is that she has no knowledge 
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of, what we have denoted as, the complexity revolution, or of ideas 
connected to self-organisation. Gatti then, is committed to an account 
of science that is strictly pre-complexity. As a consequence, she is 
unable to take account of the truly radical implications of Brunian 
ontology and cosmology which, as I have been at pains to point out, 
coincides not with the molar, overcoding procedures of State science, of 
which the DNA model is a case par excellence, but with Deleuze and 
Guattari's molecular destratifying critique of it. A final note of caution: 
whilst I have claimed that Deleuze and Guattari carry out such a 
critique they may not have been aware of its full implications, as 
Ansell Pearson makes clear "Deleuze does not appear to appreciate [... ] 
that his thinking [... ] presents a fundamental challenge to some of the 
core tenets of the neo-Darwinian synthesis" (Ansell Pearson 1997 129). 
Elements of a critique of the popular and scientific `myth' of DNA can 
be pieced together from varying sources. But first, the nature of the 
myth: principally the deference to DNA as the overarching, all powerful 
source of explanation for all questions, physical and biological, embodied 
in the immense investment of financial and institutional resources in 
the Human Genome Project (HGP). The HGP is perhaps the most 
prestigious and overdiscussed international scientific research project 
currently in existence. The goal of the HGP, that of mapping the entire 
human genome has acquired, perhaps more than any other scientific 
project, beating even the discovery of cures for cancer and AIDS, the 
status of a holy grail. Certainly in the popular, and to some degree, in 
the scientific, imagination the achievement of this goal is seen as some 
kind of panacea for a cornucopia of human ailments: it will enable a 
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cure for all genetic diseases, and reveal the solutions to a multitude of 
mysteries, the mechanisms of aging and the nature of intelligence 
amongst them (an excellent selection of essays on the various social 
and scientific issues involved is Kevles and Hood 1992). The elements 
necessary for a critique, of what is essentially the greatest coding 
problem ever set, can be found in several places. First, 
DeleuzeGuattari's account of the mechanisms of transcoding and 
transduction which together constitute multiplicities or becomings: 
creative involution, a critique of the "vapid and foggy notions of the 
innate and the acquired" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 409/332). 
Second, in "the post-Darwinian conception of the evolutionary process 
[... ] as bricolage" (Varela et al 1991 196), which is in effect a 
recapitulation of Deleuze and Guattari's account of the machinic. Third, 
in Vernadsky's account of the biosphere, in which the distinction 
between organisms and the environment is rigorously questioned, and 
the relationship between them conceived as thoroughly and actively 
bilateral, that is a critique of the idea that "organisms are basically 
parachuted into a pregiven environment" (ibid. 198). Richard Lewontin 
has expressed the idea thus: "the environment is not a structure 
imposed on living beings from the outside but is in fact a creation of 
those beings. The environment is not an autonomous process but a 
reflection of the biology of the species [... ] there is no organism without 
an environment, so there is no environment without an organism" 
(Lewontin quoted in Varela et al 1991 198). Following on from 
Vernadsky, Lynn Margulis has argued that one can no longer imagine a 
narrative of life on the planet such that organisms evolve in, and are 
formed by a given environment, rather there is a coeval relationship 
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between them: organisms make, just as much as they are made by, the 
environment. This is a productivist immanentist vision, such as that 
expressed by DeleuzeGuattari thus: "man and nature are not like two 
opposite terms confronting each other- not even in the sense of 
bipolar opposites within a relationship of causation, ideation, or 
expression [... ] rather, they are one and the same essential reality, the 
producer-product. Production as process overtakes all idealistic 
categories and constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of 
an immanent principle" (Deleuze and Guattari 1974/83 10/5). In the 
same vein, the biologist Susan Oyama has radically downgraded the 
role played by genetic factors in the characteristics of the organism: 
"there is no intelligible distinction between inherited (biological, 
genetically based) and acquired (environmentally mediated) 
characteristics [... ] What is required for evolutionary change is not 
genetically encoded as opposed to acquired traits, but functioning 
developmental systems: ecologically embedded genomes" (quoted in 
Varela et al 1991 200). This metaphysical prejudice on the part of 
biologists had in fact been exposed much earlier than the foregoing 
would suggest, that is in the 1920's at the Sorbonne, by that long 
neglected far-seer, Vernadsky, who wrote that "in most of their works 
studying living organisms, the biologists disregard the indissoluble 
connection between the surrounding milieu and the living organism. In 
studying the organism as something quite distinct from the 
environment [ ... 
] they study not a natural body but a pure product of 
their thinking" (Vernadsky 1998 30). My argument here is designed to 
show that these kinds of heretical, minor sciences, are partners of the 
non-mechanistic, non-determinist, materialist, anti-, Aristotelian (and 
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by extension non-Kantian) cosmophilosophy explicit in the tradition 
derived from Giordano Bruno, and traced here through Spinoza and 
Leibniz, to Nietzsche, and thence to DeleuzeGuattari. 
Antica filosofia 
Bruno, like Nietzsche and Deleuze, has a taste for the pre-Socratics, 
and, whilst charging Aristotle with distorting the teachings of the antica 
filosofia, he adopts from Heraclitus an ontology of eternal flow, of 
becoming, from the Stoics, Lucretius, and Heraclitus again, he takes 
the concept of the universal nous, immanent in the universe; and as if 
to ensure that no ambiguities remain, castigates "Aristotle" in one of 
his most unrestrained attacks as "a thoroughly and sophist, by his 
malignant explanations and his frivolous persuasions, [he] perverts the 
statements of the ancients and sets himself against the truth" (Bruno 
1998 91). 
Political Horizon of all Metaphysics 
Clearly as soon as one posits an animate matter, or one that generates 
form from within, as we have seen both Bruno and Deleuze do, a 
"matter [that] produces forms from itself, so to speak and does not 
receive them as from outside" (Bruno 1998 81), one is rendering the 
metaphysical question intimate with the political, initiating a 
questioning of the need for a political regulator, philosophically this 
constitutes a powerful rejection of the viability of any transcendent 
control mechanisms, and the championing of the methods of bottom-up 
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self-organisation. The thought of Brunian matter then is cast as an 
immediate attack upon any form of political authority and an affront to 
the established order, it is the thought of one "brave like Lucretius [... ] 
wrathful at human oppression" (Nietzsche 1983 189). It is Bruno's 
means of opening philosophy to an expanded zone of immanence, to a 
philosophy of expressive production. 
Anima Mundi 
In Difference and Repetition Deleuze calls Bruno the "theoretician of 
complicatio" (Deleuze 1968/94 161/123), and it seems clear that The 
Fold too is informed by him at certain crucial points, namely the idea 
that "Life is not only everywhere, but souls are everywhere in matter" 
(Deleuze 1988/93 15/11). This is Bruno's concept of plenitude and the 
immanent universal mind. Brunian panzooism, hylozoism. The truly 
revolutionary discovery of Bruno's ontology: that matter is intelligent 
and intelligence material, has only now begun to be realised empirically, 
in a neuroscience that takes its lead not from Kant, but from Bruno, 
Spinoza and Bergson. ' It is under the aegis of the latter that Deleuze 
can write: "Intelligence is contracted in matter at the same time as 
matter is expanded (detendt in duration; both find the form that is 
common to them" (Deleuze 1991 89). Current research along these 
lines is summed up by Fritjof Capra thus: "mind is not a thing but a 
process- the very process of life [... ] Mind- or, more accurately, 
mental process- is immanent in matter at all levels of life [... ] The 
entire dissipative structure of the organism participates in the process 
of cognition, whether or not the organism has a brain and a higher 
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nervous system" (Capra 1997 68); he goes on to quote the 
neuroscientist Candace Pert who argues that "'White blood cells are 
bits of the brain floating around in the body' Ultimately this implies 
that cognition is a phenomenon that expands throughout the organism, 
operating through an intricate chemical network of peptides that 
integrates our mental, emotional, and biological activities". The 
suggestion, by David Chalmers and Andy Clark in their, as yet 
unpublished paper, `The Extended Mind', that mind be prised loose from 
its cranial container takes Pert even further, and spreads 
consciousness across the surface of the world. For Bruno too, 
consciousness cannot be localised in any one part of the body for "spirit, 
soul, life is found in all things and in varying degrees fills all matter" 
(Bruno 1998 45). Deleuze's explication of the "universe that has lost all 
centre as well as any figure that could be attributed to it" (Deleuze 
1988/93 131/124) is given in Bruno's radicalisation of Copernicus, the 
move "far beyond and above him [in which] the ceiling of the heavens 
cracks, to which the latter had left the fixed stars attached" (Bloch 
1986 848). One important consequence of this radicalisation, of Bruno's 
abolition of the Medieval conception of the crystal spheres, is the new 
picture of an infinite universe that can be extended on both macro and 
micrological scales. Lovejoy has eloquently described this position as 
one of "universal parasitism, of life everywhere preying on life, and of 
the human body itself as infested with myriads of tiny predatory 
creatures" (Lovejoy 1978 238), a picture presciently paralleling that 
given to us by contemporary biology of the omnipresence of bacteria. 
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Dead Matter 
One of the central tropes of State philosophy attacked by Deleuze is 
representation, principally condemned as the "site of transcendental 
illusion" (Deleuze 1968/94 341/265). For the purposes of our interests 
here, crucial to the schemas of representation is its denigration of 
matter, that is to say the genetic attachment to the hylomorphic 
coupling found in both the State sciences of control and their 
concomitant philosophies. To scrutinise this coupling opens us to an 
awareness of the antinomy in which matter is held in the different 
forms of the dominant philosophical tradition, "the `blessed' tradition of 
philosophical thought, that is to say, the tradition that justifies Power 
and exalts the State" (Negri 1996b 61), consisting, as it does, in varying 
proportions of Judeo-Christian theology, Aristotelian formalism, 
Kantian schemas, and liberal politics, and the many varieties of what 
Bataille felicitously calls its "metaphysical scaffolding" (Bataille I 220). 
The antinomy, central to this scaffolding, in which matter is held is one 
in which it is taken to be, on the one hand inert, dead, only subject to 
motivation under the impact of an external force in one guise or 
another, whether it be Platonic form, spirit, Hebrew ruah (consider the 
now canonical invocation of the Golem, dead matter vitalised by the 
addition of the external life giving words'), or subjectivity; on the other 
hand, matter is qui simply e accursed, evil. This latter position is 
embedded in a very ancient tradition stretching from the Gnostics, 
through Augustine and Plotinus, the latter states baldly that matter is 
"primary evil" and "evil per se", and on in to the principal dualisms that 
have dominated philosophical speculation since Descartes'. It is this 
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determination of matter as the inert, the dead, that forms then a 
centrepiece of the, ultimately theological, architecture of the 
philosophical tradition. Conversely the minor tradition that Deleuze 
invents and that is being augmented here, principally with the names of 
Bruno, and Bataille, is a philosophical heresiology committed to a 
virulent thought of creative, active matter and the practise, actualised 
both philosophically and scientifically, of following immanent 
singularities as opposed to the imposition of transcendent plans upon 
the inert. These philosophical heretics have parallels in the sciences, 
principally Vernadsky, Bateson, Margulis, and Kauffman. These 
explorers have recognised the value invested in the hylomorphic 
structure and have taken it upon themselves to engage in the 
shattering of its capture of matter, and to adopt the concomitant 
adherence to monism, a vital weapon in detheologising philosophy and 
science and simultaneously ridding them of representation. In such a 
context, the evaluation by succeeding forms of State thought of Bruno 
and Spinoza as heretic, atheist, materialist is clear, as is the elaborate 
weave in which these terms are caught and bound together. "Matter", 
notes Deleuze is taken by philosophers from Aristotle onwards to be 
"already formless" such that "form is not separable from the model of 
the species or that of the morphe, and the whole is under the protection 
of the categories [... ] this couple is completely internal to 
representation" (Deleuze 1968/94 353/275)ffi. The reconstruction of a 
materialism worthy of the name would be then, in Bataille's words, "the 
obstinate negation of idealism, which amounts to saying ultimately, of 
the very basis of all philosophy" (Bataille I 220), this statement comes 
at the beginning of an article of inestimable value for our project, `Base 
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Materialism and Gnosticism'. An article, of inestimable value for its 
declaration of a war in philosophy on the basis of the evaluation of 
matter; its isolation of the question of the status of matter as 
crystallising the theological issue at stake in philosophy, centring 
around the equivalence of matter with evil; its speculations upon the 
utilisation of a philosophy of matter in overturning the "great 
ontological machines"; and finally for its recognition of the importance 
of Gnosticism as one of the root sources for the, as we have seen, 
Plotinian equation of matter with evil. Bataille is doubly important for 
this study: first as already noted for his construction of a materialism 
implacably opposed to every residue of idealism in the dominant 
philosophical traditions, a tradition that still accords to Deleuze's 
characterisation of Kantianism as a "renovated theology" (Deleuze is of 
course following Nietzsche here, for whom: "In the case of Kant, 
theological prejudice, his unconscious dogmatism, his moralistic 
perspective, were dominant", Nietzsche 1968 § 530). Second, and 
perhaps more radical, is his long term engagement with, and 
development of, themes in Vladimir I. Vernadsky's (1863-1945) The 
Biosphere. Bataille's engagement with Vernadsky is made explicit in 
both The Accursed Share of 1946 and in the 1937 article that 
inaugurated the semi-legendary College de Sociologie, that is `Sacred 
Sociology and the Relationships between `society', `organism', and 
`being". 
Inorganic 'stor'y 
For both Deleuze and Bruno, there is a history of the inorganic, an 
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inorganic life of things, "nonhuman becomings" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1991/94 200/213), such that all things, to use Plotinus's term, are 
contemplations, not just humans and animals, but plants, rocks, even 
planets, carve out a universe, a specific series of affects that spins 
them into being, that allows them to differentiate themselves out of 
matter. Recall Deleuze and Guattari's magnificent speculative 
statement of their cosmophilosophy: "not all life is confined to the 
organic strata: rather, the organism is that which life sets against itself 
in order to limit itself, and there is a life all the more intense, all the 
more powerful for being anorganic" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 
628/503). A statement to which Bruno had seemingly responded, in 
that Talmudic fashion, with another equally great question: "How much 
superior must we hold that artistic intellect that, from the interior of 
the seminal matter, solders together the bones, extends the cartilage, 
hollows the arteries, airs the pores, interweaves the fibres, branches 
out the nerves and arranges the universe with such praiseworthy 
mystery? " (Bruno 1998 39). Bruno's cosmos is divine and is pervaded 
by an immanent mind, there is no transcendent deity, and no telos for 
Bruno; what there is, is a grand ecological vision, matter in a process of 
self organisation, prodigiously throwing out new forms, new 
manifestations (somewhat like the planet in Stanislaus Lem's novel 
and Audrey Tarkovsky's film of the same name, Solaris). What Bruno 
intuited, what Leeuwenhoeck thought he saw through his microscope, a 
universal parasitism, and a smearing of consciousness beyond the 
limits of the metaphysically legislated discrete organism, is affirmed in 
Mille Plateaux. "If everything is alive, it is not because everything is 
organic or organised but, on the contrary, because the organism is a 
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diversion of life. In short, the life in question is inorganic, germinal, and 
intensive" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 623/499). 
I will now, in the final chapter attempt to bring some of the concerns of 
this thesis, and its projected Schizogenealogy to bear upon a key case: 
that of the very birth of modernity itself. The stakes are high here, for 
what is shown is that the Kampfplatz of contemporary philosophy is 
one inscribed at the inception of the modernist project. The war 
machine mobilised by immanence is seen to be the contestation point, 
then as now, and it is one that simultaneously reveals and explodes, 
with incalculable implications the theological and political carapace of 
philosophy. 
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Th ter' Crystal S e: 'rolling from th-e 
centre toward I... 
Since Copernicus man has been rolling from the centre toward 
x 
(Nietzsche 1968 § 1.5) 
Since Copernicus, man seems to have got himself on an 
inclined plane- now he is slipping faster and faster away from 
the centre into- what? into nothingness? into a `penetrating 
sense of his nothingness"? 
(Nietzsche 1969 III § 25) 
Therein we have the reason why every man, whether he be on 
earth, in the sun, or on another planet, always has the 
impression that all other things are in movement whilst he 
himself is in a sort of immovable centre; he will certainly 
always choose poles which will vary according as his place of 
existence is the sun, the earth, the moon, Mars etc. In 
consequence, there will always be a machina mundi whose 
centre so to speak, is everywhere, whose circumference is 
nowhere, for God is its circumference and centre and he is 
everywhere and nowhere 
(Cusa, De Docta Ignorantia Bk. II, ch. 12) 
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Kant claims that his achievement in philosophy is the analogue of that 
of Copernicus' in cosmology. Colloquially this carries the sense of a 
major paradigmatic shift in perception: since Kant is claiming for his 
Critical philosophy the status of a rupture with the past, a clean 
break. The problem with this claim, however, is revealed as soon as one 
begins to examine the cosmological, metaphysical and concomitant 
political charge of Copernicus' work. It then becomes apparent that 
Kant's claim is not really as apocalyptic, as cataclysmic, or as 
revolutionary, for the terms, conventions, limits and possibilities of 
thought as he would have us think, or as conventional philosophical 
historiography has claimed ever since. His claim is ultimately in 
Bataille's sense, comical. "No one can say without being comical that 
he is getting ready to overturn things: He must overturn, and that is 
all" (Bataille 11199120/10). Put otherwise, in the line of thought being 
followed here, Kant's thought is characterised as being a "renovated 
theology" (Deleuze 1983 93). In consequence, far from constituting the 
invention of a thought that would escape the State-form and "blast 
open the continuum of history" (Benjamin 1973 Thesis XVI)', 
Kantianism is taken to be a clandestine means of reinstating 
transcendence®. The link between the State-form and transcendence is 
the compliment to the intimacy that can be explored in an abstract 
diagram of immanent critique and philosophico-political heresy, this 
intimacy is not accidental but constitutive; the State-form in its 
different manifestations through history is sustained by 
transcendence'. Deleuze and Guattari capture the issue thus: 
"Whenever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the 
sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is philosophy whenever 
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there is immanence" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 46/43). An 
understanding of this abstract diagram of power and transcendence is 
the necessary precondition of accepting Kant's claim to being 
Copernican, it does of course give that claim an entirely different, 
negative or strictly delimited, value. What is the force behind these 
contradictory statements? Chiefly, that Copernicus' revolution 
consists merely in carrying out a cosmic swapping of places: that is to 
say, he places the Sun in the centre of the cosmos, where the Earth 
had been. Copernicus, in other words, replaces geo- with the still more 
ancient heliocentrism, and trades one variant of hierarchical thinking 
for another, he leaves in place the clockwork mechanisms of the 
Ptolemaic cosmos, preserves the crystal spheres, allows them to 
continue floating in the ether, and allows them to continue playing the 
resonating music that had entertained Despots and Popes, and 
stupefied the subjected for a millennia and a half. This celestial 
symphony is not disrupted until the rude intervention of the apostate 
Dominican of Nola, Giordano Bruno and his decision to stop listening to 
the "asses dressed up with diadems and hacks decked with rings under 
the title of doctors" (Bruno 1998 25)'. It is only with Bruno that the 
closed cosmos of the medieval mind is definitively exploded, and it is left 
to Bruno to venture the possibility of a way of thinking other than the 
hierarchical, the stratified, and the vertical. Bruno announces the 
necessity of thinking the world topologically, rhizomically, and of 
creating concepts that will reflect the fluid complexity of such a reality, 
an open conceptual structure, acentric and connected each point to 
every other by transversal lines, a cosmos and a thought form without 
a transcendent centre to anchor it. Bruno proclaims an unstable 
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cosmos lacking hierarchy, value and direction, in which "meaning does 
not limit itself, for wherever it goes, always and everywhere it is visible 
at the centre of the horizon, whether it shifts its observation point on 
the surface of the earth or on the edges of the universe as it crosses 
other worlds" (Bruno 1879-9111204). This clearly is a transformation 
of Cusa's dicta quoted above that God is an entity whose "centre so to 
speak, is everywhere, whose circumference is nowhere", into a 
statement with both cosmological and epistemological ramifications. 
Ramifications which, in contemporary cosmology, accord with Lee 
Smolin's statement that any description of space must be "entirely 
relational; there must not be any fixed or absolute structure of space" 
(Smolin 1997 278)1. As Nuccio Ordine comments, in Bruno's hands 
"the old cosmological concept that relegated the `edges' to a perpetually 
marginal position falls to pieces, for everything can become the centre, 
every element can occupy a different place" (Ordine 1996 166). 
Deleuze and Guattari's smooth space, or plane of immanence is here 
perfectly prefigured in Bruno's monistic ontological and epistemological 
vision, but so too is Nietzsche's perspectivism'. When approached in 
this way it becomes clear quite how these diverse doctrines are all 
derived from the destruction of transcendental values executed by 
Bruno's extension of the cosmological, as well as ontological and 
epistemological, implications of Copernicanism to their limit, marking 
out the trajectory performed by the perfect nihilist who comes out on 
the other side of the inevitable event of nihilism. 
Crucial to this trajectory is Bruno's adoption and transformation of the 
system of the Catalan mystic and polymath, Raymond Lull, and in 
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particular of his ars combinatoria, so often cited as a precursor of 
cybernetic machines via its influence on Leibniz' De Arte 
Combinatoria'. Lull's breakthrough was to endow concepts with a new 
fluidity and dynamism utterly alien to the Medieval world of hierarchies 
and categories, for as Spinoza writes "the order and connection of ideas 
is the same as the order and connection of things" (Spinoza 1985 E 
IIP7). Lull too postulates a new world in which, free from "the 
restraints of the hierarchical structures of medieval concepts. The 
concepts were now understood relative to one another, in relationships 
that were open because they could be reversed" (Roob 1997 287). 
Bruno's critique and development of Copernicanism is explicitly carried 
out on the metaphysical, cosmological, and political planes 
simultaneously, indeed, as Negri insists in his reading of Spinoza, the 
critique of metaphysics is political (Negri 1991a and 1994). In Bruno 
this identity is performatively demonstrated. To trace out these 
apparently obscure arguments is to dissect the origins, formation and 
philosophico-political conceptual foundations of modernity itself (a by- 
product of this analysis is that the terms `postmodernity' and its 
cognates must be limited to their origins as terms to describe a 
particular architectural style; all other uses of them are theoretically 
naive and historically ill informed- unless of course one is enamoured 
of the idea that we are going somewhere- by virtue of their 
being 
ineluctably tied up with one form or other of teleology, one doctrine or 
other of universal progress). When we start to look at this 
birth of 
modernity, we find coiled in its heart the snake of nihilism; and so 
to 
take up, and somewhat distort, a point made by Habermas, we 
find 
that this birth has happened again, and again, and again, and every 
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time that the refrain of modernity is played it comes accompanied by 
nihilism: their relationship, would appear to be symbiogenetic'. 
Nihilism is a constitutively productive element of modernity. It is the 
recognition of the inevitable coming of this unwanted accomplice that 
composes one of the elements of Deleuze's understanding of Nietzsche, 
and it is why he says that "Nietzsche can think that nihilism is not an 
event in history but the motor of the history of man as universal 
history. " (Deleuze 1983 152). 
It is not, then, with Copernicus who, after all, "maintained the idea of 
an absolute point of view" (Stengers 1997c 40), that any sort of threat 
is posed to the terrestrial order via an onslaught upon its celestial 
cognate, but with Bruno. The full import of this shift of attribution is 
considerable and has nothing to do with correcting Kant's use of 
metaphors, ie suggesting that he and other self-aggrandisers no longer 
think of themselves and their works as having the status of the 
Copernican revolution but rather as being Brunian in their shattering 
effects. This revolution, both scientific and philosophical, is described by 
Alexandre Koyre as follows 
the destruction of the Cosmos, that is, the disappearance, 
from philosophically and scientifically valid concepts, of the 
conception of the world as a finite, closed, and hierarchically 
ordered whole [ ... ] and 
its replacement by an indefinite 
universe which is bound together by the identity of its 
fundamental components and laws, and in which all these 
concepts are placed on the same level of being. This, in turn, 
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implies the discarding by scientific thought of all 
considerations based upon value-concepts, such as 
perfection, harmony, meaning and aim, and finally the utter 
devalorisation of being, the divorce of the world of value 
from the world of facts. (Koyre 1957 2). 
Bruno is acutely aware of Copernicus' limits, and notes them curtly, as 
follows: he, Copernicus "did not go much further [away from the 
common and vulgar philosophy] because he could not plumb and probe 
into matters to the extent that he could completely uproot unsuitable 
and empty principles [... ] he did not have sufficient means to be able to 
defeat completely, conquer and suppress falsehood beyond all 
resistance" (Bruno 1995 86). The first mention in print of Copernicus' 
heliocentric thesis was with the publication of his Cornmentariolus in 
1514, this publication was followed by a long hiatus in which it was 
largely ignored, and when Bruno starts lecturing upon its contents and 
implications, it is not as Copernicus' first acolyte and proselytiser, but 
as his first and most severe critic (Mendoza 1995 77), and as such, 
before the world was able to absorb the implications of Copernicus' 
system, Bruno was already bringing them news from a much more 
unfamiliar, disquieting planet: for barely had man been removed from 
the centre of the cosmos, than Bruno was abolishing the concept of 
centre altogether. "Bruno not only anticipated Galileo and Kepler, but 
he passed beyond them into an entirely new world which had shed all 
the dross of tradition" (Singer 1950 49). 
Bruno offers a bold precursor of Deleuze and Guattari's demand that 
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philosophy be in accord with the formula "PLURALISM = MONISM" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 31/20), as when he notes, explicitly 
against both Aristotelian and Platonic forms of dualism and 
transcendentalism, that "nature descends to the production of things, 
and intellect ascends to the knowledge of them, by one and the same 
ladder. Both ways proceed from unity to unity" (Bruno 1998 93)'. In 
this Bruno goes far beyond a naive empiricism and ventures close to a 
speculative materialism in his promotion of a monism of modal 
differentiation. Bruno writes of what is, in effect, the plane of 
immanence that it is "complicative [... ] one, immense, infinite and 
comprehensive of all being, and in an explicative manner, it is present 
in sensible bodies and in the potency and the act that we see 
distinguished in them" (Bruno 1998 93). He goes on to note that it is the 
mark of the feeble mind that it cannot "understand multiplicity except 
through many species, analogies and forms [... ] The premier intelligence 
embraces everything in a single, absolutely perfect idea" (Bruno 1998 
95). This places Bruno directly in the line of univocal ontology, beyond 
the Scholastic categories, and in touch with a certain nominalistic 
critique of the Aristotelian architecture of natural species and of the 
eilos. The latter being a critique adopted by Nietzsche following Lange's 
position that there is "no such instance of so empty and at the same 
time crass a superstition as that of Species, and there are probably few 
points in which men have gone on rocking themselves with such 
baseless argumentations into dogmatic slumber" (Lange 1879 iii 27). 
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Bruno. Architect of the Future 
It is entirely predictable that any discussion of nihilism will have to 
begin with Nietzsche, and specifically with the writings collected as The 
Will to Power. Nietzsche's characterisation of nihilism is complex, 
multifaceted, and ranged over several levels, referring to several 
ontologically distinct objects. Without wanting to attribute to 
Nietzsche a closed, totalising system, it seems that the constellation of 
nihilism does indeed knit together several of the most important axes of 
Nietzschean thought. To put it in his own words, Nietzsche sees 
himself as "a spirit of daring and experiment [who] has already lost [its] 
way once in every labyrinth of the future" (Nietzsche 1968 preface § 2) 
and what he finds there is nihilism. The sustained understanding or 
diagnosis of nihilism is in a sense the most successful actualisation of 
one of Nietzsche's definitions of the role of the philosopher: that is as a 
physician engaged in the diagnosis of the sicknesses afflicting the world 
in which he finds himself, `the philosopher as cultural physician's. "But 
it is sick, this unchained life, and needs to be cured. " (Nietzsche 1983 
120). The philosopher as well as being a physician must be a 
"soothsayer-bird spirit" who "looks back when relating what will come" 
(Nietzsche 1968 preface § 3), and what this soothsayer sees in this 
case, is a culture which "has been moving as toward a catastrophe", 
and that catastrophe is the advent of nihilism. The describer of this 
catastrophe is by virtue of this vision a perfect nihilist, that is to say 
one who has gone through the experience of nihilism, the conflagration 
of transcendent values, and has left it behind, outside himself. Nihilism 
then is the diagnosis of our immediate past, and of our immediate 
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present. As for Walter Benjamin, so for Nietzsche, both the past and 
the future are littered with signs, and speak "even now in a hundred 
signs" (Nietzsche 1968 preface § 2). The past is a transmitter of 
oracular wisdom, and it is only the soothsayer who may read this 
oracle; but a Nietzschean soothsayer, like Benjamin's and Paul Klee's 
angel of history is Janus faced, he is orientated simultaneously both 
towards the future and the past. It is only the soothsayer, the 
"architect of the future" (Nietzsche 1983 94), who knows the present 
who may read the oracle; it is imperative that the sooth-sayer "looks 
back when relating what will come" (Nietzsche 1968 preface § 3), the 
philosopher must be a "telephone from the beyond" (Nietzsche 1969 
III 5), and the news that he brings is that of nihilism. For Nietzsche, 
the coming of nihilism, and our experiencing of it, is inevitable, 
unavoidable, and necessary; it is so in order that Nietzsche's much 
vaunted transvaluation of all values may occur: we "must experience 
nihilism before we can find out what value these `values' really had. We 
require, sometime, new values. " (Nietzsche 1968 preface § 4). Diagnosis 
consists of the elements of etiology and prescription: revelation of the 
cause of the sickness, anatomisation of the symptoms, and 
prescription of a curative solution. It is for precisely these reasons that 
Deleuze notes that the "whole of philosophy is a symptomatology, and 
a semeiology", and that consequently its object of study, the 
"phenomenon [... ] is not an appearance or even an apparition but a 
sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force" (Deleuze 
1983 3). Nietzsche is immensely precise with each element of his 
diagnosis of nihilism, and unusually perhaps, no less so in his account 
of its etiology than in the other two elements. The precise source of 
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nihilism for Nietzsche lies in Nicholas Copernicus' overturning of the 
Ptolemaic geocentric cosmology, and its replacement with the, in 
certain senses still more ancient, heliocentric model; as is all too 
familiar, the immediate consequence of this, is that "the faith in the 
dignity and uniqueness of man, in his irreplaceability in the great chain 
of being" became a "thing of the past", Copernicus' projection placed 
man on "an inclined plane" so that "now he is slipping faster and faster 
away from the centre into- what? into nothingness? into a penetrating 
sense of his nothingness' (Nietzsche 1969 111 25). 
It follows from this that the Copernican revolution needs to be 
displaced from its principal position in the narrative of nihilism, "this 
long plenitude and sequence of breakdown, destruction, ruin and 
cataclysm" (Nietzsche 1974 § 343). As already noted, Kant prides 
himself in carrying out a Copernican revolution in thought, he believes 
his own thought to be a seismic event in the possibilities, trajectories 
and purposes of philosophy, he believes that his Critiques represent a 
shift in philosophy as radical as that represented by Copernicus in 
cosmology. The Chinaman of Königsberg is of course entitled to his own 
self-assessment, the problem is that it is not to Copernicus that the 
revolution that bears his name ought to be attributed, and that hence 
the event that Kant believes himself to be analogous to is not a 
revolution but a mere holding manoeuvre on the part of a faltering, 
crumbling ancien regime of thought. 
In light of the above, the issue of nihilism, when understood as a 
diagnosis of Occidental culture since roughly the late nineteenth 
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century crisis of faith must be recast. Classically it has been 
understood to be precipitated largely by various developments in the 
natural sciences, critically the Darwinian removal of man from the top 
of the chain of being, or rather the removal of that `chain' altogether, 
and the complete absorption of the ramifications of the much earlier 
`Copernican' revolution: the abolition of the geocentrism of the 
Ptolemaic cosmos. A single gathering wave from the sixteenth to the 
late nineteenth centuries. However, the advent of nihilism can be 
refashioned as a constantly recurring refrain in the history of thought. 
Understood as a persistent scepticism, and as a resolute rejection of all 
transcendent values, nihilism, is absolutely intimate with Deleuze's 
understanding of philosophy's role as a naturalism, and at the same 
time a part of Nietzsche's demand that philosophy become both 
immoral and historical. Although his work hurls countless accusations 
and critiques against all prior philosophy, it is arguable that one can 
isolate in Nietzsche two central reasons as to why "every philosophical 
architect in Europe has built in vain" (Nietzsche 1982 preface § 3). 
Kant's answer that the reason for this is the absence of a critique of 
reason is adjudged ludicrous. The first reason, for Nietzsche, is the 
eternal seduction of metaphysics by morality, and the concomitant 
preoccupation with truth, against which he "succeeded in making us 
understand, thought is creation, not will to truth" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1991/94 55/54). The demand for "historical philosophising" is 
Nietzsche's response to the second of the generalised forms of the 
failure of all hitherto existing metaphysical philosophy, that is that 
they start out "from man as he is now and think[ing] their goal through 
an analysis of him. They involuntarily think of `man' as an aeterna 
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veritas [... ] they will not learn that man has become, that the faculty of 
cognition has become" (Nietzsche 1986 § 2)'. This is clearly a charge 
that can be laid against Kant, who as we have already seen specifically 
counsels us to "begin with man as a fully formed adult" (Kant 1983 
49), and who acts as if science is and always will be Newtonian science 
and "thereby branded as impossible any opposition to classical science 
that was not an opposition to science itself" (Prigogine and Stengers 
1984 86). Kant is quite explicit about this, and it is clear that his 
motivation for such a position, and for much else in his system, is 
derived from the necessity of resisting the implications of a philosophy 
of nature that has consistently dethroned the sovereignty of man, 
Spinoza's intention to treat man as if he were dealing with "lines, 
planes and bodies" (Spinoza 1985 E III preface) for example 100. Here is 
Kant's most forthright statement of the necessity of limiting science: 
It is, I mean, quite certain that we can never get a sufficient 
knowledge of organised beings and their inner possibility [... ] 
by looking merely to mechanical principles of nature [... ] it is 
absurd for men to even entertain any thought of so doing or 
to hope that maybe another Newton may some day arise, 
to make intelligible to us even the genesis of a blade of grass 
from natural laws that no design has ordered. Such insight 
we must absolutely deny to mankind. (Kant 1952 § 75). 
For Nietzsche the event of nihilism leaves the way open for a chemistry 
of concepts and sensations, which in contradistinction to the frozen 
ontological and epistemological eternal verities of metaphysics will 
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recognise that 
everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as 
there are no absolute truths. Consequently what is needed 
from now on is historical philosophising (Nietzsche 1986 § 
2) 
The dawn of nihilism then, construed as a thinking of "existence as it is, 
without meaning or aim, yet occurring inevitably without any finale of 
nothingness" (Nietzsche 1968 § 55), is a part of that virulent 
materialism that runs through Occidental civilisation in perpetual, 
absolute opposition, destroying idols, pronouncing the end of ideals, 
renouncing states, smashing superstitions, engaging in an indefatigable 
"practical critique of all mystifications" (Deleuze 1969/80 378/279), 
from Sextus Empiricus to Lucretius, Bruno to Spinoza, Marx to 
Nietzsche. 
Kent's Secret Path 
In this way, Kant's self-proclaimed revolution can be imagined as an 
attempt to cancel time; and the critiques can be envisaged as a 
massive dam built to hold back the horrors of a world without meaning, 
a world torn from its hinges (the most profound interpretation of 
Hamlet's time "out of joint"). Kant himself is adamant that the 
"concept of noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept [... ] and it is 
therefore only of negative employment" (Kant 1929 A 255E 311) or 
even more determinedly "it is not indeed in any way positive" (Kant 
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1929 A 252). The Kantianism system then is a sea wall built to ensure 
that "the voyage of our reason may be extended no further than the 
continuous coastline of experience itself [... ] a coast we cannot leave 
without venturing upon a shoreless ocean which II. .. ] compels us in the 
end to abandon as hopeless all this vexatious and tedious endeavour" 
(Kant 1929 A 395). In other words, to accept the decentring of man 
and the necessity of a transvaluation of all values implied by a Brunian 
Cosmology would, for Kant, unleash once again the corrosive 
speculations of those "sceptics [that] species of nomads" who "despising 
all settled modes of life, broke up from time to time all civil society" 
(Kant 1929 A ix). And that, needless to add, was not an option that 
Kant would countenance. Copernicanism was already conceptually and 
empirically discredited, though as is evidenced by Kant's claim to its 
mantle, not politically and culturally redundant, its ontological 
foundations shattered; its empirical suppositions superseded by the 
scope of Bruno's epoch leaping imagination, even before its general 
acceptance, and later by the observations of Galileo and Kepler. The 
Vatican had in fact developed a far more perceptive assessment of the 
metaphysical, ontological and political stakes involved in the 
Copernican `hypothesis' than Kant ever did'°'. The Vatican's censorship 
body, the Index Congregation, characterised the Copernican enterprise 
"as simply a doctrina Pythagorica" (Lange 1879 i 232), and as a 
consequence didn't find it necessary to place the Book of the 
Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres on the Index of proscribed books 
until seventy three years after its 1543 publication, and sixteen years 
after Bruno's murder, indeed as Koestler shows there is "evidence of 
early benevolent interest in the Copernican theory [... ] by the Vatican" 
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(Koestler 1959 155). The Catholic hierarchy then was fully cognisant 
of the fact that the threat posed by the Copernicanism of its author 
was minimal- the old Canon Copernigk stayed in his isolated tower 
and troubled noone, unlike the seemingly fearless Nolan driven by an 
eroico furore, which had both Apollinean and Dionysian dimensions "the 
former because it was a passion for truth and knowledge, the latter 
because it led to death and resurrection" (Mendoza 1995 xxiv)' 
harboured no reticence about promulgating his disdain for the 
established order. The Canon, on the contrary was never persecuted, 
he was in fact feted, even encouraged, by elements reaching as high up 
the Vatican hierarchy as the Pope himself, and to reciprocate for this 
patronage, it is the name of Pope Paul III that is found in the 
dedications page of the Book of Revolutions, written in June 1542 
(Koestler 1959 176); it is in this dedication that Copernicus claims "in 
typical renaissance fashion [... ] that rather than presenting a novelty 
he was restoring an ancient wisdom that had been lost" (Gatti 1999 
15). No such collusion occurs with Bruno, whose purpose is explicitly 
revolutionary and directed to the destruction of dogmatically imposed 
ideas and values. So if Kant can ignore Bruno, if he can write as if 
Bruno had never happened, and if he can pretend that the revolution 
really does happen with Copernicus he can keep the old order intact. As 
Nietzsche points out: 
since Kant, transcendentalists of every kind have once 
more won the day- they have been emancipated from the 
theologians: what joy! -- Kant showed them a secret path 
by which they may, on their own initiative and with all 
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scientific respectability, from now on follow their `heart's 
desire' (Nietzsche 1969 III § 25) 
That is, they can sustain the existence of the transcendental without 
having to resort to the theological. They can garb themselves with the 
cloak of revolution and simultaneously reconstitute a different 
"regulative fiction", a new form of "police supervision" (Nietzsche 1974 
§ 344). In Nietzsche's judgement, then, Kant is subject to the rebuke 
that he had himself directed at those he dubbed `pretended 
indifferentists', that they "fell back [... ] into those very metaphysical 
assertions which they profess so greatly to despise" (Kant 1929 Ax). 
As has already been indicated Nietzsche's diagnosis of nihilism is 
tripartite, the third part being prescriptive: for after the revaluation of 
all values comes the formation of new ones. The programme of the 
perfect nihilist is inscribed, Nietzsche reminds us, on the title page of 
his "gospel of the future" and it is "The Will to Power: Attempt at a 
Revaluation of All Values" (Nietzsche 1968 preface § 4), Nietzsche 
lives through, indeed escalates, ("You ain't seen nothin' yet"), the 
necessary event of nihilism, and drags something shining and new from 
the catastrophic wreckage, the psychic detritus of having been 
Christian for two thousand years. Unlike Kant, Nietzsche understands 
that the disarmed depth charge dropped by Copernicus had been 
surreptitiously retrieved, rewired and given a depleted uranium 
warhead of immense destructive power by Bruno. Kant retains, claws 
back, the centre that Bruno had abolished. In constructing the 
standpoint of the transcendental, Kant reformulates the Renaissance 
Humanist vision of human dignity, to follow Nietzsche, the Kantian 
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supposition of the scientific human subject deciphering natural law, the 
subject of the critical epistemology "was immediately employed by 
man for his own self-glorification" (Nietzsche 1990b § 106). The 
Kantian critical enterprise keeps man in thrall of the pathological 
desire for centring that still orders the healthy human psyche, the 
"coming of Spirit apprehending itself" (Prigogine and Stengers 1984 89) 
in Hegelian language, the psychoanalytic subject on the Freudian 
couch. This drive for there to be a centre is a veritable, persistent, 
pernicious pathology. Witness, for example, the history of languages of 
the self predicated as they are upon the equation of health with 
centredness, balance, symmetry (vis also conventional ideas of beauty 
and current spurious attempts to calculate the physical average of the 
perfect face based upon the deviance of the proportions of facial 
features from a statistical norm). This pathology is cauterised at 
source by Bruno and his relentlessly amoral, furiously antitheological, 
pursuit of the "universe that has lost all centre as well as any figure 
that could be attributed to it" (Deleuze 1993 124). In philosophical 
history there are two types of hermit or recluse: first is the voluntary 
like Kant, and second those condemned to exile, the heretical, the 
outcast. Contrary to his own belief that he is "a solitary by instinct 
who has found his advantage in standing aside and outside" (Nietzsche 
1968 preface § 3) it is to the latter type that Nietzsche truly belongs, 
Outcasts of society, long persecuted and sorely hunted- 
also the enforced recluses, the Spinozas and Giordano 
Brunos- in the end always become refined vengeance- 
seekers and brewers of poison (Nietzsche 1990a § 25) 
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"The Philosopher's Serenity and Philosophy's Achievement" 
As has repeatedly been intimated, it will not be enough for Nietzsche to 
simply recognise the necessity, the repetition, and the event of 
Nihilism, one must go beyond it, and take its implications on board in 
the task of creating new values. "Radical nihilism is the conviction of 
an absolute untenability of existence when it comes to the highest 
values one recognises; plus the realisation that we lack the least right 
to posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that might be `divine'" 
(Nietzsche 1968 § 3). The basis for this revaluation, for this living 
through, lies in a dizzying perspectivism and a defiant cheerfulness 
that enables one to approach the "gloom without any real sense of 
involvement and above all without any worry and fear for ourselves" 
(Nietzsche 1974 § 343). Related to this, and presumably with the just 
quoted passage from the Gay Science in mind, Deleuze and Guattari 
make a very simple yet astounding comment about what is commonly 
held to be the archetypal, the pinnacle, event of nihilism, they write 
that "for philosophers neither atheism nor the death of God are 
problems [... I That philosophers still take the death of god to be a 
tragedy is astonishing. Atheism isn't a drama, but the philosopher's 
serenity and philosophy's achievement" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 
89/92, my translation). Now this idea eliminates whole currents of 
thought, past and present in both analytic and continental philosophy, 
burdened as they have been by the weight of the past, by what 
Nietzsche on occasion calls, the shadow of God. This truly philosophical 
attitude, described by Deleuze and Guattari, is precisely what 
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Nietzsche means by furor philosophicus and by cheerfulness, and 
Spinoza by joy. This cheerfulness is the only way to confront the 
"monstrous logic of terror" (Nietzsche 1974 § 343) entailed by the 
destruction of transcendent values, and of the consequences of `the 
death of god' Nietzsche says 
They are not at all sad and gloomy but rather like a new and 
scarcely describable kind of light [... ] 
We philosophers and `free spirits' feel, when we hear the 
news that the `old god is dead', as if a new dawn shone upon 
us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, 
premonitions, expectation. At long last the horizon appears 
free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last 
the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be 
right, at long last our ships may venture out again. 
(Nietzsche 1974 § 343) 
As we have seen, the most striking result of Bruno's radicalisation of 
Copernicus is the restriction of the Canon's work to a mere cosmic 
swapping of places. The Nolan, on the contrary, eliminates the entire 
medieval machinery, with its armillary spheres, its fixed firmament, 
hierarchies and centres and replaces it with an infinite, acentric, 
topological smooth space. 
You will no longer say that there is an edge or limit either to 
the extent or motion of the universe; you will esteem the 
belief in a primum mobile, an uppermost and all containing 
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heaven, to be a vain fantasy (Bruno 1950 361) 
It is with this invective that Bruno admonishes those who still hang on 
to a medieval or even a Copernican cosmos, and he might have added 
with Nietzsche and Admiral Turenne, "You tremble, carcass? You 
would tremble a lot more if you knew where I was taking you" 
(Nietzsche 1974 277)108. It is this abolition of the cosmological primum 
mobile, that had lead Bruno to the requisite perspectival and historical 
approach to epistemology that Nietzsche prescribes. Two options for 
knowledge are posed in the aftermath of the event of nihilism. For 
Nietzsche both must be avoided with equal vehemence, on the one 
hand, there is the stifling atmosphere- one that had made Kleist so 
suicidal- of Kantianism's "gnawing and disintegrating scepticism and 
relativism" (Nietzsche 1983 140), an atmosphere of scepticism in 
which "no one can live" (Nietzsche 1990b § 84), and on the other, the 
pathological "belief in truth [which] makes its appearance as a social 
necessity [and] has a moral origin" (Nietzsche 1990b § 91). Nietzsche's 
response to both of these dire options "lies not in knowing, but in 
creating" (Nietzsche 1990b § 84). One of the clearest statements as to 
what Nietzsche means by this is as follows 
For the plant the world is thus and such; for us the world is 
thus and such. If we compare the two perceptual powers we 
consider our view of the world to be the more correct one, ie. 
the one that corresponds more closely to the truth [... ] The 
natural process is carried on by science. Thus the things 
mirror themselves ever more clearly, gradually liberating 
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themselves from what is all too anthropomorphic. For the 
plant, the whole world is a plant; for us, it is human 
(Nietzsche 1990b § 102) 
It is a constant of Nietzsche's critique of Kant that the latter remains 
ahistorical, that his philosophy is "entirely outside the historical 
movement; without any eye for the actuality of his time [... 1 way off 
when it comes to great historical values" (Nietzsche 1968 § 95,101). 
Directly tied to this is Kant's reinvention of the sovereign human 
subject, and the reinscription of this subject in the centre of the 
knowable cosmos though the invention of the categories of reason. It is 
upon this that Kant provides a basis for the anthropocentric platitude, 
man is the measure of all things - dismissed by Nietzsche as the 
"hyperbolic naivete of man" (Nietzsche 1968 § 12), the quintessence of 
humanism against which Bruno had so diligently fought, and against 
which he posed with Nietzsche, man's "smallness and accidental 
occurrence in the flux of becoming and passing away" (Nietzsche 1968 
§ 4). Similarly Michel Serres has emphasised the ontological and 
epistemological consequences of this flattening of the Medieval 
hierarchy of being on a cosmic scale thus 
Nothing distinguishes me ontologically from a crystal, a 
plant, an animal, or the order of the world; we are drifting 
together toward the noise and the black depths of the 
universe, and our diverse systemic complexions are flowing 
up the entropic stream, toward the solar origin, itself adrift 
[... I this is complexity itself, which was once called being. 
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(Serres 1977/82 272/83) 
Since the result of nihilism is the recognition of the destruction of man's 
privileged position within the acentric, valueless, non-hierarchical 
entanglement that is the world, and that Nietzsche warns against and 
actively seeks to circumvent, the possibility that his analysis, his 
diagnosis of nihilism, will be taken for a merely negative platitude; he 
writes that "nihilism is not just a collection of speculations around the 
theme `all is in vain! ': it is not just the thought that everything deserves 
to be destroyed: the nihilist helps to destroy" (Nietzsche 1968/95 § 
102/§ 24, my translation), and having destroyed, rebuil. ds. 104 
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I have tried, throughout this thesis to insist upon the radical, and 
unbreachable, chasm that exists between, on the one hand, Deleuze 
and DeleuzeGuattari's heretical materialism, and on the other hand, the 
traditions that dominate philosophy. The differences exist on many 
levels as I have endeavoured to articulate, but perhaps the most 
important, at least for my proposed project of creating a 
Schizogenealogy, to which this is merely a prelude, is one that appears 
on the level of affect and that directly grows out of the conclusion of my 
last chapter. 
Deleuze and Guattari are not unique in pointing to the event of nihilism, 
indeed this is common to most of their erstwhile contemporaries; where 
they are unique though, is in their response to this event. For 
contemporary French philosophy, and its Anglophone reflection, is 
dominated by a thought of mourning, a thought that Deleuze has 
rigorously refused, in describing his own work as "not a work of 
mourning; non-mourning takes even more work" (Deleuze 1990/95 
118/84). He goes on to further displace his project: "I've never worried 
about going beyond metaphysics or the death of philosophy" (Deleuze 
1990/95.122/88), and finally, in their last joint work, Deleuze and 
Guattari declare that "we have never been bothered with the death of 
metaphysics or the overcoming of philosophy: it is just pointless, idle 
incoherencies [d'inutiles, de penibles radotage]" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1990/95 14/9). The philosophy that Deleuze offers is an invitation to 
life, to the active continuation of philosophy, to its creative, inventive 
becomings hybrid. In active opposition to the philosophy that throws 
up its hands in surrender at the supposed superior grasp of the sciences 
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on truth, and that mourns the loss of certainty brought about by the 
creative destructions of immanence's struggles with transcendence, 
philosophical thought for Deleuze "is creation, not will to truth" 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 55/54). It is the invention, and 
actualising, of virtual potentialities from the texts of science and 
philosophy that is sought by a Schizogenealogy, a positively 
constructive task, a rebuilding from the ground up, as Marx, Nietzsche, 
and Deleuze all suggest. 
The approach that I have adopted here, and the readings offered, are an 
attempt at an original and innovative intervention into the reading of 
our philosophical modernity. The thesis' novelty and radicality then is 
triply marked. First by the attempts to produce materialist readings of 
Bergson, Spinoza, Bruno, and to a lesser degree, of Schelling which 
would vitiate the charges of vitalism, idealism, mysticism, and 
determinism which prevail in their reception. However, such readings 
are not carried out for the sake of hermeneutic superiority, nor to 
ascertain the truth of these texts, nor finally are they arbitrary, but 
rather these readings seek potentialities that can be actualised, 
elements that can be assembled to build a war machine active in the 
terrain of philosophy. This is not done with etymological investigation, 
syntactical boldness, grammatical invention, or typographical 
cleverness (I noted Deleuze and Guattari's rejection of such techniques 
in the first chapter, see 1980/87 33/22), but rather by seeking those 
moments where a philosophical opposition emerges. Second, and 
perhaps most significantly, I have, by locating the few, very brief 
references to Bruno in Deleuze's work, been able to: shift the 
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framework in which the latter is seen; and demonstrate the crucial role 
that Bruno plays in the organisation of the tradition of heretical 
materialism. The discovery of Bruno, the revelation of clear Brunian 
influences upon key figures in Deleuze's genealogy (Spinoza, Leibniz, 
Nietzsche, Schelling, arguably Marx, and indirectly Bergson through 
the latter's close study of, and admiration for, Plotinus), is doubly 
critical, and this introduction leads to the third major claim. It is argued 
that a Schizogenealogy severely contests the dominant construction of 
modernity in terms of a generalised acceptance of, and reverence for, 
the projected founding break made by Kant's self-declared `Copernican' 
revolution (indeed, the very word `revolution' is historically bound up 
with Copernicus). The result of displacing, and limiting the radicality of 
Copernicanism, and thereby Kantianism, allows for the rescue of a 
powerful tradition of ontological materialism from deliberate 
obfuscation, it enables us to "wrest tradition away from a conformism" 
(Benjamin 1973 Thesis VI) that has very nearly convinced everyone of 
its power. The retrieval of the conceptual innovations of this tradition, 
and their mobilisation opens the possibility for an explosion in the 
hitherto closed continuum of contemporary history, "it gives that 
configuration a shock" allowing us to "blast a specific era out of the 
homogeneous course of history" (Benjamin 1973 Thesis XVII). 
Philosophy, seen through Schizoanalytic eyes, is stratigraphic "a 
grandiose time of coexistence" in which the figures retrieved and 
rescued from the image given to them by State thought, are all our 
contemporaries, luminous points "like dead stars whose light is brighter 
than ever" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 59/59). 
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It must also be insisted, and I have done so often, that contrary to `good 
sense' and to doxa, philosophy is the site of war; it is not a polite 
exchange of opinions, the "Western democratic, popular conception of 
philosophy [... ] providing pleasant or aggressive dinner conversations", 
a conception which has never "produced a single concept" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1991/94 138/144,12/6). Philosophy as it is understood here, 
with the identity of ontology and politics, is the privileged site of political 
conflict, at which the highest stakes are raised. Recall that, as we saw 
in the chapter on Bruno, the philosopher "puts their work and 
sometimes their lives at risk", and that this is seen most sharply in the 
question of immanence, "the burning issue of all philosophy because it 
takes on all the dangers that philosophy must confront, all the 
condemnations, persecutions and repudiations that it undergoes [... I the 
problem of immanence is not abstract or merely theoretical. It is not 
immediately clear why immanence is so dangerous, but it is. It engulfs 
sages and gods" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 47/45). 
The philosophy explored in a Schizogenealogy is not a discipline 
abstracted from the world, it is militantly active, immanent to the 
world, in the identity of brain and world so eloquently discussed in the 
second of the two books on cinema. Here, in formulating a 
Schizogenealogy of heretical materialism, I have sought those 
singularities where philosophy actualises a break with doxa, where a 
thought of immanence wrests a materialism from the image forced 
upon it by metaphysics. I have tried to show that a pragmatically 
emplaced materialism always actualises philosophical revolt, it is a 
cacoethes, an uncontrollable urge for something harmful. Deleuze asks, 
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for whom is philosophy harmful? He claims too, that it is not clear why 
immanence is so dangerous. I have tried to shed some light on the 
second, to diagram the dangers of immanence, or to put this in the 
terms of the first question, to show that the harm, the damage, that 
immanence can do, is to the thought of the State, to the "tradition that 
justifies Power and exalts the State" (Negri 1996b 61), to the powers of 
mystification, and to the transcendent. 
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I have chosen to include this piece for a number of reasons, reasons 
identical to those which drew me to translate it in the first place. In this 
lecture, I see Bataille doing something both akin to, and quite different 
from, what I am trying to achieve on one level. That is his attempt to 
treat, in a direct and unmediated fashion, metaphysical and ontological 
questions as first and foremost political ones. As is suggested in the 
first footnote to the piece, this talk was given in the immediate 
aftermath of the Holocaust, of the "diabolical organisation of the 
concentration camps" (Deleuze 1985/89 237/207), of the destruction of 
Europe. Given in a city barely free from Nazi occupation it represents 
one of the earliest attempts to discuss philosophically that most 
momentous eruption of mechanised death, to discuss "the world of the 
concentration camp" which "operates as much by lineages and 
territories as by numeration [and in which] The question is not one of 
good or bad but of specificity" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 486/390). 
Furthermore, it is a particularly virulent example of the achievement of 
the "great post-war philosophers and writers", the demonstration that 
"thought has something to do with Auschwitz" (Deleuze 1985/89 
239/209), and that thought is immanent to life and history. In this piece 
Bataille shows how "the internal sheets of memory and the external 
layers of reality will be mixed up" (loc. cit. ). It is intriguing then, that in 
all of the extensive debates about the Holocaust in French philosophy 
that this piece and the series of arguments that it initiates in Bataille 
never figure. A principal reason for this, I would suggest, lies in its 
fearless approach to the question of immanence, and its concomitant 
critique of the theological nature of the 
dominant traditions of 
philosophy. In a sense then, this returns to an issue raised at the very 
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start of this thesis. For Bataille focuses questions about death and 
matter as the breaking point at which a counter-tradition singularises, 
it takes the eruption of immanence as the starting point of philosophy, 
and treats the event of nihilism, the conflagration of transcendent 
values, not as a site of mourning of so many `deaths of and `ends of, but 
as the beginning of philosophy, of an always heretical philosophy in 
immanence. 
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We can interpret the common assumption that we currently live in a 
state of deep moral disorder in several ways. ' We have forgotten, in 
particular, that those contemporary ethics, upon which behavior and 
judgements are founded, are based upon very ancient dualisms in the 
realm of principles. 
It was once thought, and perhaps it still is, that the world sets two 
principles against each other: the principles of matter on the one hand 
and of spirit on the other. It is not generally conceded that matter is 
held to be evil and spirit, good. It is, I think, nevertheless, the general 
tendency of all religions -- the major religions at least -- to hold matter 
to be evil, and spirit, good. ' 
I don't want to start out from quite such a crude schema however. 
In spite of being unable to accurately attribute this more precise 
formula to Plato, even though it has subsequently taken on more 
meaning, one can give to the following proposition a fairly solid value: 
the good would not be spirit, it would not be the idea, it would not be 
reason, but it would be the government of reason; and evil would be the 
fact that reason is governed by matter, if you like, and with regards to 
behavior, by the passions. According to this Platonic conception, evil is 
instantiated at the moment when reason becomes dominated by the 
passions. ' 
I think that one can establish an absolutely diametrical and in a sense 
inevitable opposition between this Platonic notion and a principle to 
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which Sade, even though he doesn't express it directly, gave a gripping 
form, when, in Philosophy in the Bedroom, he depicted the death 
penalty as the most indefensible act, even though he had, in all his 
work, only depicted the murder of others as, one can hardly put it 
otherwise, the good. 
Nevertheless he condemned the death penalty as a principle. ' For 
Sade, a punishment that implies the unleashing of the passions cannot 
be dealt out unemotionally. It is unacceptable to Sade, to unleash one's 
passion on a man to such a degree that one kills him" simply because 
a judge requests it or because reason demands it. 
I think it difficult at best to oppose the two principles which I have just 
ascribed to a part of Platonism and those implicit in the judgments 
which Sade formulates in Philosophy in the Bedroom. 
We are not at present, overly troubled by ethical questions. In general, 
and perhaps justifiably we are governed by very crude, very vulgar 
judgments. We hold the moral, the good, to be, on the whole, being nice, 
behaving well; and living in accordance with the law, is not harming 
others, it is being a good family man, doing one's duty in all 
circumstances and earning the esteem of one's fellow citizens"'. 
It is clearly conceivable, and it is difficult to seriously protest to the 
contrary, but ultimately, can the question of the good be posed with 
regard to such questions as that of the good family man etc.? It seems 
to me extremely difficult to do so, and for an extremely simple reason: 
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that is, if we do good in the current sense, for whatever reason, it is 
because there is, in so doing, a good at stake that we must either follow 
or not, and this good cannot be the action itself, but only that for which 
the action is carried out. 
In this respect it seems to me that religious perspectives are rich, when 
compared to the emptiness of the ideas held by those who live now and 
are moral. In the religious perspective, the issues at stake are: the 
good, that is, God. From this moment on, one can no longer say that it is 
pointless to be concerned with this or that fact, that it is senseless on 
its own but only in relation to other things. At this point one would no 
longer be able to say that other things would be nothing: there is no 
nothing, there is God. 
But you will go along with me when I say that God is dead, and such 
that it is difficult to be more dead (d'etre pl us mort). " 
What, from here on, is the meaning of the ethics that we follow? The 
question of good conduct concerns us indefinitely with regards to an 
agreeable state of affairs. I am quite willing for everybody to come to an 
agreement around the fact that an agreeable state of affairs must be 
sought, but will we still condemn our neighbor when he tells us that he 
doesn't give a damn and that he is going beyond such a state. Will we be 
able, at that moment to doom him to the kind of abjection that moral 
approbation brings to bear upon anybody who ceases to behave in 
conformity with the law, and even in conformity to good sense? Is that 
sort of anger which is deaf to reason justified simply when one has to 
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reproach a man for not having acted in conformity with reason? " 
This seems to me all the more questionable because it is difficult to 
imagine that reason commands all of men's actions in a general way. 
That man is not reducible to reason, is something that poses itself 
again in relation to the difficulty that I was just discussing. When I say 
that it was necessary to propose that acts taken as moral have an end 
that transcends them, in the sense that if we are entirely reducible to 
reason, it would be impossible for us to carry within ourselves an end 
which transcends reason, which would always be a principle of 
behaviour, that is, a calculation subordinated to a subsequent end but 
one which is never given, apart from at the moment at which one 
deifies it. But is deified reason exactly reason? This is what I am going 
to attempt to examine now. 
In principle, one can encapsulate the entirety of theology in the idea 
that reason is deified, because the notion of God is quite precisely 
founded upon the principle that reason is divine, and on the principle 
that the divine being, the divine essence, is reasonable. 
I don't find it particularly helpful to carry on talking about God if one no 
longer finds it credible. There is evidently something in these 
discussions that some people are ready to uphold: I don't know if it is 
worth the trouble of being cautious here, because, after all, when one 
has done with the notion of a reasonable God, one is forced to succeed in 
turning God into, I don't know if one can put this in any other way, a 
kind of overthrowing of himself, X14 an overthrowing of that to which this 
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notion is condemned to adhere, to that which it is bound up, particularly 
in the experience of mystics. 
But everybody knows what a mystic is: it is someone who refuses to 
confine himself to any argument which transcends itself in advance. As 
a consequence, it is perhaps unnecessary to waste too much time on 
their opinions. 
But, if we are now able to dissociate ethics from the divine, if to be more 
precise, we can dissociate reason from the divine, the deep covenant 
upon which moral outrage is based is decidedly broken. We find 
ourselves in a situation that is entirely open, entirely new. On the one 
hand we surrender ourselves to ill considered judgments, and on the 
other we no longer have anything spiritual: we lose meaning, the reason 
for which we act; we no longer know what the point is when we say that 
one thing is good, since we no longer know the good for which it is good. 
To find oneself once again in this kind of labyrinthine problem, it is 
unfortunately necessary to take things up again historically. What we 
must question, of necessity, is the origi. nary and fundamental division of 
the two principles, spirit and matter. As long as that division is 
established, there is, regardless of what one says, a superiority of spirit 
over matter, and spirit acquires every conceivable superiority, namely, 
on the one hand the divine, and on the other, reason. 
But, this dualist division is extremely fragile. One can see that in 
principle, the divine must be considered as reducible to the notion of the 
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sacred. Now, it is quite apparent that in its origin the notion of the 
sacred cannot in any way be reducible to reason: hence there is a 
possible slippage between the two notions. The fact that the sacred is 
understood to be transcendent, that it is beyond this world, in excess of 
everything, that it is totally other, means as a consequence that it has 
some relationship in principle with the world of transcendence taken as 
the world of reason. "5 
It is perhaps the most fragile part of the edifice upon which the entirety 
of human thought rests, in the sense that one can say in the simplest, 
clearest way that the sacred is precisely the opposite of transcendence, 
that in fact the sacred is precisely immanence. 
The sacred in both its simplest and its most evolved forms is always 
something to be rediscovered, the sacred is essentially communication: 
it is contagion. ll6 The sacred exists at the moment when something 
which will not be, although it must be, stopped is unleashed, and which 
is going to destroy, which takes the risk of tampering with, the 
established order. 
The sacred, if one wishes to pay it sufficient attention, can be simply 
reduced to the unleashing of passion. And it is evident that it is this 
unleashing of passion that is most contrary to reason. For Plato it is 
precisely that which must be placed under the governance of reason, in 
such a way that if, at any moment, the government of reason was 
exceeded by this unleashing, evil would begin. 
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This immanence of the sacred finds itself completely inverted in the 
evolution of religions, the reason for this can be quickly seen: the sacred 
opposes itself to the profane, and it is this opposition of the sacred to 
the profane that introduces a transcendence. If one passes from the 
profane to the sacred world, one does so by a leap: there is no other way 
to introduce immanence. But at this point it is necessary to ask what 
precisely it is that is signified by the profane world in relation to some 
principles that I am about to discuss. " 
It seems to me that the profane world is quite precisely reason. Reason, 
whether one admits it or not, whether one calls it divine or whether one 
ignores it, is essentially equivalent with the profane, reason is 
essentially the calculation that introduces equalities; and in so far as it 
is this calculation, in so far as it introduces equality, it is that which is 
totally exterior to us, it is totally exterior to us when we are alive, when 
we plunge into the foundations of our selves. 
If one wishes to present things in a different way, there is a 
transcendence of the profane which belongs exactly to objects, to 
everyday objects. An everyday object is completely separated from us. 
This table upon which my hand is resting, is as perfectly separated 
from me as I could wish; there is no possible contagion between this 
table and me, unless one introduces some irrational concept, which 
introduces that table over there perhaps: I don't know. "8 
But you will concede that it is easy for me, having this table under my 
hand, to point out to myself that all the principles that follow from the 
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stability, the equality of this table with itself, transcend me at the 
same time as the table transcends me, that is to say that it is totally 
exterior to me, that is to say that this flow of life which I am cannot 
enter it, "9 and that it presents a resistance that is inherent to it owing 
to the fact that it is not me, because it is before me as an equivalence 
(egalite) with itself. 
If you have followed me in this account of the constitution of the world 
of reason, which is the constitution of the world of transcendence, and if 
it shows you that at a given moment, owing to the fact that the sacred 
appeared as transcendent through its relationship with the profane, it 
became possible - given that the sacred had a great value and that 
simultaneously one was bestowing on reason a great value -- to merge 
(confondre) them by an abuse of language, which can perhaps 
transform reality, but which can perhaps also leave it intact. It 
became possible to merge them by an abuse of language. And at that 
point one had the concept of God and the divinity of reason. 
It became apparent that this unleashing of the passions which could 
have been found in the sacred, found itself chained at this point. 
Perhaps there still is passion in God, but it is passion in the same sense 
that one can say that a dog is still a dog even when it is chained. Since 
God is reason, there is no way for God's passion to release itself. In this 
sense perhaps mystical experience will accord with mine, since 
it 
demonstrates that to proceed from the sacred one must give way to an 
unlimitable unleashing, since in order to proceed from the sacred, one 
must break every kind of boundary, cease to consider the 
limits of 
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reason or of morality as possible. But, once again, isn't it evident that 
at this point God dies? Isn't it obvious that by separating oneself from 
the basis upon which his identity with himself was founded, his nature 
vanishes, it ceases to be the guarantor of life that we had become used 
to thinking it was; insofar as we attach ourselves to this tradition, by 
covering over an abyss into which we sink voluntarily, or precisely into 
which the mystic needs to sink because it is necessary for him to 
separate himself entirely from this world of reason which is for him 
precisely just that which he can hate. 
In this sense, the mystic, seems to me to open the way to Sade, and it 
is not by chance that, in an experiment which has been carried out in 
multiple forms, even sensual passion, the most brutal passion, the 
most vulgar passion, have always been combined. 
Having been through this experience it is scarcely credible that 
anybody could hope, even for an instant, to return to a world, in which 
tables stand and in which one is obliged to submit to the tables simply 
because we all want them to stand. And for the tables to stand, there 
must be not only thieves, but police! ' 
Once we have acknowledged this disappearance of God, we go beyond. 
Once God is unhinged' from the frame where theology, positive 
theology at least, had fixed him, we are longer confronted by that which 
I was just calling the sacred, a name which is perhaps purely pedantic, 
and which is ultimately just the unleashing of the passions, which is 
ultimately the world that Sade had depicted and which nobody wants 
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because it is frightening. 
It is clear that these ideas don't make life any easier. As soon as one 
loses that control once exerted over reason by the sacred, ' human 
possibility disappears as it were, it becomes somewhat blurred. Once 
he has absolutely lost control of reason man ceases to be man: he 
would be mad. And it is natural that an objection should arise, as it is 
quite natural that man should continue indefinitely - like a dog forever 
chasing its tail - to behave well, simply so that other men continue to 
behave well; so that there exists a world of good conduct which would 
indefinitely chase after something that would be contrary to this good 
behavior. 
However, I don't know if fear can be considered by man as the last 
obstacle, whatever resistances one may expect to appear when this 
word "fear" is mentioned, one may also know that it is fundamental to 
man, if not to be afraid, then at least to overcome his fear. Inhering in 
man is a voice that urges him never to give in to fear. This response is 
continually given, in all sorts of random acts, and for often doubtful 
reasons. 
But man needs to prove to himself in every way that he is not subject 
to fear in a final sense, that in the end he is beyond fear, and even, that 
he only exists beyond fear, because as long as he is governed by fear he 
is not yet a man. 
But if it is true that in general man cannot give in to fear, at the very 
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least he indefinitely postpones that moment when he will have to 
confront himself with the object of his fear. He indefinitely postpones 
that moment when, bereft of both the help of reason that God 
guaranteed, and of that help of God that reason guaranteed, man finally 
finds himself confronting his own naked image. 
It is necessary to step back, but it is also necessary to leap, and 
perhaps in order to leap better, one has first to take a step back. 
It seems to me in this regard that Sade's example is one of the most 
impressive, because one cannot say that Sade hadn't leapt! ' And I 
think that even if one wants to consider carefully a reality like that 
depicted in Sade's work, one must acknowledge that it surpasses us in 
every way: the man able to recognise his own world in One Hundred and 
Twenty Days does not yet exist. ' 
There is in this brutality that cannot take cognizance of the limit, 
something which makes one hesitate before leaping in every case. 
Perhaps, Sade's cruel representations can be considered as the precise 
definition of the leap that it is necessary to make, in the sense that one 
is not necessarily bounded by the kind of leap that Sade represents in 
the actions of his characters living out their most terrifying fantasies. 
But if it isn't necessary to follow these characters behavior exactly, the 
surpassing demonstrated by their behavior is sufficiently indicated 
in 
every instance by its depth. ' 
If it is unnecessary to set about treating one's neighbor in the way that 
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the characters in One Hundred and Twenty Days do, is it necessary to 
grant that moral liberation that I have just evoked, the distance 
marked out by Sade's cadavers? From a certain point it becomes 
impossible to joke. It is impossible to joke precisely because the 
unleashing of the passions is at stake, and because the unleashing of 
the passions is the good, which has always known how to incite men in 
the way that we have seen, which has given them licence to behave 
with unprecedented brutality, whilst they reduce the good to the 
impoverished things that we are familiar with. 
The unleashing of the passions is the only good - this is the kernel of 
what I have had to say this evening -- from the point when reason is no 
longer divine, from the moment at which there is no longer a God. There 
is no longer anything which for us can merit the name "sacred, " which 
merits the name "good, " other than the unleashing of the passions. 
What is the meaning of our activities? What does the train of thought 
that we have been following mean? What is the meaning of the work 
which we must do in order to eat? These things always signify 
something placed beyond us, like the carrot that one places before a 
donkey when one wants it to move forward as if led on a rope. We have 
no choice but to stop at the point when nothing matters for us more 
than that which is free, at the point when nothing matters more for us 
than what exists at that moment. 
It is possible however, to see the weakness in this argument, because 
when I speak of it, and as soon as I have spoken of it, 
I have 
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subordinated my life to something that was not immediately present. I 
cannot pretend, even when I raise my voice a little, that I am 
unleashing my passions here. Standing before you, I am not in the least 
bit unleashed. I am precisely chained. And when I raise my voice, it is 
perhaps nothing but a wailing (gemissement), because there is no other 
way for me to find the phrase that corresponds to my will. I am 
amongst you searching, but knowing that as long as I search with you I 
will be limited by the research that we can do together; and that 
limitation will remain such that the research will be nothing but a 
research and in no way will its object appear before us. 
In order for this object to appear before us, it would at least be 
necessary to do what is unacceptable when we engage in discourse, 
because it is discourse that concerns us at the moment: it would be 
necessary for me to speak like a poet. I would have to forget that I had 
something to say to you. I would have to become wrapped up with 
myself before you, to forget you and live nothing but my madness. 
Still, if I were to do it, I would not be able to be sure of success, because 
poetry itself is subject to all kinds of burden, and I think that the 
demands which have been made are of a character that shows the 
weight of which I am speaking. 
All the work which developed to give poetry back the freedom which it is 
losing at every instant, marks the distance that I have said must be 
cleared by a leap. This leap can be poetry, but when poetry claims to 
leap at the moment it evaluates itself, when it sees the leap that must 
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be made, and when it has not yet destroyed everything, then poetry is 
also the powerlessness of poetry. 
I'll stop speaking now, but will answer any questions that you might 
have. 
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J. WAHL: It's obviously very difficult to respond to such a talk, but 
even so, rd like to invite someone to start the discussion. 
I am going to say a few words, but it is very difficult, because the most 
formidable objection that I could make to Bataille would be to say: 
evidently, you are right! In which case, whatever I would say... 
BATAILLE: I think that I had this objection in mind from beginning to 
end. I think that what I have shown is that it is an objection. 
J. WAHL: The second thing, since we cannot talk about that objection, 
is this: you said that nothing can count more for you than what is free; 
it is not only unchained passion that poses objectives for itself quite 
arbitrarily. 
But, is this passion? Doesn't it believe its objectives to be reasonable? 
The word "reasonable" isn't really the one that we're after. But, the 
impassioned man, nevertheless, thinks that he has reason even in his 
passion. If I take anger as an example, it is very hard to conceive of a 
passion without objective, without content. 
Notice that I say this, but on the other hand I'd very much like to be 
able to explain myself, but it is very difficult to isolate passion in this 
way. 
I am coming to the fundamental question: two oppositions have been 
set up: transcendence and immanence on the one hand, the sacred and 
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the profane on the other. What is new about this is that you identify 
transcendence with the profane, immanence with the sacred. In what 
sense is the profane transcendent? It is in a sense other than the 
ordinary. This table is in no way me. You said in parenthesis however, 
that perhaps it has a very profound relationship with me 
BATAILLE: It is no longer profane. 
J. WAHL: Yes, but even when it is no longer profane, it has a certain 
relationship with me. `here is a part of me which is profane, to which I 
cling in order to write: it doesn't have a relationship to a sacred me, but 
it does have a relationship to a profane me. Yes. 
Finally, I detect an echo of Sartre's en-soi and pour-soi. You say. "this 
table is this table. " But, I'm not sure. We are no more able to find 
stability in the world than in ourselves. It is a pure fiction to say "this 
table is this table. " This table is changing. 
BATAILLE: It is in so far as transcendence is a fiction. 
J. WAHL: The immanent is the sacred: isn't it necessary however to 
distinguish between the passions. I can imagine a passion which doesn't 
have a sacred character. The question is to know whether there are not 
some conditions which passion must fulfil in order to become sacred. 
Not all passion could be sacred. That is the question that I am posing. 
BATAILLE: It is a very difficult question, and one dependent upon a 
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profane science, that is, it is necessary to consider very immediate 
things as the foundation of the profane sciences, as the subject of 
sociology. 
J. WAHL: I don't even know if that would give us an answer. 
BATAILLE: It is, indirectly, a way to proceed from sociology. 
J. WAHL: I would like to pin you down on specifics, since they are not 
given in your answer. Why are certain passions sacred, and others not? 
BATAILLE: It is always confused because the division between the 
sacred and the profane is continually becoming formal, and when the 
sacred is defined formally everything gets confused. 
J. WAHL: Would anybody else like to continue this discussion? 
ANONYMOUS: I wonder if one can't describe Sade, as a sacred being 
who is irritated by his own damnation; and when he seeks his 
characters' deaths in tortures isn't it that he finds that an ordinary 
death, the death of a bourgeois in his bed, is a profane death, and that 
he tries to make it sacred by surrounding it in torture, plunging these 
beings into the fire, or else behaving as some did during the war: we 
have plunged entire peoples into the crematorium, we have strewn 
towns with atomic bombs like at Hiroshima as Bataille writes in a 
recent edition of Critique. ' 
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What I want to ask then is this: isn't Sade the sacred, irritated by his 
becoming profane? 
BATAILLE: I don't think Sade cared about being either sacred or 
profane. In any case, if there is any life left in the notion of the sacred, 
Sade perfectly captured it. The essentials, it seems to me, are given by 
Sade in this respect, in that he doesn't allow even for an instant that a 
dispassionate interest can intervene in his unleashings. And it is in this 
sense that the definition of evil given in Philosophy in the Bedroom is 
the profound condemnation of everything that we have seen the 
Germans do. Because it is clear that compared to the executions of the 
Terror that Sade contemplated in Philosophy in the Bedroom , Nazi 
executions responded still more to the images, to the suggestions of 
Sade. But also, they responded continually to the fundamental 
objection that Sade made to the executions of the Terror, since from 
beginning to end, the unchaining of the passions that raged at 
Buchenwald or Auschwitz was an unchaining that was under the 
government of reason. 
And it is because of this that an opposition can now be made- 
between, on the one hand, traditional morality represented by 
Platonism, and on the other hand, that profound, stupefying morality 
offered by Sade- that can today take on the greatest meaning, and 
even serve as a landmark in a way that is perhaps definitive. 
127 
ANONYMOUS: Perhaps it is a little off the subject, but to what extent 
do you think that the civilisations to which man 
devotes himself are the 
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caricature of the madnesses that he resists? 
BATAILLE: It is very difficult to reply. I don't know in this sense if 
Buchenwald can be considered to be a caricature of One Hundred and 
Twenty Days. The word "caricature" is a little limited perhaps. 
THE SAME: rm not thinking of Buchenwald exactly, but of societies, of 
civilisations yet to come, as well as of communist society. 
BATAILLE: It is very difficult for me to speak of a society that doesn't 
exist. 
THE SAME: But nevertheless it is developing! 
BATAILLE: It is developing. Nobody, not even Soviet communists 
themselves, would claim that communism exists to any degree. 
THE SAME: Potentially, up to a certain point. 
J. WAHL: I do not see how your formula can be easily applied. 
THE SAME: Nevertheless, since the call to accomplish the communist 
society requires other calls to a certain unchaining of the passions 
which can go quite beyond the realisation of that society; I would say 
that there comes a time when a blockage is created, when these 
passions are guillotined. 
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BATAILLE: It seems quite impossible to me for a society to exist that 
would admit into its breast a multitude of Sades each as free as the 
other. This time it is not me who makes the objection. I say that it 
seems difficult that such a society could exist. I would do nothing in any 
case to prevent its arrival, and I consider that one would be in breach of 
the most profound morality by doing anything that would prevent its 
realisation. 
ANONYMOUS: M. Bataille can you explain what you meant when you 
said: "God is dead, and it is difficult to be more dead? " 
BATAILLE: This cannot be explained! 
J. WAHL: Surely we can discuss the "more dead. " 
BATAILLE: It is legitimate, even in a talk, to sometimes allow the 
intervention of a poetic absurdity; this one is quite poor. 
ANONYMOUS: Do you consider Malraues unchaining of action to be a 
caricature of the unchaining of the passions that you are describing? 
BATAILLE: In any case the word "caricature" strikes me as being 
unwarranted in this instance. 
THE SAME: It seems to me that one can draw out as a conclusion the 
idea that there is nothing more radical than the unchaining of the 
passions. 
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BATAILLE : In effect. 
THE SAME: On the other hand, it seems that through action, Malraux 
went far enough in intensity when losing himself in a very distinct 
passion. It seems to me that this is superior to what can result (pent 
aboutir) from the pure passion that you recommend (preconisez); so 
long as, according to Malraux, it maintains a means of creation. 
BATAILLE: It is possible that from the perspective of reason, which is 
perhaps the perspective of communism, Malraux goes wrong by 
allowing the intervention of passion. For at a given time Malraux 
announces the divorce between reason and passion, and it seems to me, 
at the moment, to end in confusion. 
THE SAME: I don't want to defend Malraux, but I think that action 
constitutes a third term that you have completely ignored. You opposed 
reason to passion, but what is most opposed to passion perhaps, is 
action. 
BATAILLE: I attributed a certain importance to the fact that action, 
which is not perfectly reasonable, which as a result of being 
subordinated to passion, is an action which cannot lead to anything. 
THE SAME: You would be able to avoid unrestrained passion. It is a 
question of reason; all the same, perhaps there are more profound 
impressions in reason. 
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BATAILLE: It is clear to me that history is made up of distortions 
similar to the ones that you have made of what I said. 
THE SAME: If the unchaining of the passions is the ultimate, is it all 
the same historically if one doesn't follow it? 
BATAILLE: It is quite difficult to speak on this point, because in the 
end, if passion is really unleashed to such a point that it is possible to 
have spoken about One Hundred and Twenty Days, well, we are 
situated so far beyond such a conversation that we cannot free 
ourselves of evocations that are really out of place, as soon as one 
speaks for example in a meeting; already when one is alone with 
oneself, it is not so easy. 
THE SAME: Finally actions occur in Sade's work that are powerful 
enough, even bloody enough, which are I think not lacking in a certain 
grandeur; and it is precisely in this purely positive sense, that he 
unleashes passion. 
BATAILLE: It seems to me that to the extent to which they have this 
grandeur, they are not exactly what they would like to be, at least they 
haven't sought that grandeur for its own sake, and that they are, 
however, subordinated to that grandeur, to the government of reason. 
Wasn't this the same minimum of the government of reason that was 
possessed by Hitler. 
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All action bears a profound weakness, and you have two options: either, 
it claims to carry out an act of reason, and in this case we no longer 
speak of passion; or it is a pretence destined to liberate passion, and in 
this case passion finds itself morally under the government of reason to 
which it is foreign. And this is the deep meaning of everything that I 
have said this evening, and it is what makes -action seem impossible to 
me, since one has not separated it entirely from passion. And perhaps 
for that reason, action is, like everything else human, immediately 
placed before the category of the impossible. 
THE SAME: On the subject of reason, the rather shabby appearances 
which you have given it are, all the same, those that are transcended in 
the work of someone like Kant, and precisely in the moral sphere. And 
one can see something here: Kantian reason, by its rigor, by the kind of 
sacred in which it reflects itself, ends up postulating God. As a 
consequence, the passage of God to reason does not prevent a return to 
God by reason itself, reason itself is almost irrational and surpasses 
itself in its assumptions. 
BATAILLE: I would like to learn from that rather than reply. ' 
J. WAHL: What one can say, is that, when reason appeared in 
Heraclitus' work, when he used the word "logos, " it bore some 
characteristics that one could call profoundly irrational. The two are 
more united, and "logos, " at its birth, is more contradictory. So, what 
you have criticised is reason in a particular epoch. 
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BATAILLE: Yes. There is, in the fact of the birth of reason, in its 
relationships with transcendence, connections which are infinitely 
difficult to sever. It is perhaps at the heart of one of the most difficult 
philosophical questions, and especially so because it can only be 
resolved historically, and this presupposes knowledge that I do not 
possess. 
J. WAHL: If nobody has anything else to say we can end the meeting. 
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 
1 All references in this thesis are given in the text by author, publication date 
of the edition used, and page number. The only exceptions being references to 
collected works eg. Bataille's, where the date is dropped in favour of volume and 
page number; or else in the case of authors, to whose work there is a standard 
scholarly method of reference that eschews page numbers eg. most of Nietzsche's 
works are referred to by section number, and Spinoza's Ethics, to which reference is 
made by Part, Proposition, Scholia etc, according to Edwin Curley's scheme, and his 
letters that are referred to by number. Finally documents from the WWW are, of 
necessity, unpaginated. 
Where two numbers are given in a reference they refer to the French 
followed by the standard English translation. In some instances, I have only given 
one reference, this is either where only one or the other version was available to me, 
or else in cases where I have made my own translations, owing either to 
unavailability, nonexistence, or more rarely to the inadequacy of the extant 
standard translation, I have usually indicated this. As for other works, where the 
only reference given is to a French edition, it can be assumed that the translation is 
my own, this is especially the case with regards to the largely and scandalously 
untranslated work of such authors as Alliez, Chätelet, Simondon, and Stengers. 
Fortunately for Anglophone readers, major works by the latter two are currently in 
translation and will be available soon. Hopefully, the availability of such work will 
encourage the more widespread exploration of the possibilities for thinking that 
these writers provoke, and will facilitate a leap beyond the current frozen image of 
continental philosophy. This thesis is offered as a small contribution to the spread, 
in the Anglophone world, of the renewed materialism embodied in these writers. 
2 To the best of my knowledge Bruno has never been discussed in relation to 
Deleuze, at least not in print, whilst Schelling crops up only very rarely. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER I 
3 In the translation of this piece published in the volume On the Line (New 
York: Semiotext(e), 1983), the phrase `agencement de desir' is rendered as 
`arrangement', I have replaced this with the more customary, and more 
machinically precise term `assemblage'. In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari 
frequently used the term `desiring-machine', however, because of the manner in 
which it leaves itself open to a subjective interpretation this term was replaced 
by 
`assemblage' in A Thousand Plateaus. 
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4 Note that a diagram, when presented in this way, is an immanent 
counterpart of a Kantian schema: the latter imposes a logical order from the 
outside, the former follows forces immanent to that which is studied. 
5 Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari's, work contains numerous critiques of 
the work of their contemporaries, most of them-- like the two that we have already 
pointed to in this chapter are by allusion- others, are direct, principally that 
directed at Lacan in Anti-Oedipus. Most of the allusory ones are, I would claim, 
directed at Derrida, take for instance that to be found in `Introduction: Rhizome'. 
"To attain the multiple, one must have a method that effectively constructs it; no 
typographical cleverness, no lexical agility, no blending or creation of words, no 
syntactical boldness, can substitute for it" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 33/22). 
All of these could be said to appear to varying degrees in Derrida's work, his Glas 
(1974) being a case in point, displaying typographical cleverness, and the blending 
and creation of words, in abundance. 
6 This gives us an opportunity to point out one of the major breaches between 
Deleuze and Guattari's critique of `modernist' texts and those deriving from Derrida 
and Lacan. I shall use as an example, the self-confessed Lacanian-Hegelian, Slavoj 
Zizek's encapsulation of the Lacanian reading of the structure of Freudianism. 
Zizek recounts a story about Freud taking a walk in a subterranean cave system, 
in the depths of which he encounters "another visitor to the caves, Dr Karl Lueger, 
Mayor of Vienna [... ] a notorious anti-Semite", he tells us, portentously, that we 
must be attentive to the fact that in German, the name `Lueger' "immediately 
associates with Lüge, a lie". The meaning of this story, according to Zizek is that it 
goes against the "obscurantist New Age approach according to which, upon 
penetrating the ultimate depth of our personality, we discover there our true Self, to 
whom we must open ourselves", and instead shows, that implicit in Freud is the 
argument that "what we discover in the deepest kernel of our personality is a 
fundamental, constitutive, primordial lie, the proton pseudos". For Zizek, and he 
argues Lacan, this contraindicates the Foucauldian, and also DeleuzoGuattarian, 
"insertion of psychoanalysis in the line of development that begins with the 
Christian practice of confession" (Zizek 1996 1). The problem with Zizek's argument 
is that, from our perspective, it is not what is discovered by psychoanalysis- the 
primordial truth or lie- that constitutes it as a part of confession, and later of the 
apparatus of the State, but the very presumption that there is anything to find in 
the first place. Hence it is the structure of psychoanalysis that we object to, its 
presumption that there is an originary plenitude/absence to be discovered in the 
first place- not what it finds there. It is therefore in its claim to holding the key to 
truth. 
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For a magnificent account of Millenialist movements throughout history see 
Norman Cohn's The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and 
Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages. 
8 Alison Coudert has argued that an early version of this thesis entered the 
philosophical tradition with which we are concerned via the "practicing alchemist 
and [... l Lurianic Kabbalist" (Coudert 1995 95) Francis Mercury van Helmont's 
influence on Leibniz. Coudert's book provides incontrovertible evidence that Leibniz 
was profoundly influenced by van Helmont, and over a considerable period of time, 
she demonstrates that key Leibnizian ideas were derived via van Helmont from 
Kabbalist and alchemical ideas, suggesting for example that his monadology draws 
on alchemical notions about `seeds' and the `flower' of substances, from Neoplatonic 
and Kabbalist theories of emanation. On the point at hand here, she argues that 
"Van Helmont rejected the common view of time as a continuum of infinite 
indivisible moments or points of duration [... ] in his view time was not an absolute 
concept. It was relative and intrinsic to each individual. Van Helmont consequently 
arrived at the idea of `biological time' which proved so useful for later biologists" 
(Coudert 1995 97), including, as we shall see in chapter three, Jakob von Uexküll. 
9 Pierre Zaoui: "Deleuze says in the course of an interview regarding his work 
in the history of philosophy that `Everything leads towards the great-identity 
Nietzsche-Spinoza'" ("Deleuze au cours d'une interview, ä propos de son travail en 
histoire de la philosophie: `Et tout tendait vers la grande identite Nietzsche- 
Spinozae), Zaoui 1995 65. Zaoui is quoting Deleuze 1988c. 
10 See the survey of such positions by Peter Landsberg in his paper `From 
Entropy to God? '. 
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11 Smolin is one of those physical scientists (at the time of publication of his 
book, The Life of the Cosmos, he was Professor of Physics at the Center for 
Gravitational Physics and Geometry at the Pennsylvania State University) who 
make frequent appearance in this thesis and whose very existence provides 
empirical difficulties for the work of Alan Sokal and Jean Briqmont who recently 
attracted much media attention for their attacks upon the use made by a series of 
French philosophers of examples, concepts, and arguments from the physical 
sciences, usually in the defence of some form of social constructivism. Smolin's work 
is interesting for a host of reasons, but we need only mention here the proximity of 
his overall view of cosmology to the philosophical positions espoused in this thesis, 
and his omnipresent enthusiasm for, and granting of, a prominent place to, the 
style of philosophy advocated here. Of interest principally are, his thorough critique 
of the Platonic background of most orthodox scientific thought, leading him to an 
ontological and epistemological position close to the Nietzschean perspectivism that 
we will encounter in several places below; and for his key statement of relationality 
"the world is a vast interconnected system of relations, in which even the properties 
of a single elementary particle or the identity of a point in space requires and 
reflects the whole rest [sic] of the universe" (Smolin 1997 221). This by no means 
exhausts the points of convergence. 
12 Two thorough studies of Nietzsche's relation to Boscovich are Whitlock 
(1996), and Stack (1983) chapter nine. Whitlock's two excellent articles assess and 
explicate the role played by Nietzsche's not inconsiderable understanding of the 
physics of his day upon his central philosophical concepts. His focus is on the 
influence of the Dalmatian physicist Roger Joseph Boscovich on Nietzsche (critically 
for the interpretation of Nietzsche in this thesis, Whitlock also emphasises the 
Spinozist elements of the eternal return, for which see also Yovel's fine study, 
1988). Whitlock's principal point is to show that Nietzsche derived from Boscovich, 
a radically relational or intensive view of matter, pace that espoused in this thesis 
and attributed to Deleuze and Guattari. Interestingly, Alison Coudert, whose 
fascinating work on Leibniz we have already encountered, argues that Leibniz had 
arrived at a position in which matter was to be treated as a "complex of forces. In 
this he was anticipating modern field theory, which treats material particles as 
concentrated fields of force- an anticipation duly recognised by its founder [... ] 
Ruggiero Giuseppe Boscovich" (Coudert 1995 97). 
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is On these and related questions see L. Ropolyi's excellent essay 
`Thermodynamic Elements in World Views- World View Elements in 
Thermodynamics' in Thermodynamics: History and Philosophy. Facts, Trends, 
Debates, pp 424-38. Ropolyi convincingly demonstrates that even the most 
fundamental concepts eg. entropy, equilibrium, work, extensive and intensive 
qualities, are subject to almost total disagreement, based upon this he 
programmatically concludes that "Thermodynamics is a science in crisis and a 
science of crisis. " Martin Barrett and Elliott Sober for example have suggested that 
"entropy is not simply a technical system applying to closed gas chambers, but has 
a larger meaning as a measure of organisation and order". To reinforce this point 
one might also survey the debate in biology concerning the import, interpretation 
and structure of the second law, see inter alia Daniel R. Brooks and E. O. Wiley, 
Evolution as Entropy: Toward a Unified Theory of Biology (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), Bruce H. Weber, David J. Depew, and James D. 
Smith, Entropy, Information, and Evolution: New Perspectives on Physical and 
Biological Evolution (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1988). In 
addition to this, one can examine the widespread use of tropes from 
thermodynamics across a wide range of social commentators, writers and artists 
from Henry Adams, and Spengler, to Freud, to the novelist Thomas Pynchon (in 
particular in his magnum opus Gravity's Rainbow, and his short story `Entropy'), 
and in the work of the artist Gordon Matta-Clark. 
14 Simondon's contribution to the critique of hylomorphism is dealt with in 
greater detail in chapter two. It will suffice here to note that the account of 
singularity currently under consideration and its use of the concepts of the 
membrane, limit, and topological surface is explicitly drawn from Simondon. Bear in 
mind also that Simondon is one of the first French philosophers of cybernetics, and 
correspondingly one of the first to write philosophically on modern thermodynamics, 
these two being intimately entwined. 
15 This line of thinking is elaborated in Stuart A. Kauffman's work in 
The 
Origins of Order: Self-organisation and Selection in Evolution 
(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
16 Leon Brillouin, Science and Information Theory (Academic Press, 1962). See 
also Lila Gatlin, Information Theory and the Living System 
(New York: Columbia 
Press, 1972). 
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" The relationship between Deleuze and Guattari and Prigogine and Stengers 
has been adequately mapped by James Flint in his `Mapping the Plane of 
Consistency', and I shall not attempt to repeat it here. Note though that their 
relationship was one of both personal friendship and intellectual solidarity, and 
that the original French version of this book contains not inconsiderable references 
to Deleuze and to Michel Serres (the references to the latter alone have been carried 
over into the English translation which differs considerably from the French, to the 
detriment of a solely Anglophone readership). In a recent interview about his work, 
including its relations with that of Deleuze, Prigogine has said that he considers 
the term `repetition' to be coextensive with the time-reversible frame (that of 
dynamics), while `difference' is coextensive with the time-irreversible perspective 
(that of thermodynamics, and complexity). 
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18 As Prigogine informs us (Prigogine and Stengers 1984 153-6, Prigogine 
1997 66-7) this result was only proved by the Belouzov-Zhabotinsky reaction in the 
early 1960 s. This experiment, a complex demonstration of regular chemical 
oscillation, showed that when matter is pushed to the limits of it stability it begins 
to self-organise into new and novel forms. It is the empirical basis for Nietzsche's 
world "eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of 
recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms; out of the simplest forms striving 
toward the most complex, out of the stillest, most rigid, coldest forms toward the 
hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory" (Nietzsche 1968 § 1067). This 
experiment, and related research programmes on different strata give rise to a 
concept that I would call, `creative instability'. Another, seemingly unrelated, theory 
is that of punctuated equilibrium, developed by Niles Eldridge and Stephen Jay 
Gould, as a challenge to the gradualism implicit in orthodox Darwinian evolution. 
The theory in brief suggests that the evolutionary history of most species is 
characterised by long periods of stability, punctuated by calamitous changes. Such 
events or instabilities can lead to one or several species undergoing rapid 
transformation or even extinction, and then the onset of a long period of stability or 
equilibrium. The classic example of this, of course, is the extinction of the dinosaurs 
as a result of the impact of an extraterrestrial object. Research into these issues 
has led to a revitalisation of the tradition of catastrophism (Huggett 1997) in the 
earth sciences, and poses "the greatest challenge to Darwinian gradualism" such 
that "catastrophe replaces the linear temporal creep of microevolution with 
nonlinear bursts of macroevolution" (Davis 1996 75). As such, this is a science that 
fully opens the Earth to what Deleuze calls the `forces from the outside' (we return 
to these forces in more detail in chapter two). This research seems to relate directly 
to at least two distinct DeleuzoGuattarian themes, and illustrates the very serious 
challenge that their work poses to orthodox philosophy of science: i) their critique of 
Darwinian linear evolution and its replacement with creative involution; ii) their 
development of concepts of external metastable milieus and singularity as concepts 
of individuation. 
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19 The elements of a thermodynamic or energetic economics are contained in 
sources as diverse as Rosa Luxemburg, Georges Bataille's Accursed Share, and two 
magnificent and obscure studies: Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen's The Entropy Law and 
the Economic Process and Alf Hornborg's `Machine Fetishism, Value, and the Image 
of Unlimited Good: Towards a Thermodynamics of Imperialism'. Like Deleuze and 
Guattari's, Georgescu-Roegen's work rests on a thorough critique, and definitive 
rejection, of the nature-culture distinction and its replacement with what 
DeleuzeGuattari call the machinic phylum, a commitment to understanding the 
world as a single plane of consistency, a single matter, organised in multiplicitous 
ways. This is a commitment to a complete overcoming of anthropocentrism by the 
adoption of, a biocentrism by Georgescu-Roegen and Vernadsky, DeleuzeGuattari's 
geocentrism, or Bataille's general economy (a concept, incidentally, that Bataille 
may have derived from Vernadsky's use of it in The Biosphere), concerned with the 
study of "unformed matter" which is "not dead, brute, homogeneous matter, but a 
matter-movement bearing singularities or haecceities, qualities, and even 
operations" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 638/512). Georgescu-Roegen describes 
his work as an attempt to show that thermodynamics "is the foundation of a 
physics of economic value [... I the Entropy Law is by its very nature the most 
economic of all the physical laws" (Georgescu-Roegen 1995 83), his work represents 
an empirical study of the flows of matter and energy over the body of the 
"immanent unity of the earth" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 171/146), and as 
such it is the realisation of Bataille's project. Whilst Georgescu-Roegen, perhaps not 
surprisingly, doesn't refer to Bataille, both have something very important in 
common: both were inspired in their heterodox economic endeavours by the work of 
Vladimir Vernadsky, a figure whose work we will return to at several points 
throughout this thesis. Jacques Grinevald, who has done more to publicise this 
scandalously overlooked tradition than anyone else, writes in his introduction to a 
recent French edition of Georgescu-Roegen's writing that, apart from being a 
"nonconformist and heterodox economist, a scientific dissident" he was "one of the 
rare theoreticians of economic development to have taken seriously the idea- 
sustained in the inter-war years by Lotka, Vernadsky, Teilhard de Chardin, and 
Edouard le Roy- that with industrial civilisation, man has become a veritable 
geological agent, one of the most powerful forces in the living world at work in the 
transformation of the face of the Earth" (Jacques Grinevald in Georgescu-Roegen 
1995 1,13). As well as advocating Georgescu-Roegen's work, which he names a 
`bioeconomics', Grinevald has also written the introduction to the new edition of the 
founding work in this area, Vernadsky's The Biosphere. 
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20 To locate energetics in Freud is not of course a move unique to 
DeleuzeGuattari, it is to be found in the other works of libidinal economics, 
principally Lyotard's Libidinal Economy and Baudrillard's attempts in Symbolic 
Exchange and Death. These latter texts were exhumations of the work of Siegfried 
Bernfeld, who had made a study of this element of Freud's work in his `Freud's 
Earliest Theories and the School of Helmholtz'. In the fifties Lacan applied himself 
to excavating Freudian energetics, the pertinent papers are `The Symbolic 
Universe', `Materialist Definitions of the Unconscious', `Homeostasis and Insistence', 
`Freud, Hegel and the Machine', `The Circuit'. All are collected in Seminar II. " The Ego 
in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-5. As Freudianism 
territorialised itself into a statist therapeutic apparatus all mention of energetics in 
general and the death drive in particular became strictly verboten. See also 
Guattari's comments in `Les energetiques sßmiotiques' the second chapter of his 
Cartographies schizoanalytiques (Guattari 1989). Guattari comments that with the 
subordination of the triad Unconscious-Subconscious-Conscious to Id-Ego-Superego 
(the shift from dynamic to the topographic), Freudianism shifted its ground from an 
energetic to an anthropomorphic model. In Lacan's case he notes that initially 
libido was taken to be a "simple system of energetic notation", but shifts to 
declaring "la thermo-dynamique ä n'etre elle-meme qu'un jeu de signifiant". A 
useful secondary study in this respect is Rosenberg 1993. 
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21 One of the examples that Stengers gives to illustrate her sense of the term 
`invention' is particularly relevant here, it is that of the birth of thermodynamics in 
Carnot's work on the heat cycle. She writes that the immediate backdrop to the 
Carnot cycle is lodged in three distinct `lineages-disciplines' or assemblages, the 
latter defined by her as a complex of "object/representation/practice" (Stengers 
1997c 205): that of theoretical studies of the outputs of engines and of heat, and of 
empirical technical studies on the outputs of steam engines. From this background 
she writes: "Carrot invents a relationship that was not contained in any of these 
three lineages-disciplines and creates a new theoretical object, unexpected by any of 
them; unexpected for mechanics since one passes from the usual conversions 
between kinetic and potential energy to quite different energetic conversions, which 
imply a change in the state of matter; unexpected for the specialists of heat since 
its specific dimension of dissipation is systematically eliminated in the cycle that is 
represented as subjected to laws analogous to the reversible laws of dynamics; 
unexpected for the engineers who find themselves offered, as a model, an engine 
with zero productivity" (Stengers 1997c 207). Using this schema we could 
understand Marx's study of "the capitalist mode of production, and the relations of 
production and forms of intercourse that correspond to it" as the invention of such 
an object of study with its concerted attempt to comprehend "the economic law of 
motion of modern society" (Marx 1976 90-2). Following Stengers we could 
understand what Lenin calls the "three main ideological currents of the nineteenth 
century" as the relevant lineages-disciplines that precursed Marx's work, that is 
"classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, and French 
socialism" (Lenin 1967 I 7). An analysis produced in this way would be far more 
rigorously materialist than Lenin's own which is little more than an exercise in 
intellectual history. The ideological currents of Lenin's analysis would become 
machinically interlocked assemblages of political power, international political 
dynamics, technical study and research. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER II 
22 Simondon's primary work and the one upon which we shall draw most is 
L'individu et sa genese physico-biologique. This is a reprint of the 1964 edition and 
includes some important additions: an extra chapter and some supplements. The 
only text by Simondon yet published in English translation is the introduction to 
this latter work under the title `The Genesis of the Individual'. It was also 
reprinted as the first part of the introduction to Simondon's L'individuation 
Psychique et Collective, under the title `Position du probleme de l'ontogenese', the 
second part is `Concepts directeurs pour une recherche de solution: Forme, 
Information, Potentiels et Metastabilite'. These two books together comprise a 
partial reprint of Simondon's Doctoral thesis `L'Individuation it la Lumiere des 
Notions de Forme et d'Information'. The English translation of L'individu et sa 
genesephysico-biologique is due to be published by Zone Books in 2000; I have also 
heard of plans to publish a translation of L'individuation Psychique et Collective. 
23 As a historical point it is worth noting that Simondon was critical in 
introducing cybernetic research into France and gave a major paper at the first 
French conference to be organised for the benefit, and in the presence, of Norbert 
Wiener. The proceedings of this significant event are published as Le concept de 
l'information dans la science contemporaine, ed. by Louis Couf ignal (1965). 
24 In the most extensive discussion of Butler in Anti-Oedipus (338/284) he is 
credited with "shattering the vitalist argument by calling in question the specific or 
personal unity of the organism, and the mechanist argument even more decisively, 
by calling in question the structural unity of the machine". In addition to which, 
Butler encounters the crucial concept of surplus value of code, in which "a part of a 
machine captures within its own code a code fragment of another machine, and 
thus owes its reproduction to a part of another machine". 
25 See Stengers Cosmopolitiques 6: La vie et l'artifice: visages de l'emergence, p. 
123 n. 15, and Gilles Chätelet `Du Chaos et de 1'Auto-Organisation comme Neo- 
Conservatisme Festif. An expanded version of this paper has been printed in 
Chätelet's recent book Vivre et penser comme des pores: de l'incitation a l'ennui dans 
les democraties-marches. 
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26 Steven J. Heims (1991) gives a clear and politically astute account of the 
collusion between the founders of Cybernetics and the American military-industrial 
complex, showing for example how Cybernetics research was tied institutionally 
and financially to weapons research. More recently, the origins of the internet in the 
development of a networked computer system, the ARPANET, for the American 
military have been widely demonstrated by, amongst others, Manuel De Landa 
(1994). 
27, As a technical term in virology, transduction is defined as the process in 
which "a virus takes up a piece of DNA from its bacterial host and incorporates it 
into its own viral genome. After the virus has multiplied, many copies of the virus 
erupt from the infected cell [... ] Transduction by virus works in eukaryotic 
organisms as well. The discovery that large blocks of genetic instructions can be 
swapped and transferred among creatures is a clue that the insertion of new genes 
could be the mechanism behind evolution. If viruses can transfer eukaryotic genes 
across species boundaries, and can install their own genes into their hosts, the case 
for the new mechanism is even stronger. " Processes such as this are entirely 
inexplicable by autopoietic theory, which cleaves to a paranoid model of self- 
preservation of the pure autonomous entity, and go towards a strengthening of the 
cases both for Deleuze and Guattari's parallel to Lynn Margulis' symbiogenetic 
challenge to Darwinian evolution by pure filiation and lineage; and to a theory of 
constitutive heteronomy, or machinic surplus value. Tying these two areas together 
DeleuzeGuattari write: "the living thing has an exterior milieu of materials, an 
interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, an intermediary 
milieu of membranes and limits, and an annexed milieu of energy sources and 
actions-perceptions. Every milieu is coded, a code being defined by periodic 
repetition: but each code is in a perpetual state of transcoding or transduction. 
Transcoding or transduction is the manner in which one milieu serves as the basis 
for another, or conversely is established atop another milieu, dissipates in it or is 
constituted in it" (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/87 384/313). 
28 See also Gilles Chatelet, Les enjeux du mobile: mathematique, physique, 
philosophie. 
29 DeleuzeGuattari refer to the Biblical book of Numbers, as the place in 
which the Hebrews discover the connection between nomadism and numbers, a 
connection made clearer when the Hebrew title of the book is literally translated: 
Bemidbar, in the desert. 
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s0 The same source is cited for the etymological argument in both Difference 
and Repetition and A Thousand Plateaus, that is Emmanuel Laroche, Histoire de la 
racine `nem' en grec ancien, where it is argued that in pre-Solonic Attica nomos 
referred to a distribution of arable land that did not involve division of space into 
allotments but rather the scattering of livestock across that land, hence the nomos 
designated an "occupied space, but one without precise limit", as such there was a 
distinction between the polis (controlled by logos) and the exterior subject to nomos. 
All of these distinctions play a critical role in the procedures of both Difference and 
Repetition, and A Thousand Plateaus, principally in the opposition of Riemannian 
topological smooth space to the Euclidean geometry of the striated. Such a 
distinction is fundamental to Simondon's rejection of Euclidean models in the realm 
of the living "the cortex cannot be adequately represented in a Euclidean fashion" 
(Simondon 1995 225). This conceptual continuity is further ammunition to be used 
against those who would claim a clear breach between the Deleuze of the 
partnership with Guattari, and the Deleuze of the early, sole authored, `academic' 
books. 
31 I have translated this into English from the French translation by Charles 
Appuhn (Flammarion), in a way that is more akin to the Spinoza used by 
DeleuzeGuattari. As has been noted elsewhere, principally by Antonio Negri in his 
work on Spinoza, the French is far clearer than the English on this point, having a 
more direct relation to Spinoza's Latin. The obvious example where this becomes 
pertinent is around the Spinozist distinction between two types of power: pouvoir 
(potestas), and puissance (potentia). A distinction lost in English. Subjectively, I 
have found that it is only through reading Spinoza in French (presumably the effect 
is multiplied on an exponential scale in Latin) that one is able to grasp the potentia 
of the Spinozist challenge. 
32 These points are made in the chapter entitled `Newtonian and Bergsonian 
Time' in Wiener's Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine. As a side issue it is worth noting that Joseph Needham, in `The Book of 
Changes and the Binary Arithmetic of Leibniz', in volume two of his magisterial 
multivolumed study of Science and Civilisation in China, notes that 
it is due to 
Leibniz' deep study of Chinese civilisation that one can say that cybernetics 
has 
Chinese roots, vis "although Chinese civilisation could not spontaneously produce 
`modern' natural science, natural science could not perfect itself without the 
characteristic philosophy of Chinese civilisation", (Needham 1962 
340). 
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ss It was only after formulating this sense of Simondon's proximity to Spinoza, 
in spite of himself, that I discovered a very similar argument in an article, that I 
have had occasion to discuss earlier, by Etienne Balibar. Balibar writes that "I was 
surprised to discover that specifically this term [transindividuality, EA), with a full 
definition and theoretical implementation, has been used by [Simondon] My 
surprise was even greater when I realised the extent to which Simondon's 
arguments in fact are truly Spinozistic, literally converging with some basic 
propositions of the Ethics" (Balibar 1993 10). Balibar then goes on to note, as I 
have, Simondon's own "rather conventional" rejection of Spinozism. 
34 Stephen Brush is somewhat more catholic in his interpretation of the scope 
of the second, `probability revolution' giving it a much rider range in both time and 
scope, he writes: "The first Scientific Revolution, dominated by the physical 
astronomy of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton established the concept of a 
`clockwork universe' or `world machine' in which all changes are cyclic and all 
motions are in principle determined by causal laws. The Second Scientific 
Revolution, associated with the theories of Darwin, Maxwell, Planck, Einstein, 
Heisenberg, and Scrödinger, substituted a world of process and chance whose 
ultimate philosophical meaning still remains obscure. " (Quoted in Depew and 
Weber 1996 330). 
35 See Paul Bains' use of this, and related material, in his 'And if one day the 
brain became inobjectifiable'. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
36 Felix Guattari gives an extremely clear, indeed programmatic, statement 
concerning machinic thinking and its distance from both phenomenology and logic in 
`Les propositions machiniques' in his La Revolution Moleculaire, p. 355. An 
abridged English translation of this book does exist but it is so inaccurate, such a 
poor edition, that I have chosen not to give references to it. Eric Alliez' De 
l'impossibilite de la phenom nologie is an essential map of the current French 
philosophical scene showing very clearly how Deleuze and Guattari's work is based 
on entirely different predicates of that of the bulk of their contemporaries, at the 
same time it is an expert demolition of the very possibility of phenomenology, and a 
demonstration of the need for, and possibility of, thinking in entirely other ways. 
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s' This is chapter eleven of Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. The French 
title of the book is far clearer as to its intention, that is Spinoza et le probleme de 
l'expression. The theme of the identity of expression, elsewhere called production or 
constructivism in DeleuzeGuattari's work, with immanence is developed throughout 
this thesis, in particular in the sections dealing with Giordano Bruno. 
38 See Robert Rosen, Life Itself A Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin 
and Fabrication of Life, and Nicholas Rashevsky, `Topology and Life: In Search of 
General Mathematical Principles in Biology and Society'. 
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39 Deleuze and Guattari define a regime of signs as "any formalisation of 
expression [... ] at least where the expression is linguistic" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 140/111); the importance of the introduction of such terms is that it marks 
one of the principal routes by which Deleuze and Guattari distinguish themselves 
from the rest of the French philosophical scene. This is elegantly, albeit negatively, 
marked by an essay, stunning in its uselessness as a discussion of Deleuzian 
philosophy, but useful in stating the breach opened up between Deleuze and his 
erstwhile contemporaries. I refer to Jean-Luc Nancy's `The Deleuzian Fold of 
Thought' in which he acknowledges that "Deleuze's thought is so far removed from 
the sources, schemata and modes of conduct which, for me, are those of 
philosophical work" and insistently "within my tradition", (Nancy 1998/96 
115/107). Establishing a clear and distinct breach between the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari and the rest of the French philosophical scene (and for what it's 
worth, the British establishment of an image of thought for Continental Philosophy) 
is one of the tasks implicit in this thesis. Alliez' work (1993,1995) in this area is of 
course exemplary in its invention of a Deleuzian counter tradition, this work must 
exceed the discursive formation of `history of philosophy' and even of genealogy to 
invent singularities, thought events that can explode the present time of 
philosophical actuality- as is common to that line of thinkers of a materialism in 
which thought sediments itself as a material force, following Bruno, Spinoza, Marx, 
Reich, Bataille, up to and including Deleuze and Guattari. A philosophical 
heresiology. Most, principally deconstruction inspired, philosophy that claims to 
exceed the Greek inheritance, the logos, then. is shortcircuited from the start by the 
irrevocable indebtedness of the sources used precisely to that tradition (Levinas' 
stated aim is precisely to fold Judaism back into Western thought, into sacred 
history), and their failure to comprehend the extent to which philosophy is 
dominated at the deepest and most profound levels by the politico-theological 
complex, Control. In order to genuinely break from that tradition requires a 
rethinking of a kind that has not hitherto been attempted, and one of its principal 
resources will be in a sense a revocation of Casaubon's 1614 redating of the 
Hermetic texts (for two differing assessments of the impact of Casaubon's work on 
seventeenth century thought and culture see Martin Bernal's Black Athena vol. I and 
Frances Yates' Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition). Hardt and Negri have 
elegantly illustrated the difference by noting that the tradition that we are following 
is "in line not with the Judaism of Emmanuel Levinas, which Derrida seems to 
prefer, but the heretical Judaism of Spinoza" (Hardt and Negri 1994 330). Deleuze 
signals his total opposition to the tradition of State thought, his declaration of war, 
down to the detail of mirroring Schopenhauer's programming of his lectures to clash 
with Hegel's, by lecturing at Vincennes contemporaneously with Lacan's own 
seminars in Paris. 
References 
240 
40 It is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present chapter to bring these 
concerns to bear upon the relationships between a DeleuzoGuattarian and a 
Marxist materialism in the context of stratification in the social domain. There is a 
further exploration of the relationship in chapter four. Another route to follow would 
be one in which the principal axis of engagement is with Althusser and Negri's 
`aleatory materialism', see Louis Althusser, `Sur le materialisme aleatoire', and 
Antonio Negri, `Notes on the Evolution of the Thought of the Later Althusser'. 
Essentially this is an assemblage composed of Deleuze and Guattari's joint and 
separate works that are specifically concerned with Marxism, and the peculiarly 
French school of Spinozist Marxism. A good survey of these Marxist "detours" 
(Althusser) through Spinoza is Tosel's Du materialisme de Spinoza. 
41 This quote is from Deleuze's preface to the English translation of Difference 
and Repetition. Hence the single page reference. 
42 This idea is subject to an extended elaboration in the important twelfth 
chapter of Deleuze's Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza and in chapter seven of 
Antonio Negri's The Savage Anomaly. 
43 For an excellent introduction to Uexküll's own work see both T and J von 
Uexküll 1992; for treatments of Deleuze's relationship to Uexküll see Ansell 
Pearson (1996), and Bogue (1997). 
44 Deely goes on to show how this line of thought, following the prioritisation of 
relationality and an immanently creative matter, permits the development of the 
relatively new field of biosemiosis. The `Actor Network Theory' which is "a ruthless 
application of semiotics [in which] entities take their form and acquire their 
attributes as a result of their relations with other entities. In this scheme of things 
entities have no inherent qualities: essentialist divisions are thrown on the bonfire 
of the dualisms" (Law) associated with Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and others is 
yet another cognate development. It would be worth examining Guattari's very 
prescient papers from the 1960 s where he very clearly adumbrates certain themes 
that will later be developed in biosemiotics and in various non or anti-Darwinian 
biologies. Clearly we will have to deal here with the persistent critique of 
Darwinism that exists in Deleuze's work at least since Difference and Repetition. 
Noone has devoted more time or acuity to Deleuze's complex involvement with 
Darwinism than Keith Ansell Pearson (see especially his Germinal Life 1999). 
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45 For examples of such texts which are unashamedly theological: Paul Davies 
God and the New Physics ; John Barrow and Joseph Silk, The Left Hand of Creation; 
John Barrow and Frank Tippler, The Cosmological Anthropic Principle; Arthur 
Peacocke, God and the New Biology; Paul Davies, The Mind of God. Science and the 
Search for Ultimate Meaning. Countless others such as Roger Penrose are more 
surreptitious, making the theist move by an adherence to a remarkably 
unmediated Platonic theory of forms to account for, in Penrose's case, mathematical 
objects. For a critique of the latter, coupled with an attempt to found a corporeal, 
materialist mathematics that avoids the unexamined mentalism of constructivism 
(mathematical stricto sense rather than philosophical), and that aims to "shuck 
Platonism off in the end as a theological obfuscation of `number'" see Rotman 1993 
passim. 
46 See also Isabelle Stengers `Introduction' to L'effet Whitehead, pp. 9 -11 for 
commentary on the relationship between this aspect of Whitehead's thought and 
that of DeleuzeGuattari. 
47 This tendency in science can be seen in such popular figures as Hawking 
Lewis Wolpert, and Steve Jones who simultaneously arrogate to themselves the 
role of providers of a `philosophy' to justify their scientific claims, and in those 
philosophers, of Heideggerian inspiration, scornful of a supposed `scientism' in 
philosophy, the most extreme of whom will claim that philosophy has nothing to 
learn from or say to science. To the latter one can only repeat Nietzsche's critique, 
aimed at the Kantianism of his day, that: "Philosophers wish to flee from science, 
but it pursues them. One can see where their weakness lies: they no longer lead the 
way, because philosophy itself is merely science and is gradually turning into 
nothing but professional border patrolling" (Nietzsche 1990b 112, but also 1974 § 
344,1983 188 for a similar argument), of which the editor rightly notes that "this 
conception of philosophy is more wide-spread today than it was in the 1870's" 
in 
both its `Analytic' and `Phenomenological' varieties. 
48 The essays collected in Isabelle Stengers Power and Invention: Situating 
Science, constitute a powerful statement of the sense of invention suggested 
here. 
49 Gilles Deleuze, `The Theory of Multiplicities in Bergson'. The provenance of 
this text is hazy. In a personal communication, its translator, Tim Murphy, 
explained to me that the manuscript containing the text is "apparently a set of 
notes for an invited lecture to some Society of Philosophy in 
France, though the 
coordinates aren't specific. There is no date on the MS. either. 
" An important 
statement of Bergson's theory of multiplicity occurs in the analysis of number which 
opens chapter two, `The Multiplicity of Conscious States. 
The Idea of Duration', of 
his Time and Free Will, pp. 75-90. 
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60 Deleuze invites us to compare the citation from Marx with this from 
Bergson: "The truly great problems are set forth only when they are solved". The 
quotation from Marx is from A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy . 
By 
citing this, Deleuze is endorsing a key part of Marx's philosophy, a question that is 
right at the centre of all of the debates about determinism in Marx (debates that 
we are in no position to examine here). The position that I would support, and that 
Deleuze is indicating, is one that seems to be true to Marx (the dubious value of 
such a notion of fidelity being accepted in silence). It is summarised in the idea that 
`man makes history but not in conditions of his own choosing', this is the formula 
that needs to be applied to the question of conceptual invention that we are raising 
here- it avoids both arbitrary subjectivism and mechanistic determinism. 
51 See Antonio Negri Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, pp. 47--58 
for the constitutive elements of Marx's materialist method, and Karl Marx 
Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), p. 90 for 
the reference to Spinoza, and the section entitled `Consumption and Production', pp. 
90-4 for an expansion of this equivalence. 
52 It is the work of such philosophically astute scientists as Rosen, Pribram 
and Margulis that confirms the truth of Sean Watson's comment that "we dismiss 
neuroscience, and the biological in general, as the work of epistemologically naive 
`technicians' at our peril" (Watson 15). It is not just the philosophical implications 
of the work of these scientists, but moreover the direction of their own philosophical 
interests, that gives the he to the recent outbursts of Sokal and Briqmont, and that 
exposes the view of science that the latter defend for the reactionary and irrelevant 
charade that it is. 
53 For an account of the political conservatism of much work in the `Science of 
Complexity' see Gilles Chätelet `Du Chaos et de l'Auto-Organisation comme 
Neo- 
Conservatisme Festif, and for a careful study of some of the misuses of the term 
see Isabelle Stengers `Complexity: a Fad? ', in her Power and 
Invention: Situating 
Science, pp. 3-19. 
54 Gilles Chatelet, `Virtuality and all That', as yet unpublished, hence 
unpaginated ms. 
55 Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial, chapter seven `Alternative 
Views of Complexity', pp. 170-81. 
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56 In the context of my earlier comments on the productive results of forcing a 
meeting of Spinoza and Simondon, it is perhaps not surprising that it is Balibar 
who makes this comment. Because it is Balibar, and to my knowledge, Balibar 
alone, who has also written on Spinoza through Simondonian lenses. See Balibar 
1993. In this unique article, he surveys Spinoza's conception of the continual 
production of the individual, paying particular attention to the role therein of the 
necessary immanence of relation, and conceives the whole complex as a precursor of 
Simondon's concept of transindividuality, his "veritable theatre of individuation" 
(Simondon 1995 25). 
57 Margulis and her son Dorion Sagan state that "No life without a membrane 
of some kind is known" (Margulis and Sagan 1986 54). Similarly Fritjof Capra, in 
his exemplary exposition of autopoietic theory, notes that for Maturana and Varela 
the creation of a limit or membrane is definitive of the living system in that their 
"autopoietic organisation includes the creation of a boundary that specifies the 
domain of the network's operations and defines the system as a unit" contrary to 
catalytic cycles which do not "constitute living systems, because their boundary is 
determined by factors [... ] that are independent of the catalytic processes" (Capra 
1997 98). 
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58 See chapter eleven of Microcosmos, `Late Bloomers: Animals and Plants', in 
particular the passage on fungi. Elsewhere in this remarkable book, Margulis and Sagan tend towards DeleuzoGuattarian theses, vis. the thorough machinism of 
their discussion of the virtual impossibility that biologists face in giving a "concise definition of the difference between living and nonliving substance" (Margulis and 
Sagan 1986 72). It is precisely this nondeterminate difference that is traversed by 
the machinic phylum as laid out by Deleuze and Guattari (1980/87 414/335) and by Deleuze alone in his Bergsonism (1991 101), such that one cannot ask about the 
distinction between life and matter, but rather two states of matter: "stratified 
systems" and "self-consistent aggregates". Which as DeleuzeGuattari conclude is 
cut across by "a machinic phylum, a destratifying, transversality [which] moved 
through elements, orders, forms and substances, the molar and the molecular, 
freeing a matter and tapping forces". Margulis' biology and DeleuzeGuattari's 
schizoanalytics converge also in the relationship between on the one hand, 
Deleuze's theory of contraction and habitus sketched out in chapter 11 of Difference 
and Repetition resulting in the dissolution of the unitary self in favour of the 
complicatio of "thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is 
always a third party who says `me'" (Deleuze 1968/94 103/75) and again in Logic of 
Sense in an analysis of Klossowski's critique of the Kantian-Christian self and the 
concomitant untenability of any account of the psyche based on phenomenology, "I 
may be an other, that something else thinks in us [... ] because so many beings and 
things think in us" (Deleuze 1969/90 399/298); this thought is to remain with 
Deleuze and Guattari up to their last collaborative work, where it is given an 
inflection that relates it to the inverted vitalism discussed at length elsewhere in 
my work. They write that "even animism, when it implies little immanent souls in 
organs and functions, is not so far removed from biological science as it is said to 
be, on condition that these immanent souls are withdrawn from an active role so as 
to become solely sources of molecular perception and affection [... ] bodies are 
populated by an infinity of little monads" (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/94 124/130). 
This philosophical move is coupled to Margulis' empirical confirmation in her, 
increasingly accepted, thesis that "all organisms of greater morphological complexity 
than bacteria, that is nucleated or eukaryotic organisms [... ] are also polygenomic, 
having selves of multiple origin [... ] comprised of heterologous (different-sourced) 
genomic systems, evolved from more than one kind of ancestor" (Margulis and 
Sagan 1997 65). In an article outlining the tenor of the `new biology', which is, he 
tells us characterised by its mutually interdependent critiques of i) the dominant 
monolithic model of the unified body, and ii) the distinction between the plant and 
animal kingdoms, Dorion Sagan, characterises the eukaryotic cell as an `assembly', 
and hence comes tantalisingly, close to Deleuze and Guattari's usage of the concept 
of the assemblage. Sagan writes: "each eukaryotic `animal' cell is, in fact, an 
uncanny assembly, the evolutionary merger of distinct prokaryotic metabolisms. 
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a one-celled plant or animal [... ] all 
References 
245 
previous biology has been grossly zoocentric" (Sagan 1992 363). For yet another 
convergence see Guattari's `Redondances Intensives et Redondances Expressives' 
where he writes that "multicellular organisms continue to be colonies, packs of 
unicellular organisms, living in part by a system of intracoding, and in part by 
transcoding" (Guattari 1977 336). Guattari's anticipation of the nascent field of 
biosemiotics is astounding. I take these themes up in more detail elsewhere. 
Finally, this material takes on another dimension in the context of the critique of 
ontological unity, see for example Goethe's dicta that "[e]very living being is not a 
single thing, but a plurality; even insofar as it appears to us as an individual, it 
still remains a collection of living, independent beings" (Goethe, Morphologie, quoted 
in Stack 168 n. 27), and the influence on, and development of, this line of thought 
in Nietzsche. An important and incisive survey of these questions from the 
Eighteenth century onwards can be found in the fifth chapter of Michel Foucault's 
The Order of Things, the sections on `Monsters and Fossils' and `The Discourse of 
Nature' are especially apposite. Elements of Foucault's approach are deployed to 
great effect in Yoxen's (1981) critical study of the presuppositions of contemporary 
molecular biology. 
59 Valuable work in this area, concentrating entirely on Simondon's 
contribution, has been done by Anne Fagot-Largeault in her essay `L'individuation 
en biologie'. 
60 See the chapter `Morphology, Maps and Integrated Tissue' in Kauffman's 
The Origins of Order. 
61 Giordano Bruno's fine description (1998 21) of the philosopher is variously 
translated as "the true philosopher's country is the world" or else as "to the true 
philosopher all lands are his own". This comment occurs in a 
discussion of Bruno's 
attack on the Oxford Aristotelians and the idea proposed 
by his interlocutor that 
one "must not be an agitator in a country not one's own", 
it is this that evinces 
Bruno's internationalist response. This idea is of course taken up in the late- 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a watchword of revolutionary 
internationalism, such that, the revolutionary has no homeland; in the 
Manifesto of 
the Communist Party, for example, we read that the "working men 
have no country. 
we cannot take from them what they have not got". 
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CHAPTER IV 
62 As exemplified for example in the title of Pierre Macherey's book. In a far 
cruder register see Jean-Bernard Pouy's Spinoza encule Hegel, literally `Spinoza 
fucks Hegel up', a science fiction novel in which les Spinozistes are a group of 
nomadic antistate rebels carrying out guerrilla type attacks on the forces of an 
authoritarian state. 
63 For recognising the decisiveness of Spinoza for reconstructing Marxist 
theory, if for nothing else, Althusser's greatness must be acknowledged. 
64 1 refer here to two talks given by De Landa in Winter 1997 at the `Institute 
of Contemporary Art' and the `Architectural Association', both in London. 
65 Kenneth Surin offers a particularly lucid account of Amin's work from a 
perspective close to our own in his article '"Me Continued Relevance of Marxism' as 
a Question. Some Propositions'. A different critique, focusing on the "third-worldist" 
implications of Amin's position is contained in Robert Brenner's dispute generating 
article `The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian 
Marxism'. 
66 See their immensely important article `Systems, Structures and Capitalistic 
Processes'. 
67 To redress the balance, De Landa is not the only reader of Deleuze and 
Guattari to ignore the seriousness and centrality of their engagement with Marx, it 
is a conjuring act common to most Anglophone readings. There are of course notable 
exceptions: Jameson, Hardt, Holland to name the most prominent; as well as those 
recent graduates from Warwick, who have done considerable work of great integrity, 
contributing to the formation of a Marxism, reinvented, reconfigured through the 
future oriented lenses of Deleuze and Guattari. The disappearance of Marx from 
reception of DeleuzeGuattari is merely another of those indices of his relatively 
recent, yet extremely thorough, excision from the set of commonly possessed 
intellectual coordinates. 
68 The section entitled `The Molecular Unconscious' in Anti-Oedipus is one of 
the most important passages in DeleuzeGuattari's joint work dedicated precisely to 
this task. 
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69 It is relevant to point this out because it is of course in the field of biology 
that the question of vitalism originally arose and in which it has the greatest 
pragmatic implications. 
70 In an act of inestimable value to all those interested in the evolution of 
Deleuze's thought, his notes for these lectures have now been transcribed and made 
available to all on the WWW at imaginet. fr/deleuze. 
71 The full quote, in a discussion with Toni Negri, reads "I think Felix 
Guattari and I have remained Marxist, in our two different ways, but both of us. " 
As is well known, the text upon which Deleuze was working at the time of his 
death was a book on Marx, apparently to be called La Grandeur de Marx, of which 
Negri has written: "In a text carefully drawn up [elaborato] by Gilles Deleuze, and 
which his untimely death prevented him from publishing, La Grandeur de Marx, it 
is precisely this realisation of Marxist theory which is studied and identified as an 
ontological dispositif/apparatus. Communism, Deleuze says, is a concept which 
becomes a `common notion' through the power [puissance/forza] of the masses, a 
notion/name that corresponds to the way of existing/being of the multitude/masses, 
or rather that in becoming, it gives reality to the masses/multitude" (Negri 1998b 
8). The translation of this section is in a private communication to me from Matteo 
Mandarini. For more on this, now nonexistent, book see Negri's Exil (1998c 28), 
and Holland (1997). 
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72 A complete French translation, that used by Bataille, was published in 
1929. Jacques Grinevald's introduction to the new scholarly English translation, 
the first complete one, of The Biosphere, `The Invisibility of the Vernadskian 
Revolution', gives an excellent account of the political and scientificoideological 
background to the half-century long neglect of Vernadsky's work outside the Soviet 
Bloc. On the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain, Vernadsky has the status of a scientific 
giant, to the extent of there being institutes, scientific prizes, streets, a mineral 
(vernadite), mountain ranges, a lunar crater, and even a species of bacteria (one 
active in the formation of sea bottom manganese and iron ores) in his name; in 
addition to which, and more importantly, there was also a significant and well 
funded multidisciplinary research programme, Biogeochemistry, founded on 
explicitly Vernadskian lines. A fascinating study is waiting to be written of the 
`positive' effects of the Soviet attempt to invent a proletarian science, a science in 
accord with the frozen form of Marxism developed to justify Soviet power, Dialectical 
Materialism (Diamat), or again a science that claims to follow from Engel's The 
Dialectics of Nature. Vernadsky's theses with their rejection of the idea of passive 
organisms being acted on by a distant, reified environment, his slogan of `life is a 
geological force', and his research on the manifold ways in which the environment is 
shaped, formed in fact, in ways far beyond those piously bemoaned by naive 
environmentalists, are clearly ones that could be easily coopted and made to 
harmonise with the rhetoric of the Soviet state. This is clearly how Vernadsky's 
work was portrayed by one of his leading Soviet commentators, Andrei Lapo. That 
being said, Lapo is able to cite certain comments by Vernadsky himself that are 
sympathetic to Marx in a most superficial way: "I know Marx but little [... ] but I 
think that the noosphere will be fully in accordance with his basic conclusions" 
(Vernadsky quoted by Lapo 1987 68). Vernadsky's concept of life as a geological 
force is in fact fully in accord with Marx and Engel's critique of the nature-culture 
division in The German Ideology, where they write against Feuerbach that "He does 
not see that the sensuous world around him is not a thing given direct from all 
eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of 
society [... 1 The cherry tree [... ] was only a few centuries ago transplanted by 
commerce into our zone" (Marx and Engels 1976 47). The negative aspects 
of the 
campaign for such a science are all too well known, having their apotheosis in the 
Lysenko episode. From the perspective of the genealogy of Deleuze and Guattari's 
work we might observe that the ethologist Uexkull, from whom Deleuze and 
Guattari draw certain key concepts, was, like Vernadsky quite neglected in the 
West, yet championed in his native Estonia, where a centre at the University of 
Tartu still bears his name, and now carries out research in a field 
directly derived 
from his work, Biosemiotics. Beyond this trivial level, there are important ways 
in 
which themes common to both, are elements of the `new biology' as 
described by 
Dorion Sagan (see the previous chapter for more on this). Finally, given the general 
intellectual background to this thesis it is worth noting that Vernadsky lectured at 
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the Sorbonne in 1922 on `Geochemistry', where he was in contact with Bergson, 
whose work he read and is explicitly influenced by. This Bergsonian influence is 
further felt in the work of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, the economist who has done 
most to create a thermodynamic economics explicitly building on both Vernadsky 
and Bergson, and indirectly on Bataille's general economics. 
1VQTES TO CHAPTER V 
?s This is Nick Land's judgement on Deleuze alone, in `Making it With Death: 
Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring Production'. The idea that there is an 
unbridgeable chasm between Deleuze, Guattari and their contemporaries is derived 
from Land, but the one carved here is through very different materials, has a 
different shape, and so very different consequences. Deleuze himself has indicated, 
albeit for very different purposes, some of the components of his philosophical make 
up that mark him out as belonging to a tradition utterly at odds with that of his 
contemporaries; he remarks in a letter that "What I most detested was 
Hegelianism and dialectics" (1990/95 14/6), a moment in philosophical history in 
which most of his contemporaries are of course immersed to varying degrees; he 
notes too that he has "never worried about going beyond metaphysics or the death 
of philosophy, and [... ] never made a big thing about giving up Totality, Unity, the 
Subject" (ibid. 122/88) one could add to this his utter rejection of Heidegger and 
phenomenology; his never having been a member of the CPF; his lifelong and 
outspoken adherence to Marxism; his utter refusal to succumb to psychoanalysis; 
his preference for Anglo-American over French literature (Deleuze and Parnet 1996 
47ff), and for Hjelmslev over Saussure, ie. the turn in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, to semiotics. In the Abecedaire, Parnet poses Deleuze's tradition to 
him in terms of his preference for the `z' in philosophy": Zen, Zarathustra, Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Nietzsche, BergZon (Deleuze), and one might oppose to this the three `h's' 
of phenomenology: Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger. 
74 See Alain Badiou (1997 69) for an elaboration of the idea that Deleuze's 
philosophy is `Classical'. By this Badiou denotes any philosophy that doesn't 
submit to Kant's critical injunctions, that acts as if the critical process invented by 
Kant was null and void; and that also opposes any of the much-vaunted "returns to 
Kant", to critique, etc. In so doing Badiou too seeks to sharply demarcate Deleuze's 
position from that of his erstwhile contemporaries, all of whom participate, in 
varying degrees, in this neo-neo-Kantianism. 
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'5 This formulation originates in Negri `On Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, 
A Thousand Plateaus' 98. In an extremely unusual, highly provocative, and to my 
mind quite superb, analysis of Leibniz and the Kabbalah Allison Coudert writes 
that Leibniz and his close associate Francis Mercury van Helmont "both reject the 
corpuscular philosophy of the Cartesians and Gassendists for a vitalist philosophy 
that endows matter with force and activity" (Coudert 1995 54). Coudert performs a 
minor reading of Leibniz, exploring his relationship with, and in some cases, active 
production of Kabbalistic and alchemical texts that explodes his insulation by the 
philosophical establishment in a hermetic and teleological discipline by allowing 
these excluded traditions of thought to leak in and corrupt the philosophical body. 
She writes for example of Leibniz "Ghost-writing a book for a self-proclaimed 
Kabbalist [van Helmont, EA]" and notes dryly that this is an "extraordinary act for 
someone supposedly repelled by fanciful Kabbalistic theories" (Coudert 1995 13). A 
similar minor reading that incurred perhaps greater hostility is Betty Jo Teeter 
Dobbs' pioneering work on Newton's lifelong involvement with alchemy. 
76 The relevant works of biology to which I refer are Robert Rosen's Life Itself 
A Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin and Fabrication of Life, and Lynn 
Margulis and Dorion Sagan's Microcosmos: Four Billion Years of Microbial Evolution. 
The pertinent issues in these works are akin to those we had encountered in the 
critique of autopoiesis: the recognition that mechanism is not counterposed by 
vitalism but by complexity; and that the boundary lines separating the organism 
from the world are increasingly under challenge, such that the dominant 
characteristic of life lies in its symbiotic, contagious nature: the mutual 
interdependence of each and every entity, the process that Deleuze and Guattari 
characterise as machinic heterogenesis. This concept suggests that one can no 
longer ask about the identity, the bounded unity of a being, but rather about its 
complex interlocking with a network of forces that both cut through and transverse 
it by virtue of its surplus value of code, "the phenomenon [... ] in which a part of a 
machine captures within its own code a code fragment of another machine, and 
thus owes its reproduction to a part of another machine" (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/87 339/285), and see the discussion of this concept above. The second 
direction from which this challenge comes is in that work that (to name four very 
different authors: Chalmers and Clarke, Samuel Butler, and Candace Pert) 
suggests that not even cognition can be contained within the brain or indeed the 
body, but is rather smeared across the world, and embodied, or immanent to 
matter. 
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77 For some fascinating, if characteristically idiosyncratic, comments on the 
continuities between Spinoza and Bruno, see Ernst Bloch's `Bruno and the Infinite Work of Art; Spinoza and the World as Crystal'. Bloch credits them both with 
espousing an immanent philosophy of "sorrowless and daybright materialism" (864), and sees them both as direct philosophical precursors of Marx. 
78 Fred Beiser's chapter on `The Rise of Spinozism in Germany 1680-1786' 
gives a vivid account of the terror that Spinozist materialism and atheism inspired 
in the forces of authority, and principally in Kant. 
79 For a popular account see Margulis and Sagan 1997, for Margulis' technical 
work see her Symbiosis in Cell Evolution. 
80 Bruno, De minimo in opera latine conscripta I, III, p. 135 quoted in Ordine 
155. 
81 Steven Rose, one of DeleuzeGuattari's favourite biologists on whom they 
frequently rely for their understanding of the sciences of the brain, has superbly 
summarised a similar critique of the DNA myth thus: "to put the organism and its 
lifeline back at the core of biology [... ] means replacing the static, reductive, DNA- 
centred view of living systems that currently pervades biological thinking with an 
emphasis on the dynamics of life. We need instead to be concerned with process, 
with the paradox of development by which an organism has simultaneously to be 
and to become" (Rose 1998 18). Roses's work on the Conscious Brain is referred to in 
both A Thousand Plateaus and in What is Philosophy? 
82 One can similarly detect the emergence of a nascent Spinozist influence in a 
wilfully heretical research programme in the field of Artificial Intelligence and 
Robotics. I refer to the work of Rodney Brooks at MIT, announced in his 1987 
paper, `Intelligence Without Representation'. Brooks' approach to building 
`intelligent autonomous robots' is anti-representational, acentric, embodied, and 
bottom-up; and based on the argument that intelligence is not abstract and 
representational, but immanent and embodied. The Spinozist element of his work 
lies in his method, which is not "the usual decomposition of a system by function 
but rather a novel decomposition by activity" (Varela et al 1991 209); an account 
which directly recalls Deleuze's account of Spinozist bodies. Brooks further argues 
that "there is no single place where `perception' delivers a representation of the 
world in the traditional sense" (Brooks quoted in ibid. 211). In Brooks work there is 
no representation, no central system, and no transcendence. 
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83 See chapter two of Aryeh Kaplan's excellent, instructive translation of and 
commentary on the Sefer Yetzirah: The `Book of Creation' in Theory and Practice, 
this text is both the most ancient and one of the most important works in Jewish 
Kabbalism, being the urtext of that literature which deals with the creation of both 
spiritual and physical Golems. Kaplan reminds us that in Genesis 1: 2 "The Earth 
was chaos (Heb.: tohu) and void (Heb.: bohu)" and that "Tohu denotes pure 
substance that does not contain information. Bohu is pure information that does 
not relate to any substance". It is impossible to state the hylomorphic coupling 
more clearly. This coupling resonates through the ages and as I am concerned to 
show is one of the most important axiological structures of State thinking. The 
trope of the Golem is far reaching, for beyond its origin in Kabbalist speculations on 
the creative power of the word, it has exerted its influence upon, for example, 
Norbert Wiener one of the originators of cybernetics who saw fit to suggest that one 
of the earliest computers be named Golem, see also his collection of essays God and 
Golem Inc., and has generally served as a metaphor for passive matter activated by 
a transcendent force; contrary to its recent use by blind technophiles as a 
fashionably recondite metaphor for `matter out of control', it is in fact the model of 
State science par excellence. For a detailed treatment of the history of the Golem see 
G. Scholem's essay `The Idea of the Golem', and Moshe Idel's monumental Golem: 
Jewish Magical and Mystical Traditions on the Artificial Anthropoid. 
84 For Augustine see Book VII of his Confessions, for Plotinus see the Enneads 
and Denis O'Brien's paper `Plotinus on Matter and Evil', the quotes in my text are 
from Enneads 1.8.3.35-40 and are cited by O'Brien. For the beginnings of a critique 
of the matter-evil complex see George Bataille's 1947 lecture on `Evil in Platonism 
and Sadism', his review article of the same year, `Du rapport entre le divin et le 
mal', as well as his ground breaking article on `Base Materialism and Gnosticism'. 
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85 The price for such heresies has differed through history. Whereas now it 
might simply be difficult to secure an academic position or funding for certain kinds 
of research, Beiser, in his account of the multifronted war on Spinozism that formed 
the backdrop to the writing of the Kantian critiques, writes in his The Fate of 
Reason (Beiser 1987 48) that by 1710 in the German states there was a Catalogus 
scriptorum Anti-Spinozanorum held in Leipzig to which one had to subscribe in 
order to secure a teaching license. R. G. Mendoza writes that in Sixteenth Century 
Oxford "every bachelor and master who dared to diverge from Aristotle's Organon, 
or violate any point of it, was fined five shillings" (Mendoza 1995 24), indeed until 
the late nineteenth century both Oxford and Cambridge were closed to religious 
nonconformists. Nietzsche of course has written one of the most scathing attacks 
upon the complicity between the State and the management of University syllabi, 
paying particular attention to the peculiar intimacy between this kind of censorship 
and philosophy in the closing paragraphs of his `Schopenhauer as Educator'. 
Bruno's own critique of the academic politics of exclusion, based principally upon his 
experiences at Oxford is worthy of deeper study and is a constant theme in 
his 
work. See in particular The Ash Wednesday Supper and The Expulsion of the 
Triumphant Beast, references are also to be found in Cause, Principle and Unity. 
86 It should be noted that in his translation Paul Patton takes the 
bizarre 
step of rendering the sentence "la matiere est dej ä informee" as "matter 
is already 
informed", it is, needless to say, corrected here. 
References 
254 
87 This article is published in English in Denis Hollier's valuable collection of 
lectures and other material connected to The College of Sociology 1937-39, pp. 
73-84. Regrettably the history, trajectories, and influences both intellectual and 
political of the College have not yet been treated to the detailed study they so richly 
deserve; it was without doubt one of the most important, innovative and seminal 
events of modern intellectual life. One of the reasons, I suspect for the absence of 
such a study lies in the nature of the concerns guiding the current orthodox reading 
of Bataille, crudely put, the `transgressive' reading. The Bataille that emerges from 
the College period is somewhat inassimilable to this reading, focusing as he does on 
political and scientific, as opposed to literary and phenomenological questions. One 
admirable attempt to deal with this side of Bataille's work is Richman 1982. 
Issues arising from Vernadskian themes in Bataille, Nietzsche's critique of science, 
and related elements of superior materialism reappear in numerous places 
throughout this thesis. Bataille's work has suffered from an exceptionally thin 
reception, governed, for the most part, by both a narrow inspiration: that is to say, 
one that is largely defined by the scope of Derrida's interests in his essay `From 
Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve'; directly related to 
this is a severe limiting of the Bataillan corpus, a Bataille composed of his erotic 
novels, and a careful selection of his more `properly' philosophical texts, hence we 
are given the dominant image of the `transgressive' Bataille. In the current work, a 
corrective to this picture is offered, by concentrating my attention upon Bataille's 
economic and political works: this is by no means a case of imposing a periodisation 
on to Bataille's career, for as is self-evident, he consistently produced work attuned 
to economic and political issues. Bataille's engagement with what he calls "the 
general problems that are linked to the movement of energy on the globe" (Bataille 
VII 27) ranges from the articles for Contre-Attaque and Acephale in the 1930's, and 
culminates in the already mentioned magnum opus, The Accursed Share. 
NOTES TO CHAP 
88 In Thesis XVI of the `Theses on the Philosophy of History' Walter Benjamin 
writes that it is the task of the historical materialist critic to be "in control of 
his 
powers, man enough to blast open the continuum of history". The following thesis, 
elaborates on the theme, which permeates the theses, such that 
historical 
materialism is not a passive empiricism, but a constructivism, 
"based on a 
constructive principle" it seeks to "blast a specific era out of the homogeneous course 
of history [... 1 a specific life out of the era or a specific work out of the 
lifework". 
Again, "the awareness that they are about to make the continuum of 
history 
explode is characteristic of the revolutionary classes at the moment of their action" 
(Thesis XV). 
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89 For a detailed exposition of the concept of the `State-form', its differences 
from the classical Marxist model, and the necessarily transcendent nature of State 
thought see Hardt and Negri, Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form. Of 
particular relevance is the section called `Genealogy of the Constituent Subject', pp. 
308-13. 
90 The construction of this abstract diagram is sketched out in greater detail 
in the previous chapter, `Elaborations on Brunian Materialism in Deleuze'. Antonio 
Negri's work (1991 and 1994) on the identification of politics and ontology, in 
Spinoza and Descartes in particular, is also essential in this respect. 
91 Frances Yates offers a detailed account of the long history of heliocentrism, 
paying especial attention to the role of the sun in Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean 
mysticisms. As an index of quite how artificial the boundaries were between 
"science and Hermeticism in the Renaissance" (Yates 1964 155) she writes that 
"Copernicus' discovery came out with the blessing of Hermes Trismegistus upon its 
head, with a quote from that famous work in which Hermes describes the sun- 
worship of the Egyptians in their magical religion t... I And at the crucial moment, 
just after the diagram showing the new sun-centred system comes a reference to 
Hermes Trismegistus on the sun" (loc. cit. ). 
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92 For a snapshot of the range of different interpretations of the Brunian 
achievement vis a vis Copernicanism, and specifically, on the limitations of the 
latter, see Gatti (1999 102-6) and Yates (1964 237-9). Whilst Yates is 
concerned to show either that Copernicanism is marginal to Bruno's thinking or else 
that his writings on cosmology, far from being inspired by contemporary science are 
entirely indebted to hermeticism and Gnosticism, that he is concerned not with 
scientific, but with "Egyptian truth, magical truth" (Yates 1964 239). Gatti's book 
is dedicated to showing that Bruno is the first philosopher of the new science, and 
with regard to the issue at hand, that "Bruno never believed that Copernican 
cosmology in its original formulation abolished the celestial spheres. He claimed 
that discovery for himself" (Gatti 1999 104). Yates' project is extraordinary for two 
connected reasons worth mentioning here: first, whilst the great bulk of her 
scholarly output is dedicated to Bruno, and as a whole constitutes an invaluable 
body of work that almost singlehandedly kept interest in him alive in the 
Anglophone world in the middle part of this century. And that second, this body of 
work constitutes as unrelenting attempt to portray a one dimensional Bruno who is 
nothing more than "an out-and-out magician, an `Egyptian' and Hermetist of the 
deepest dye" (Yates 1964 450); as such Yates' work acted as a dam for decades 
preventing the kind of work carried out by Gatti, Mendoza, and hopefully, myself. 
Yates was, as Lindsay has pointed out, perhaps the last in the long line of Catholic 
detractors of Bruno (the Catholic cosmologist Stanley Jaki is another), the 
manifestation of whose work has changed throughout the centuries, but whose 
object has remained constant: to sideline and belittle Bruno's work, or to reject him 
as a mad apostate. Mendoza, in his comparison of Bruno with Nietzsche, has 
pointed out that both were grossly misunderstood by their contemporaries and by 
many of their modern interpreters as well [... ] their highly subversive thinking was 
attributed by some of their enemies to mental derangement" (Mendoza 1995 219). 
Finally, for a comprehensive survey of the varieties of Bruno interpretation see 
Antonio Calcagno (1998). Unfortunately Gatti's book was published when I had 
almost completed the writing of this chapter, and consequently I have not been able 
to integrate her research as fully as I would have liked. The reader will note that 
the publication dates of Mendoza, 1995, Calcagno, 1998, and Gatti, 1999 taken 
together indicate an intensification of interest in the Nolan as we approach the four 
hundredth anniversary of his immolation in 2000. 
93 Smolin, whom we have encountered before, is rare amongst contemporary 
cosmologists in his positive assessment of Bruno for contemporary, post-complexity, 
cosmology. 
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94 For Deleuze and Guattari philosophy is characterised as a constructivism 
with two interconnected yet distinct elements: "the creation of concepts and the 
laying out of a plane" of immanence, this latter "constitutes the absolute ground of 
philosophy, its earth or deterritorialisation, the foundation on which it creates its 
concepts" (44/41). Philosophy in this sense is coterminous with immanence, it is not 
that immanence is one concept among many that one can choose to think or not, at 
the same time it is not a master key, for "whenever immanence is interpreted as 
immanent to Something, we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the 
transcendent" (48/45); rather philosophy is defined by immanence in 
contradistinction to the transcendent which characterises religion. "Whenever there 
is transcendence [... I there is religion; and there is philosophy whenever there is 
immanence" (46/43). There is no one plane of immanence; it is the mark of great 
philosophers, as opposed to the "functionary" (52/51), Nietzsche's "officially 
recognised guild of pseudo-thinkers" (Nietzsche 1983 190), that they invent their 
own plane of immanence. It is this invention of planes that gives the specific mode 
of philosophical time as stratigraphic, for it is not a question of a linear succession, 
a list of names of the dead (a Necronomicon), but rather an interlacing of planes, no 
longer characterised by before or after, but rather above and below. "Philosophy is 
becoming, not history; it is the coexistence of planes, not the succession of systems" 
(59/59). An excellent, extended treatment of this matter is to be found in Bento 
Prado Jr. 1998. 
All nonsourced quotations in the preceding paragraph are from Deleuze and 
Guattari's What is Philosophy? 
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99 Recall that Norbert Wiener acknowledges Leibniz as the "patron saint for 
cybernetics" (Wiener 1994 12) for two reasons: first, for anticipating mathematical 
notation and second for constructing an early symbolic logic; but one can also 
construe a third reason, and that is for the implications of Leibniz's thought for the 
mechanical actualisation of thought "in the metal". However as Ernst Bloch argues, 
the credit here should go to Lull, whose combinatory circles take pride of place as 
the first abstract diagrams of a calculating device, and now "Lull's arithmeticised 
dream has been turned into a whole intellectual industry, with speed as witchcraft" 
(Bloch 1986 652). Both Yates and Bloch show that a considerable part of Bruno's 
work, principally his earlier texts on mnemonic techniques, constitute an attempt to 
improve upon or rationalise the Lullian art. It should though be born in mind that, 
as with all of the other figures cannibalised for Bruno's syncretism, his 
interpretation of Lull is "even more peculiar, and more remote from the medieval 
Lull, than [that found] in normal Renaissance Lullism" (Yates 1966 207). Once 
again then we see Bruno's decisive stamp on one of the key figures of the Deleuzian 
genealogy. Calcagno is right to point out that "the exact relationship between 
Leibniz and Bruno has never been established" (Calcagno 1998 38), however 
Bruno's influence on Leibniz is wide, as is evidenced by the frequency of his 
appearances in The Fold: in brevis, the Leibnizian monad is taken from Bruno, 
principally for its role in the transformation of "Neoplatonic emanations [... ] to a 
large zone of immanence" (Deleuze 1993 24); the supposition of a universal 
parasitism is Brunian; as is the Leibnizian complicatio. 
96 In what is, I suppose, a landmark essay `Modernity-- An Incomplete 
Project' Jürgen Habermas notes the frequency, dating back to the fifth century, of 
the use of the term `modernity' to denote "the consciousness of an epoch that relates 
itself to the past of antiquity, in order to view itself as the result of a transition 
from the old to the new" (Habermas 1985 3. ) 
97 Antonio Calcagno's interesting analysis of Bruno's reads his entire 
philosophy as dedicated to a working out of this identity of unity and multiplicity. 
98 This is a common theme in Nietzsche's work. See in particular the collection 
of aphorisms under this title in Philosophy and Truth, pp. 69-76; and the notion 
that the perfect nihilist, the Nietzschean, pursues the ideal of the great health 
(1974 § 382). 
99 Marx and Engels have a similar critique of Feuerbach in The German 
Ideology, "Feuerbach's `conception' of the sensuous world is confined on the one hand 
to mere contemplation of it, and on the other to mere feeling; he posits 
`Man' 
instead of `real historical man'. `Man' is really `the German'" (1976 48). 
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100 For an account of the role that the rising tide of Spinozist inspired Natur 
philosophie had upon much of Kantianism see Fred Beiser's chapter on `The Rise of 
Spinozism in Germany 1680-1786' referred to above. Zammito's work is also 
indispensable for understanding the role that opposition to Spinozism played in 
inspiring the critical system, and in particular the third critique, again suggesting 
that Kant is principally motivated by a need to combat hylozoism. Zammito goes so 
far as to suggest that it is impossible to understand Kantianism without 
considering this polemic and its political dimensions. 
101 Between the completion of the manuscript of The Book of the Revolutions in 
1530 and its eventual publication, Copernicus vacillated, terrified by the possible 
consequences of the public availability of his book and his neurotic obsession with 
maintaining a Pythagorean secrecy. Like Copernicus, Darwin too vacillated in 
publishing his genuinely revolutionary findings, unlike Copernicus, Darwin was 
genuinely terrified about the social, political and religious conflagration that his 
work might, and did, spark. Darwin's fears are minutely detailed in Desmond and 
Moore's magnificent biography. When Copernicus' book was eventually published it 
came with a preface by the cofounder of Lutheranism, Andreas Osiander, who 
unlike his colleagues, Luther himself and Melanchton, was favourable to 
Copernicanism. There is some historical controversy as to Copernicus' attitude 
towards this preface, indeed it is not even certain that he was in any position to 
read it, as the first printed copy of his book arrived only hours before his death by 
which time his mind had apparently become quite as unhinged as the Earth soon 
would be. The point of this preface, and my sole reason for mentioning it, is that it 
describes the contents of the Revolutions as "hypotheses [which] need not be true 
nor even probable" (the full text of the preface can be found in Koestler 1959 573 n. 
59). 
102 Eroicofurore is the title of one of Bruno's books, the most recent English 
translation of which is that by Paul Memmo entitled Giordano Bruno's The Heroic 
Frenzies, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964). 
103 This quotation has a page reference, rather than a section number as is 
usual with Nietzsche because it is the motto of book five We Fearless Ones' of The 
Gay Science. According to Walter Kaufmann's commentary, this splendid quotation 
comes from the Vicomte de Turenne, the great seventeenth century French general. 
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10' That "Nietzsche was aroused from his dogmatic slumber by Darwin" 
(Kaufmann 1962 142), is a commonplace. But what is less remarked upon is that 
whilst Nietzsche had a long and sustained engagement with Darwin, it is 
substantially a Darwin mediated through the book that Nietzsche called variously 
a "treasure house" and `the most significant philosophical work to have appeared in 
the last hundred years'- Friedrich Lange's History of Materialism. Of the small, but growing literature on the influence, upon Nietzsche, of Lange's astonishing and 
compendious three volume work, I have consulted the work of Stack (1983), and 
Ansell Pearson (1988). 
A detailed examination of the complex set of relationships- Nietzsche and 
Lange, Nietzsche and Darwin- is beyond the scope of the present thesis. However, 
I would like to examine some aspects of the latter elsewhere. Especially worth 
pursuing would be the resonances of Darwin's horrendous realisation that "It is 
absurd to talk of one animal being higher than another [... ] We consider those, 
where the intellectual faculties [are] most developed as highest. -A bee doubtless 
would [use] instincts [as a criterion]" (Darwin quoted in Desmond and Moore 1997 
232) in Nietzsche's diagnosis of nihilism and his coterminous project of 
perspectivism. It might also be pointed out, although not pursued here, that 
Spinoza had advanced an equally radical perspectivism in his polemical letters on 
superstition to Boxel. Spinoza writes "when you say that if I deny to God the acts of 
seeing, of hearing, of attending and of willing etc. [... ) I suspect therefrom that you 
believe that there is no perfection greater than that which is unfolded in the said 
attributes [... ] I believe that a triangle, if only it had power of speech, would say in 
like manner that God is eminently triangular, and a circle would say that the 
Divine Nature is eminently circular" (Spinoza 1966 LVI). One of the principal 
objects of Nietzsche's implacable philosophical scorn is the skin of humanism that 
bounds the dominant traditions of philosophical history, an anthropomorphism 
stretched between Plato and Kant. An anthropomorphism, that Spinoza had 
attempted to banish from his own thought: "All the prejudices I here undertake to 
expose depend on this one: that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, 
as men do, on account of an end" (Spinoza 1985 EI appendix). There is a direct line 
from this Spinozism to Marx's critique of reification. This humanism which grounds 
an instrumentalism ("to `humanise' the world, ie. to feel ourselves more and more 
masters within it", Nietzsche 1968 § 613) towards the cosmos is skewered by 
Nietzschean perspectivism and its speculations upon the possibilities of nonorganic 
perception and the nonhuman senses. Nietzsche writes that "interpretations" by 
different species of animals and insects other "than merely human ones are 
perhaps somewhere possible" (Nietzsche 1968 § 616). The existence of such senses 
is now supported by solid empirical evidence ranging from studies of the deep sea 
fish that can see light at wavelengths well beyond the range perceptible to the 
human (eg. Pain 1999), to the sonic abilities of bats and dogs, and beyond the 
senses to von Uexküll's writing on the temporalities of different organisms ranging 
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from the tick to the tree, to a bacteria. 
The line of thought opened here, has, it can be argued, culminated in, or at least currently arrived at, what Ilya Prigogine has called the end of certainty. In 
Prigogine's interpretation, quantum mechanics, is the apotheosis, and 
actualisation, of the analysis of nihilism and its transvaluation that we have 
developed out of Nietzsche. Prigogine writes that "we are on the eve of the 
`probabilistic revolution', which has been going on for centuries. Probability is no 
longer a state of mind due to our ignorance, but the result of laws of nature" 
(Prigogine 1997 132): we must henceforth confront not a relativity of truth, but a 
truth of the relative. (See Deleuze 1993 20,1985/89 191/147 and Deleuze and 
Guattari 1991/94 55/54,123/130). 
NOTES TO APPENDIX 
105 All notes are my own, excepting numbers 1,17, and 21 which were added 
by the editors of Bataille's Euvres Completes. I have however made an obvious 
addition to note 1. The revised text of this talk, delivered at the `College 
Philosophique' on Monday 12 May 1947, was published as `Sade et la morale' in 
La profondeur et le rhythme, the third volume of the Cahiers du College 
Philosophique. It is reprinted in Bataille's (Euvres Completes VII pp. 445-52. 
The principal reason for including this piece rather than the later article is 
that whilst in the latter Bataille tightens or clarifies some of his formulations, it 
lacks the instructive discussion session that follows the present lecture which falls 
within a crucial period for modern French Sade criticism, that is the appearance of 
a cluster of questions which solidified around the debate as to Sade's responsibility 
for Nazism. On this issue, Deleuze has described Bataille's Eroticism as "a text 
that ought to invalidate all theories relating Sade to Nazism, Georges Bataille 
explains that the language of Sade is paradoxical because it is essentially that of a 
victim" (Deleuze 1989 17). This lecture contains the germ of those ideas. Maurice 
Lever, in his recent biography of Sade, Sade: A Biography, locates the beginnings of 
this "debate" in Raymond Queneau's Lectures pour un front, published in his 
Batons, chiffres et lettres (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), in which the latter writes that 
"the world imagined by Sade and willed by his characters (and why not by Sade 
himself? ) was a hallucinatory precursor of the world ruled by the Gestapo [... ] with 
their horrors no longer confined within a man's head but practised by thousands of 
fanatics. Disagreeable as it may be, philosophies end in charnel houses. " Lever 
notes that this text appeared on "November 3,1945. Six months earlier the Allies 
had liberated Buchenwald. " In the present article, as in his prescient and then 
almost singular disengagement of Nietzsche from Nazism in `Nietzsche and the 
Fascists' (Acephale 2, January 1937). Bataille took a position diametrically opposed 
to that of the bulk of his censorious contemporaries. Bataille's reading of politically 
References 
262 
or ethically "dangerous" texts and authors represents a serious challenge and a 
powerful alternative to the vacuities of the procedures associated with 
deconstruction and its subdisciplines in this respect. Starting out from Bataille's 
approach here, it is apparent that there is substance to be extracted from an 
examination of the panoply of responses generated by the three most prominent 
affaires aires in twentieth century French thought (those focused around Sade, Nietzsche, 
and later Heidegger) that would allow for a more sophisticated, and infinitely more 
productively political approach to the immanence of violence to what is called 
culture than has hitherto been allowed by the dominance of deconstructive concerns 
in these areas. That Bataille played a crucial role in, and took a revolutionary and 
astonishingly far sighted position on, the first two of these affaires, is worth noting 
here, but is, unfortunately, beyond further comment. We can simply note that the 
positions taken by Bataille on Nietzsche and Sade when both were stigmatised and 
anathematised as complicit, beyond the grave, with Nazism by virtually the 
entirety of the French intelligentsia is testimony to the depth and untimeliness of 
his reading, to his absolute disregard for the conventions of intellectual good taste, 
and to his courage in pursuing directions and thought that ran in directions 
absolutely counter to those sanctioned by the moral and intellectual authorities of 
bourgeois France. True to his intentions to live by Nietzsche, Bataille is almost 
alone in that he would escape Nietzsche's castigation of academic philosophy as 
having disturbed noone (see the third section of `Schopenhauer as Educator'). It is 
for the maintenance of a disturbing Bataille that I have translated this piece. The 
questions to be asked are crystallised by what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
have called that reterritorialisation of philosophy on Nazism effected by Heidegger 
of which they write, it is a question of a geophilosophy, of the "constitutive 
relationship of philosophy with nonphilosophy" (Deleuze and Guattari 1990/94 
104). There is not the space here for full exposition but I can only take the 
opportunity to note the path not to be taken, that of the "strangest commentaries 
[... ] complicated and convoluted arguments" that only leave us "still in the 
dark" 
(ibid. ), this is the interlocking set of texts comprising Jacques Derrida's Of Spirit: 
Heidegger and the Question, J-F Lyotard's Heidegger and `the jews', and 
Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe's Heidegger, Art and Politics. What I would suggest is that, on 
this and so many other issues the current `official', Bataille, that inaugurated 
by 
Derrida, is a severely inadequate, and at the very least, domesticated version. 
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107 See Nietzsche, Will to Power (1968) § 676, "We are in the phase of modesty 
of consciousness. " 
107 A critical confrontation here would be with Plotinus, principally his 
statement in The Enneads I. 8 `The Nature and Source of Evil', that "the cause of 
evil is matter. " 
Boa Bataille had begun this characterisation of the figure of Platonism in a 
review article of Simone Petrement's book Le dualisme dans l'histoire de la 
philosophie et des religions entitled `Du rapport entre le divin et le mal' (XI 
198-207). Here he had outlined two of the themes of the current lecture: first the 
notion that for Plato evil lies in "the subordination of reason to the unchaining of 
the passions" (Bataille XI 208); his contention that contrary to Platonism it is not 
reason, but passion that is allied to the divine. This is the basis of Bataille's 
delirious materialism, the location of an "ungraspable horror" (Bataille XI 207) in 
the heart of the sacred. One could also trace this theme through Enlightenment 
progressivism and the subsequent founding assumptions of anthropology. An 
important moment to examine in this regard would be Kant's critique of the 
"despotism of desires" at Critique of Judgement § 83. 
109 See Sade's various arguments that it is imperative to "get rid forever of the 
atrocity of capital punishment, because the law which attempts a man's life is 
impractical, unjust, inadmissible" (Sade 1966/91 493/310), as a principle of the 
Republican, atheist state. In his Libidinal Economy Lyotard notes that "Sade 
clearly says that the death penalty is an infamy because it is a law, that is to say a 
regulation of intensities, whereas murder if it is passionate, would be no more a 
crime than is orgasm" (Lyotard 1993 182). The Sade that Bataille is concerned 
with throughout this lecture is the "Sade who is Spinoza and Lucretius, the Sade of 
`Francais, encore un effort pour etre republicains', a libidinal materialist, the one 
we here desire and desire to sustain" (Lyotard 1993 64). 
110 Sade argues that the the law cannot commit murder "since the law, cold 
and impersonal, is a total stranger to the passions which are able to justify in man 
the cruel act of murder. Man receives his impressions from Nature, who 
is able to 
forgive him this act; the law, on the contrary, always opposed as it is to Nature and 
receiving nothing from her, cannot be authorised to permit 
herself the same 
extravagances: not having the same motives, the law cannot 
have the same rights" 
(Sade 1966/91 493/310). 
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111 This recalls in many ways Nietzsche's coruscating attack on the "weakness 
of the outlines and the dullness of the colours in the picture of modern life" 
(Nietzsche 1983 149). Artaud's looking back to the medieval days of mysticism 
where, as Agamben says, the everyday was not so horribly banal as it is now, but 
was "the speck of impurity around which experience accrued its authority, like a 
pearl" (Agamben 1993,14). Thanks to Catherine Mary Dale for this reference. 
112 There is a discussion of this strange phrase in the question session 
following the lecture, that is, on p. 377 of the French edition. 
113 See Pierre Klossowski's critique of the concept of the general will on the 
basis that "logic then commands that we take the right to exist away from him who 
remains outside the species and is thus necessarily a monster, " in (Klossowski 
1991 125). Sade again "now, would it not be to carry your injustice beyond all 
limits were you to send the law to strike the man incapable of bowing to the law? " 
(Sade 1966/91 493/310). 
114 The phrase used by Bataille here is "une espece de culbute de lui-meme"; it 
is worth noting that "culbuter quelqu'un" means to "fuck somebody over. " 
115 For earlier elements of Bataille's understanding of the relationships 
between immanence and transcendence see Bataille 1992, especially pp. 157-60. 
116 See Bataille, `Attraction and Repulsion I: Tropisms, Sexuality, Laughter 
and Tears, ' in (Hollier 1988 103-12), especially pp. 109-12. 
117 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 1980/87 229/187, and Deleuze 
1968/94 55/37 on this leap. One should also bear in mind the consistent 
appearance of this figure in Bataille's On Nietzsche. 
118 In `Sade et la morale, ' (Bataille VII 448) Bataille makes his point more 
clearly: "This table upon which my hand is resting is as distinctly separated from 
me as could be: the proximity changes nothing. There is as much proximity between 
this table and me as if the table were on another planet. " 
119 See also the `Letter to X, Lecturer on Hegel', that is Alexandre Kojeve, in 
which Bataille writes of the "open wound that is my life, " in (Hollier 1988 90. 
) 
120 Bataille is using this reference in two ways, initially as a play on the table 
whose physical existence he had been interested in earlier, and second as a pointer 
towards the concept of a transcendental table of law. 
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121 The phrase used by Bataille is "sortir de ses gonds, " the expression "sortir 
(hors) de ses gonds" means "to lose one's temper, to fly off the handle. " 
122 In `Sade et la Morale' (Bataille VII 450), Bataille writes "If one loses the 
control that reason had over violence (the sacred), human possibility fades away. " 
123 The audience, of course, would have heard the second sense of "sauter, " 
that is fucking. 
124 The context of this line of argumentation lies in Bataille's reintegration of 
experiences of horror (more broadly, perhaps crudely, the transgressive) within the 
remit of human experience. One of Bataille's most powerful formulations of this 
position runs as follows: "Auschwitz, like the Pyramids or the Acropolis is the 
achievement, the sign of man. Man's image is henceforth inseparable from a gas 
chamber..., " (Bataille XI 226). A further aspect of this lies in Bataille's 
preoccupation with the "what does not yet exist", but in a way that completely 
escapes any dialectic, any truck with teleology, with project orientated doctrines of 
his and our time: his reading of Sade is conditioned by the impossibility of his being 
read without a "vulgar impotence... a pretentious hypocrisy" by those whose 
relationship with Sade "resembles that of primitive subjects in relation to their 
king, whom they adore and loathe, and whom they cover with honors and narrowly 
confine, " (Bataille 111 54). The figure of Sade is central in these two respects to the 
development of Bataille's theory of heterology. For these questions see 'The Use 
Value of D. A. F. de Sade', (Bataille II 54-69). 
125 The complexity of this paragraph lies within Bataille's extended use of the 
leap, le saut, here the suggestion is that contemplation of the moral leaps that 
Sade's characters make puts one into a contagious communication with the 
unknown, the impossible. The strength of this lies in the introduction of hauteur, a 
saut en hauteur is a high jump in athletics. The possibilities offered by a knowledge 
of Sade's work is doubly inscribed on a plane of representation by the overbearing 
weight of the deictic in the final phrase. 
126 `A propos de recits d'habitants d'Hiroshima' (Bataille XI 172-87), a review 
article of John Hersey's book Hiroshima (London: Penguin, 1990). 
127 In `The Use Value of D. A. F. de Sade' Bataille suggests that a post- 
revolutionary society would require, in addition to the economic and political 
organisation, an "antireligious and asocial organisation 
having as its goal orgiastic 
participation in different forms of destruction, 
" he goes on to argue that "this 
organisation can have no other conception of morality 
than the one scandalously 
affirmed for the first time by the Marquis 
de Sade, " (Bataille 11 69). 
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128 On this involution in Kant consider Deleuze's claim that "this is what Kant 
saw so profoundly in the Critique of Pure Reason, at least at one point: the manner 
in which the speculative death of God entails the fracture of the I, the simultaneous 
disappearance of rational theology and rational psychology. " (Deleuze 1968/94 
117/86). 
129 Bataille concludes `Sade et la morale' with a suggestion that might be 
derived from this brief exchange. "In order for words to correspond to my passion, I 
would indeed have to renounce the enchaining, I would have to pass from `discourse' 
to poetry. It is in this sense that Kant's judgment was sound when he made art the 
model of the moral act, since art is the only domain in which the end is identical 
with the means. Bu this is still insufficient: discourse is not raised to the level of 
poetry simply by abandoning lucidity. ' (Bataille VII 452). 
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